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Preface 
Who is this book for? 
In my hopes, this book will interest anyone who wants to encourage 
economic prosperity for all Americans. Prosperity for all requires sufficient 
creation of jobs. Job creation is too important to be left to the federal govern-
ment alone; state and local governments also need to help create jobs. 
If you’re a governor or mayor, how will you create jobs for your con-
stituents? For most governors and mayors, the main job creation policy is 
economic development incentives—business tax breaks or other government 
assistance, which goes to targeted businesses to create jobs in a local area. 
Any concerned voter should want to understand our current incentive poli-
cies—do they make sense as part of our nation’s economic policies? 
But a primary audience for this book is those who design and use incen-
tives: governors and mayors and their staffs, and state legislators and city 
council members and their staffs. How can these policymakers better design 
incentives? How can they avoid excessive incentive costs that threaten other 
budget priorities? 
Another audience is the staff who evaluate incentives: analysts in legis-
lative audit bureaus or executive audit agencies, and researchers within eco-
nomic development agencies. How should they evaluate incentives? What 
are the desired benefits of incentives, which an evaluation should seek to 
objectively measure? What are the possible hidden costs? What evaluation 
methods are reliable? 
Finally, important audiences for this book are those outside the incentive 
policy world who seek to understand incentives and judge their merits: jour-
nalists concerned with state and local government or the local business com-
munity; public interest groups and good government groups; and, of course, 
the public. What information should the public demand from state and local 
governments? How can they tell whether incentives are succeeding or fail-
ing? What should incentives be expected to achieve? How do incentives fit 
into overall state and local economic development policy? 
The policy debate over incentives is full of bad ideas and misleading 
claims. For example, economic developers sometimes mistakenly claim that 
incentives tip every location or expansion decision they touch. Economic 
developers sometimes also mistakenly claim that “incentives pay for them-
selves”—the gain in state and local tax revenue generated from incentives’
job creation is claimed to exceed whatever business tax breaks are handed 
out. 
In this book, I analyze incentives’ benefits and costs with an economic 
model based on empirical evidence. Common claims about incentives are 
xiii 
 
 
 
debunked. For example, incentives don’t tip every location decision of 
assisted businesses; research suggests that typical incentives tip less than 25 
percent of the location or expansion decisions of assisted businesses. Even 
without the incentives, the state or local area would have received at least 75 
percent of these jobs. 
As another example, after one accounts for the public service needs 
caused by job growth, typical incentives do not pay for themselves. Job 
growth yields population growth that increases the need for public services, 
such as expanded roads, more teachers, and police. Such public service needs 
consume over 90 percent of any increased tax revenue. Incentives only have 
slight “fiscal benefits” (fiscal benefits are the increase in tax revenue minus 
the increase in needed public services spending). Such fiscal benefits are not 
incentives’ main benefit. 
If an incentive program is to have benefits exceeding costs, the main 
benefits come from increased earnings per capita of state residents, due to job 
creation pushing up employment-to-population ratios. But were the incen-
tive costs to achieve this job creation too great? What government spend-
ing program was cut or taxes were raised to pay for the incentive costs, and 
what impact would that alternative use of resources have had on the state 
economy? Understanding the job creation effects of incentives requires look-
ing beyond the obvious possible effects on the firms receiving incentives. Job 
creation in a state also is affected by many other state characteristics, includ-
ing government tax and spending policies. 
Economists can be needlessly technical. But the economic concepts can 
be grasped by any interested reader, if clearly shown. That is my goal in this 
book. I seek to clarify 
• what incentives should be trying to do; 
• how best to evaluate incentives’ effects; and 
• how state, local, and federal policymakers can reform incentives. 
With better ideas and evidence, the policy debate over incentives will be 
more productive. If we want to tame incentives so that they are better targeted 
at creating jobs for all, we need to first make sense of incentives. Without 
the right model for understanding incentives, we’re unlikely to make much 
progress in targeting incentives at the right goals. Without knowledge of the 
empirical facts, state and local policymakers are acting blindly. In this book, I 
fill these gaps by providing better ideas and models to understand incentives, 
and by uncovering empirical facts that can guide incentive policy. 
xiv 
  
       
  
Chapter 1 
Why Incentives Are 
Tempting but Problematic 
Are economic development incentives out of control? 
To attract jobs, state and local governments increasingly provide 
targeted businesses with incentives: tax breaks, cash grants, free land, 
free job training. Since 1990, incentives have tripled to $50 billion 
annually. 
Recent incentive offers have escalated: 
• In 2017, Wisconsin agreed to provide tech giant Foxconn with 
incentives of over $3 billion for a new manufacturing plant to 
make flatscreen panels. The Foxconn deal in Wisconsin was 
equivalent to paying Foxconn a wage subsidy of 30 percent 
for 20 straight years. 
• In 2017 and 2018, numerous states competed for Amazon’s 
proposed “Headquarters II.” Several serious offers exceeded 
$7 billion.1 
Having seen what states were willing to offer Foxconn and Ama-
zon, one can easily imagine business incentives mushrooming. Busi-
ness incentives may increasingly inhibit the ability of state and local 
governments to provide public services, such as schools and roads. 
WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK
ABOUT INCENTIVES 
Economic development incentives are tax breaks, cash grants/ 
loans, or services that are 
1) targeted at an individual firm, or some industry or group of 
firms; and 
1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Bartik 
2) intended to promote job growth in a state, or in a local geo-
graphic area that is big enough to be a local labor market.2 
By “local labor market,” I mean an area big enough so that increas-
ing jobs in the area affects job availability for local workers. This size 
criterion requires that the area be big enough to encompass a substan-
tial share of all local commuting flows. A metropolitan area would 
clearly be big enough.3 In contrast, moving jobs from one neighbor-
hood to a bordering neighborhood would not affect job availability 
for workers because few people work in the same neighborhood they 
live in. Policies targeting neighborhoods are usually labeled as “com-
munity development” policies, not “economic development” policies. 
Community development policies may provide important benefits by 
improving neighborhood amenities. But economic development poli-
cies aim at affecting job availability for local workers. Job growth 
only affects job availability for local workers if it affects job growth 
at a larger geographic scale than the neighborhood.4 
Anything that state and local governments do—every tax or 
spending policy, every regulation—might affect job growth. What is 
distinctive about incentives—and what arouses more controversy— 
is targeting individual firms or industries, sometimes called “pick-
ing winners.” Why should a state or local government try to pick 
winners? Can this targeting strategy achieve a higher “bang for a 
buck,” compared to more general policies to promote job growth? 
Or is it doomed to make mistakes, or to be corrupted to help political 
supporters? 
WHY JOB GROWTH? 
But we’re getting ahead of ourselves. First we need to ask: Why 
promote local job growth? What’s wrong with the number of jobs that 
are produced by the private market on its own, without government 
intervention? 
  
 
  
 
 
Why Incentives are Tempting but Problematic  3 
The private market doesn’t produce enough job growth because 
jobs have social benefits: labor market benefits for state residents, and 
fiscal benefits that improve state and local governments’ budget situ-
ations. Private employers ignore these social benefits, and therefore 
do not expand jobs as much as we would like to see in our society. 
Local job growth helps more residents get jobs. This added work 
experience increases residents’ job skills. These greater job skills 
yield long-run benefits: these local residents will have persistently 
higher employment rates and earnings. 
More jobs also increase state and local tax bases, and thereby 
increase state and local tax revenue. Governors and mayors have 
more revenue to work with, without any tax rate hike. 
WHY TARGETED INCENTIVES? POLITICAL REASONS 
But why pursue local job growth with assistance to targeted 
firms? Why not just general policies to encourage local job growth? 
A political reason for incentives is that they are popular. Target-
ing the creation of particular identified jobs—which is what incentives 
do—is rewarded by voters. Voters are more likely to vote for politi-
cians who offer incentives, even if the incentives are unsuccessful.5 
Voters appreciate well-publicized efforts to attract jobs. If a governor 
or mayor can go after a prominent large corporation with an incentive 
offer, why not? At least he is trying; he cares. 
Better yet, the incentives may be long-term, paid for by the next 
governor or mayor. Political benefits now, budget costs later. 
A governor or mayor can use the threat of competition from other 
states and cities to appeal to the minority of voters who are incentive 
critics. She can say, “Look, I would prefer not to offer large incen-
tives, but I have no real choice except to keep up with the interstate 
competition.” 
    
 
 
 
 
4 Bartik 
WHY TARGETED INCENTIVES?
ECONOMIC RATIONALE 
Incentives also have an economic rationale. Targeted assistance 
to some firms may create more local jobs per dollar than more general 
policies, for two reasons. 
First, targeting some firms may increase their job growth more 
than spreading the same dollars over all firms. For example, smaller 
firms often lack information on the latest technology, or on possi-
ble new markets. Government services that provide information for 
small firms may be cheap for the government to provide, yet have 
large effects on these small firms’ growth. Examples of such informa-
tion services for smaller firms are manufacturing extension services, 
which offer advice to small- and medium-sized manufacturers on how 
to improve their competitiveness. 
As another example, some firms are actively considering a new 
location or expansion decision, while other firms have more modest 
ambitions and are content to stay at the same scale. The former group 
of firms is easier to affect via government assistance. 
Second, targeting job creation on some types of local firms may 
have higher multiplier effects, which occur when job increases in one 
local firm lead to job increases in the firm’s local suppliers, or in local 
retailers serving the additional workers. An expansion of an auto final 
assembly plant leads to increased sales and jobs at local suppliers of 
auto component parts. The added workers at the assembly plant and 
the parts suppliers will buy more at local grocery stores and brew-
pubs, increasing these retailers’ jobs. 
Multipliers are higher for firms producing “tradable” goods or 
services. For regional economists, tradable goods or services are 
more than those sold in international trade—they are any goods and 
services that are sold outside the local economy, such as manufac-
tured goods. For example, Michigan auto plants sell cars to Ohio, so 
autos would be “tradable” goods for Michigan even if international 
sales were nonexistent. Nontradable goods or services are sold within 
  
 
 
Why Incentives are Tempting but Problematic  5 
the local economy, such as local restaurants. Helping one local restau-
rant expand will reduce sales and jobs at other local restaurants. This 
local competition reduces the multiplier, perhaps all the way to zero: 
any jobs gained at the assisted restaurant may be offset by jobs lost at 
other local restaurants. In contrast, local manufacturers compete with 
firms elsewhere, so incentives may help these firms gain a greater 
share of the national or even international market. 
Multipliers are also higher in high-tech industries in local econo-
mies that have many other, related high-tech firms.6 High-tech firms 
cluster together, as seen in Silicon Valley. Attracting more high-tech 
firms may help an already-existing local high-tech cluster to grow 
and prosper. 
WASTEFUL INCENTIVES 
Incentives can be wasteful. State and local costs may be large, 
with little local benefit. 
First, many incentives have little effect. As we will review, for 
typical incentives, only a minority of incented firms will be induced 
to alter their location or expansion decisions. Yes, there is competition 
from incentives in other states. But even with this competition, typi-
cal incentives are small enough as a percent of firms’ costs that they 
rarely drive the location or expansion decision. 
Second, multipliers often are smaller than claimed. More local 
jobs will drive up local wages and prices. Increased wages and prices 
will drive away some local jobs, reducing the multiplier. 
Third, most new local jobs eventually go to in-migrants. Local 
job growth drives local population growth. This reduces the job 
opportunities that state residents receive from new jobs. 
Fourth, increased jobs and population will increase public spend-
ing needs. As we will review, these increased spending needs are 
almost as large as the tax revenue gain from a larger state and local 
tax base. Incentives’ “fiscal benefits”—the tax revenue gain minus 
6 Bartik 
the increased spending needs—are slight, and almost always far less 
than the dollar costs of incentives. As a result, incentives do not pay 
for themselves. 
Fifth, the net financial costs of incentives, after netting out fis-
cal benefits, must come from somewhere in state and local budgets. 
Some taxes must be raised or some public spending cut. Either tax 
increases or public spending cuts will hurt the local economy. The 
economic costs of incentives are more than their dollar costs. 
EVALUATING INCENTIVES 
Therefore, in evaluating incentives, everything depends on the 
details: how much in incentives it takes to truly cause a firm to locate 
or expand, the multiplier effects, the effects of jobs on employment 
rates, how jobs affect tax revenue versus public spending needs. Do 
benefits of incentives exceed costs? This depends on the details. 
This book is about those details. What magnitudes of incentive 
effects are plausible? How do benefits and costs vary with incentive 
designs? What advice can be given to evaluators? What is an ideal 
incentive policy? 
Answering these questions about incentives depends on a model 
of incentive effects, which this book provides. First, however, the 
next chapter describes our current incentive practices. How are incen-
tives designed and used by U.S. state and local governments? 
  
 
 
Chapter 2 
A Description of 
Business Incentives 
INCENTIVE TRENDS 
Government incentives for businesses are as American as apple 
pie or Social Security.7 Our current state incentive competition began 
with Mississippi, in 1936. Mississippi’s “Balance Agriculture with 
Industry” program enticed Northern manufacturing facilities to Mis-
sissippi by leasing them land and buildings at low rents, without local 
property taxes.8 Other Southern states followed, and later Northern 
and Western states. 
The incentive competition escalated in the 1970s and after. Why 
the escalation? Perhaps the slowdown in growth of U.S. wages. Gov-
ernors and mayors might have felt pressured to do something to create 
more and better jobs. 
From 1990 to 2015, business incentives tripled (Figure 2.1). Most 
of this tripling occurred from 1990 to 2001. Since 2001, average busi-
ness incentives across the nation have been roughly stable. Some 
high-incentive states, such as New York and Michigan, have made 
incentive cutbacks. Some low-incentive states, such as Wisconsin, 
have made incentive expansions. The 2001–2015 stability suggested 
a temporary political stalemate: proponents and opponents of incen-
tives had roughly offsetting influences. 
But where are we headed now? Recent billion-dollar incentive 
offers to Foxconn and Amazon raise fears that the incentive competi-
tion could once again escalate.9 
7 
  
 
 
 
6%
4%
2%
0%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
8 Bartik 
Figure 2.1 Average Incentive Offer as a Percentage of Firm’s Value 
of Production 
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NOTE: This figure shows average business incentives across U.S. states for firms in 
tradable industries. The present value of the incentive offer over 20 years is calcu-
lated, as a percentage of the present value of the firm’s “value of production,” or 
value-added, over those same 20 years. The particularly large jump from 2000 to 
2001 comes from New York, but the overall increase from 1990 to 2000 is more 
broadly based. 
SOURCE: Bartik (2017a, p. 69, Figure 3). 
INCENTIVES TODAY 
Business incentives today have a total cost of around $50 billion 
annually (Table 2.1).10 
The largest type of incentives are job creation credits: tax breaks 
or cash grants that are either some dollar amount per new job or some 
percentage of the new jobs’ wages. Such job creation credits grew 
from almost nothing in 1990 to almost $20 billion annually today— 
nearly two-fifths of the total of all incentives. Many job creation 
credits are so large because states allow firms to simply keep their 
workers’ personal state income tax withholdings. (The worker still 
gets credited with a payment.) This allows these job creation cred-
its to exceed the firm’s state corporate income tax liabilities, which 
  
A Description of Business Incentives  9 
Table 2.1  Annual State/Local Incentives, by Type of Incentive 
Annual dollars 
Level of government Type of incentives (in billions) 
Mostly state tax credits/cash 
payments 
Mostly local tax breaks 
Subtotal for cash incentives 
(sum of above) 
Mixed federal/state/local 
funding 
Job creation credits 19 
Investment tax credits 7 
R&D tax credits 7 
Property tax abatements 14 
47 
Economic development 
services 3 
Total 50 
NOTE: Figures are in 2018 dollars, updated largely from Bartik (2017a). The cost 
estimates for business services are derived in Bartik (2019). 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
ordinarily limit how much in tax breaks a firm can take. But state 
governments can still claim that firms are not being paid state money 
directly, just keeping some funds they would otherwise pay the state. 
Most business incentives are provided by state governments. An 
exception is property tax abatements, under which local governments 
forgive all or part of a firm’s normal property tax bill for some period. 
Property tax abatements have long been a prominent incentive, going 
back to Mississippi’s completely forgiving property taxes on new 
manufacturing plants. Even today, property tax abatements have an 
annual cost of $14 billion, over one-quarter of the total incentives. 
Other tax incentives include investment tax credits and R&D tax 
credits. Despite the rhetoric about helping high-tech industries, R&D 
credits are a relatively modest incentive compared to others. 
The bulk of incentives are tax incentives, or other cash incen-
tives, over 90 percent or almost $47 billion of the total $50 billion. 
Tax breaks or cash grants are easy to hand out to any firm. 
But some incentives are customized services targeted at individ-
ual firms. Such services total over $3 billion per year. 
One such service is customized job training, at almost $1 billion 
per year. Customized job training programs are typically run by local 
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community colleges and are distinctive in seeking to meet the specific 
training needs of an individual firm. Customized training programs 
are frequently tied to a new facility opening or an expansion. The 
community college works with the firm to design the training pro-
gram and screen job applicants. 
Another such customized business service is manufacturing 
extension, at almost one-half billion per year. State manufacturing 
extension centers are funded by the federal government with supple-
ments from state and local governments and business fees. These cen-
ters mostly work with small and medium-sized manufacturers. What 
these manufacturers receive from extension centers is advice, which 
might be on adopting new technology, or identifying new markets, 
or any other information that might improve the firm’s profitability. 
Some advice is directly provided by center staff; other advice is bro-
kered by the center using networks of consultants at local universities 
or elsewhere. 
Many other customized services go to small businesses in gen-
eral. Such services include entrepreneurship training, small business 
development centers, and business incubators. Potential entrepre-
neurs are provided with training and advice on whether and how to 
start a successful business. Existing small businesses may be given 
training and advice on how to expand. Business incubators may pro-
vide cheap space along with advice and opportunities for networking. 
The federal government funds some of this small business assistance, 
but state governments also provide funding. 
HOW LARGE ARE INCENTIVES?
At $50 billion, current business incentives are both large and 
small, depending on the basis for comparison. 
Compared to state corporate income tax revenues of $48 billion 
annually, business incentives are large.11 They are also large compared 
to overall state and local business taxes paid by assisted businesses. 
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State and local business taxes go beyond state corporate income taxes 
to include the larger categories of state sales taxes on business inputs 
and local property taxes. For the average firm receiving incentives, 
such incentives offset 30 percent of the overall state and local busi-
ness taxes the firm would otherwise pay. 
But business incentives are modest compared to the size of busi-
ness activity. The average business incentive offer is equivalent to 
subsidizing 3 percent of the firm’s wages for 20 years.12 Even rela-
tively modest changes in a state’s wages or worker productivity could 
offset incentives. 
The modest size of incentives suggests that it would be surprising 
to find that average incentives have overwhelming effects in determin-
ing business location decisions. On the other hand, a 3 percent reduc-
tion in wages would be expected to have some effect. To see this, look 
at what it takes for incentives to tip location decisions to a particu-
lar state—call it YourStateName.13 Some firms would have chosen 
YourStateName anyway. YourStateName offering an incentive has no 
effect on these firms. Other firms, without the incentive, would have 
chosen SomeOtherState. These are firms whose location decisions 
can potentially be tipped by YourStateName offering an incentive. 
Whether an incentive will cause the firm to switch from SomeOther-
State to YourStateName depends on the gap in the firm’s profitability 
between SomeOtherState and YourStateName. The average amount 
of this gap, and its range across different firms, depends on how much 
costs and therefore profits vary across states. An incentive offer by 
YourStateName that is 0.01 percent of wages will rarely if ever be 
enough to offset such gaps, as variation across states in wages, labor 
productivity, and other costs will usually cause much larger gaps 
in profits than 0.01 percent of wages between SomeOtherState and 
YourStateName. On the other hand, a 30 percent of wages incentive 
would cause more firms to switch from SomeOtherState to YourState-
Name. (Of course, that might not be a good idea, as the 30 percent of 
wages incentive is 3,000 times costlier than the 0.01 percent of wages 
incentive.) A 3 percent of wages incentive by YourStateName is in
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between; it will tip a few decisions, but many more firms would have 
chosen YourStateName anyway, and even more firms will still choose 
SomeOtherState. 
Business incentives are also modest compared to overall state 
and local budgets. Business incentives are about 3 percent of total 
state and local annual tax revenue of $1.7 trillion.14 Current average 
incentives do not substantially affect overall tax burdens or public 
services. Maybe in some times and places an incentive offer depresses 
public services, but this is not true on average. 
But incentives might become bolder. The Wisconsin Foxconn 
offer was equivalent to subsidizing 30 percent of Foxconn’s wages for 
20 years, over 10 times the current average incentive offer. If business 
incentives were 30 percent of wages, their effects on business location 
decisions would be much larger.15 If business incentives cost $500 bil-
lion annually—30 percent of total state and local tax revenue—either 
households would pay a lot more in state and local taxes, or public 
spending on schools and roads and other local services would suffer.16 
WHICH FIRMS GET INCENTIVES? 
Business incentives mostly go to firms in tradable industries, also 
known as firms in export-base industries. These are firms that sell 
their goods and services outside the state. Tradable industries include 
most manufacturing industries, as well as industries such as software, 
tourism, mining, farming, etc. 
Targeting incentives on tradable-industry firms makes sense. Pro-
viding incentives to firms in nontradable industries amounts to subsi-
dizing some local firms to compete with other local firms. Why would 
a state or local government want to do that? 
Among tradable industries, incentives tend to vary, but not in any 
sensible way that is related to likely incentive benefits. An industry’s 
average incentives are not much correlated with whether the industry 
pays high wages. An industry’s average incentives are not much cor-
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related with whether it is high-tech. For example, among a group of 
31 tradable group industries with data on incentives, by far the most 
high-tech are chemicals manufacturing and computer manufactur-
ing. The R&D spending of these two industries is each over three 
times that of the average tradable industry. But among the 31 tradable 
industries, computer manufacturing is ranked 10th in its average level 
of incentives for the average state, and chemicals manufacturing is 
ranked 24th.17 Their high-tech nature wins them no incentive love. 
This is despite R&D tax credits, which are too small to result in much 
industry targeting. 
Incentives favor large firms. Over 90 percent of incentives go to 
firms with more than 100 employees; such firms are 66 percent of 
private jobs.18 The largest firms benefit most. Wisconsin’s Foxconn 
offer promised annual incentives to this one firm equal to one-third of 
Wisconsin’s total annual incentives to all firms. 
Why favor large firms? There are bad reasons and good reasons. 
Among the bad reasons: governors and mayors know that incentives 
to large firms get the most media attention. Another bad reason: large 
firms are more likely to know about incentives, and more likely to 
have the time and expertise to navigate the application process. But 
there is at least one good reason for favoring large firms: state eco-
nomic development agencies may find it administratively efficient. 
The state government’s administrative costs per job incented are 
lower by targeting large firms: it’s cheaper to deal with a few firms, 
with many jobs at each firm, than to deal with many firms, with few 
jobs at each firm. 
DO INCENTIVES TARGET NEEDY AREAS? 
Incentives vary greatly by state. New Mexico’s incentives are 
about three times the national average. The state of Washington’s 
incentives are less than 10 percent of the national average.19 
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But state variation in incentive offers does not seem to have 
much to do with which states might need jobs more. Indiana’s incen-
tives are twice as high as Illinois’s; the two states are similar in their 
employment-to-population ratio. South Carolina’s incentives are 
twice as high as North Carolina’s, for no obvious economic reason.20 
This lack of targeting seems to cry out for reforms, which I advocate 
in this book. 
The best predictor of a state’s incentives is what it did last year. 
State incentives persist until some governor or legislator makes an 
abrupt change, which may have more to do with politics than eco-
nomics. Political gamesmanship leads to states making incentive 
changes, not changes in the state’s need for more jobs. Each new gov-
ernor needs to mark his territory by tweaking his state’s incentives. 
Within states, most incentives are generally available. There is 
little effective targeting of local labor markets that lack jobs.21 State 
governments, which dominate incentive policy, find it hard to pick 
geographic winners and losers. Each state legislator wants state 
incentives to benefit her district. 
LONG-TERM INCENTIVES 
Policymakers have choices about how incentives are structured 
over time for a new or expanding firm. They can pay incentives only 
in the first years of an investment, or over a much longer period. 
Incentives are front-loaded, to some degree (Figure 2.2). They 
are highest in the first year of a new or expanded plant but persist at a 
high level through the new plant’s year 10. 
Long-term incentives are a problem, for two reasons. First, long-
term incentives may be less effective per dollar. Firms are focused on 
short-term profits. The incentive in year 10 probably doesn’t affect 
location decisions. Why, then, do governors and mayors offer such 
long-term incentives? 
Second, long-term incentives are more likely to be paid by the 
next governor or mayor. This helps explain why governors and may-
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Figure 2.2  Typical State Incentives as a Percentage of a Firm’s Value of 
Production, Various Years after Facility Opening 
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NOTE: This figure shows average state/local incentives for a new facility, in years 1 
through 20 of the new facility’s operation, as a percentage of the facility’s value-
added in each year. 
SOURCE: Bartik (2017a, p. 82). 
ors offer long-term incentives. But this means that incentive decisions 
are being made with inadequate concern for long-term costs. Long-
term incentives offer political benefits now, and future leaders will 
have to figure out how to pay for them. Is it any wonder that this 
political calculation tempts governors and mayors to offer long-term 
incentives that are excessively costly? 
UNDERSTANDING INCENTIVES 
Better targeting and design of incentives requires better evalu-
ation of incentives’ benefits and costs. Evaluation must be based on 
analyzing incentives with a good model. I now turn to a conceptual 
model for how incentives affect a state’s residents. 

  
  
 
 
Chapter 3 
Multipliers and Leakages 
How to Think about Incentives 
How should we evaluate incentives’ benefits and costs?22 That 
depends on incentives’ goals. 
Let’s start with a state perspective. Chapter 7 will consider a 
national perspective. But states are the main actors in the current 
incentive wars. From an individual state’s perspective, what should 
governors and state legislators be trying to do with incentives? 
Presumably, helping state residents. Incentive costs and incentive-
induced jobs affect state residents in many ways. Job growth may 
sometimes harm the environment. More and different people in a state 
may affect the quality of life, in ways both good and bad. 
But incentives’ most important effects are on state residents’ per 
capita incomes—both average per capita incomes and the distribution 
of income across different income groups. I don’t mean to sound like 
an economist obsessed with money, but higher per capita incomes are 
important to peoples’ well-being. 
Furthermore, we know a lot about how job growth affects income; 
how growth affects the local quality of life is harder to measure. Qual-
ity of life effects also may vary quite a bit with the state’s circum-
stances and the particular job creation project. Generalizing about 
quality of life effects may not be feasible. 
Therefore, I focus on how the level and distribution of state res-
idents’ per capita incomes are affected. The reader should keep in 
mind that job growth may also affect a state’s quality of life in other 
ways. Ideally, we would adjust our estimates of income effects for 
these harder-to-measure effects, whether positive or negative. 
So, what is the logic for how incentives affect state residents’ per 
capita incomes? 
17 
   
 
 
 
 
18 Bartik 
MULTIPLIERS AND SPILLOVERS 
Let’s start with the positive. Why might incentives increase state 
residents’ incomes? (Negative costs for state residents’ incomes will 
be considered later in this chapter.) 
To see the effects of incentives, envision the state economy as 
a machine. Incentives are a fuel that can set the machine going. The 
machine of the state economy has various mechanisms that transmit 
the incentives’ fuel into the machine’s output: various goodies for 
the state’s residents. Some of these transmission mechanisms may 
even multiply the effects of the incentive fuel on the machine’s ability 
to produce goodies. Later on, we consider leakages in the machine, 
which slow down the machine and reduce its production of goodies. 
Incentives have several multipliers and spillovers that increase 
state per capita income (Figure 3.1).23 Some incentives will directly 
benefit state residents who own businesses receiving incentives, but 
most incentives go to out-of-state corporations.24 How can helping 
out-of-state corporations ever benefit a state’s residents? 
For most incentives, benefiting state residents requires that the 
incentive induce some local job creation. This job creation could be 
induced in several ways: because of the incentive, a business chooses 
to locate in the state rather than some other state. Or because of the 
incentive, a new business is created that would not have occurred 
otherwise. Or because of the incentive, a business chooses to expand 
in the state, and otherwise that expansion would not have taken place. 
Or because of the incentive, a business retains its current jobs in the 
state, rather than downsizing or closing. In each case, the incentive 
leads to some additional jobs in the state that would not have existed 
in the state “but for” the incentive. 
An economic developer might say: “What I do must have some 
impact. Surely you have to admit that providing tax breaks must have 
some impact on the probability of favorable location and expansion 
decisions made by business executives. The “but for” percentage for 
incentives must be greater than zero.” The “but for” percentage also 
   19
Figure 3.1  A Model of Incentives’ Benefits
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may not be 100 percent, but it is realistic to acknowledge the eco-
nomic developer’s point that it is greater than zero. 
Job creation in the incented firm will have some multiplier effects. 
The incented firm may buy more from local suppliers, which will in 
turn hire more. Workers at the incented firm, and its local suppliers, 
will have more earnings to spend. Some of these workers’ increased 
earnings may be spent at local companies: grocery stores, hardware 
stores, restaurants, gift shops, etc. These local companies may hire 
more employees to distribute their goods and services. If any of these 
purchased goods and services are produced locally (craft beer? local 
farmers? local jewelry makers?), then such local production jobs 
increase. 
If the incented firm is high-tech, and there are many other nearby 
high-tech firms, there may be additional multiplier effects. High-
tech firms often cluster. Why this clustering? High-tech firms such 
as Google steal ideas from one another. Google does so in part by 
stealing workers from other high-tech firms.25 If an incentive induces 
local job creation in a high-tech firm, this additional high-tech firm 
can contribute more workers and ideas to the local high-tech cluster. 
This adds to the productivity of the local high-tech cluster, which will 
encourage other local high-tech firms to start up or expand.26 
The total boost to local jobs, from both incented firms and their 
multiplier jobs, will make it easier for state residents to find jobs. The 
local employment-to-population ratio—the “employment rate”—will 
go up in the short run. Local workers who otherwise would not have 
a job end up with additional job experience. A worker who gains job 
experience will gain job skills. Those added job skills are of many 
types: from my job experience, I learn how to work with industrial 
machinery, I gain self-confidence, I am less likely to get involved 
with alcohol and drugs, and so on. All these added job skills make me 
more employable in the long run. My long-run employment rate and 
wage rate will be higher. 
This job growth will also boost wages for workers in general, 
with more labor demand relative to labor supply. This boost in wages 
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would exceed any increases in local consumer prices; an economist 
would say that local “real wages,” wages adjusted for local prices, 
will increase. Because of both higher employment rates and wages, 
state residents will experience an increase in per capita earnings. 
This increase in per capita earnings is likely to be a higher per-
centage boost in income for state residents who otherwise would have 
low and moderate incomes. Low- and moderate-income Americans 
are more likely to be unemployed, or so discouraged by poor job pros-
pects that they give up seeking jobs. They are also more likely to be 
underemployed, working in lower-wage jobs than they are capable 
of doing. Job creation, by increasing employment rates and wages, 
particularly helps these nonemployed or underemployed Americans. 
An economist would say that the distribution of earnings gains from 
local job growth is likely to be “progressive,” which is simply jargon 
for the income boost being a higher percentage of income for those 
lower in the income distribution. 
Growth will increase housing demand. Higher housing demand 
will boost property values. State residents who own real estate will 
experience a capital gain. 
These capital gains from higher property values are likely to be a 
higher percentage of income for state residents who are higher in the 
income distribution, as higher-income Americans are more likely to 
be homeowners. An economist would say that the distribution of local 
real estate capital gains from job growth is “regressive,” which is sim-
ply another way of saying that the boost to economic well-being is a 
greater percentage of income for those higher in the income distribu-
tion. This regressivity is moderate, as home ownership does extend, 
at lower rates, into lower-income groups. 
(What dominates, the progressivity of earnings gains, or the 
regressivity of property value gains? Stay tuned until the next chapter!) 
The increase in business activity and profits, sales, worker earn-
ings, and property values all will increase various tax bases. Revenue 
for state and local governments will increase, even with no change 
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in tax rates. If nothing else changes, this provides a fiscal benefit for 
state and local governments. 
This fiscal benefit in turn helps state residents. State and local 
governments have more or less binding balanced budget require-
ments—they will use this fiscal benefit to either lower residents’ tax 
rates or increase spending on public services or welfare programs 
that transfer income to state residents. Either way, one could argue 
that state residents’ true incomes per capita, adjusted for govern-
ment policy, will increase. Lower tax rates obviously increase state 
residents’ net incomes after subtracting taxes. Higher welfare ben-
efits also increase state residents’ incomes. Higher public services 
increase state residents’ well-being—which we could view as their 
“real income”—in that they provide state residents with some service 
they value: the roads have fewer potholes, the state parks have better 
and more accessible trails, more policemen and firemen make life a 
little safer. 
In sum, state residents’ incomes increase because of higher 
employment rates, higher wage rates, higher property values, and 
either lower tax rates or higher public services. 
LEAKAGES AND NEGATIVE FEEDBACKS 
But the machine of the state economy has various leakages. 
Incentives’ boost to state per capita incomes is reduced or eliminated 
by several leakages or negative feedbacks (Figure 3.2). 
The “but for” percentage is less than 100 percent. Not all firms 
receiving incentives were induced to locate, expand, or retain jobs 
because of the incentive. Even without any incentives, many of these 
firms would have chosen this state anyway. Many other state and 
local characteristics and national forces affect business decisions— 
local wage rates, skills of local workers, the area’s access to national 
markets, and so on. A typical incentive, which is equivalent to a 3 
percent wage subsidy, will not overwhelm these other forces. 
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Figure 3.2  Adding Incentive Costs to the Model
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24 Bartik 
As mentioned previously, incentives to nontradable firms will 
displace jobs at other local nontradable firms. For firms that sell to 
a local market, their expansion takes away sales and jobs from other 
firms selling to the local market. The new local hardware store cuts 
into the sales of nearby hardware stores. 
One might think that wise policymakers would never provide 
cash incentives to nontradable firms. But incentives are often pro-
vided to business activities that are in part nontradable. Witness gov-
ernment subsidies for sports teams. If we’re trying to increase total 
local jobs, such subsidies make little sense.27 Any expanded jobs at 
the sports stadium in large part come from local residents spending 
more at the stadium. This leaves less local disposable income for 
other local goods and services. Jobs at the stadium and at nearby bars 
and restaurants may go up, but jobs in other neighborhoods’ restau-
rants and bars, and other local retailers, will go down. 
Even for tradable firms, multiplier effects may be less than 
expected. Increased local wages and property prices will increase 
business costs. These increased business costs will cause other busi-
nesses not to locate or expand in the area. For example, high costs in 
Silicon Valley and other high-tech areas may drive away many non-
tech businesses. In addition, these increased business costs may make 
local suppliers less competitive and result in increased use of suppli-
ers outside the local area. 
Increased business costs reduce profits for some businesses 
owned by local residents. Businesses that sell locally may be able 
to pass on increased costs to local consumers.28 But businesses that 
sell nationally have their prices set nationally, so they must absorb 
the business cost increases. A manufacturer in Grand Rapids, Michi-
gan, selling to customers in Chicago or Germany will simply have 
to absorb any higher costs if Grand Rapids happens to experience a 
growth boom. These losses to local business owners tend to be much 
higher for upper-income residents, who are far more likely to own a 
business. 
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Not all the jobs that are created in the state will go to residents. 
Job growth increases population growth. In-migrants will take some 
of the new jobs. 
This in-migration also reduces upward wage pressures. Labor 
supply increases will to some extent offset the increase in labor 
demand. 
Increased population also raises the demand for government-
provided goods and services. In-migrants want good schools for their 
children. New schools will have to be built and additional teachers 
hired to avoid increases in class size. New population creates conges-
tion on roads and other local public infrastructure. If we want to avoid 
increased congestion, we have to spend more on infrastructure. All of 
this reduces fiscal benefits from incentives. 
If state and local governments refuse to increase spending, then 
state residents are hurt in another way—by reduced quality of public 
services through more crowded schools and roads. Increased popula-
tion has costs regardless of state and local policy: policymakers can 
just choose what form those costs take, either increased needs for 
spending or reduced local public service quality. Pick your poison. 
If the combination of incentive costs plus increased tax revenue, 
minus increased spending needs, is on net a negative cost for state and 
local governments, then policymakers will have to keep the budget 
balanced and pay for these costs. Taxes must go higher, or public 
spending lower. Either option may have negative effects on the state 
economy. On the demand side of the economy, higher taxes or lower 
public spending will reduce state residents’ disposable incomes. 
Lower disposable incomes of state residents will reduce demand for 
goods and services, which will hurt some businesses in the state and 
hence hurt their workers. 
Higher taxes or lower public spending may also affect the state 
economy on the supply side. Higher business tax rates may cause 
other firms to avoid locating or expanding in the state. Cuts in some 
types of public spending may reduce the productivity of the state 
economy, and thus reduce state residents’ wages and earnings. Cuts in 
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education and job training may reduce skills of state residents, which 
will reduce their future wages. 
KEY FACTORS AFFECTING INCENTIVE BENEFITS 
What is the likely magnitude of these multipliers and leakages, 
these spillovers and negative feedbacks? How are these magnitudes 
affected by policy? 
“But For” Percentage 
Research suggests the “but for” percentage is usually less than 25 
percent.29 What does this mean? For a new facility location or expan-
sion decision, this means that the incentive tipped the location deci-
sion toward this state only 25 percent of the time or less. The other 75 
percent of the time, the firm would have made the same new facility 
location decision, or same expansion decision, even if no incentive 
had been provided. Another way to put it: even if the state had not 
provided incentives to a firm providing a “Big Number” of jobs, 75 
percent of those jobs would have been created in the state anyway.30 
This low “but for” percentage greatly increases the costs of incen-
tives relative to their benefits. At least 75 percent of the time, incen-
tives are all costs, with no job creation benefits.31 And these incentive 
costs will require increased state and local taxes, or higher state and 
local public spending, either of which will have negative economic 
effects. 
Incentive effectiveness can be increased by making incentives 
more up front.32 Business executives making investment decisions 
have an exaggerated focus on the short run, on what happens to prof-
its in the next few years.33 The incentive provided 10 years from now 
has little effect on tipping the location or expansion decision. By then, 
the executive making the location or expansion decision may be long 
gone. Compared to our typical incentive structure, which continues 
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incentives at a high level through at least 10 years, up-front incentives 
would be over one-third more effective: per dollar of incentive, the 
“but for” percentage would be over one-third higher.34 
Customized services to smaller businesses tend to be far cheaper 
per assisted job. It would be difficult or impossible to provide useful 
services to smaller businesses as big as Foxconn-level wage subsidies 
of 30 percent, or even as big as average business tax incentives. Yet 
even at much lower costs, customized services to smaller businesses 
can have considerable effects. Advice to small business is cheap, 
and—if high-quality—can be effective if used as directed. For these 
customized services, research shows that the ratio of job creation 
effects to costs is plausibly 10 times as great as for cash incentives.35 
In other words, if we reallocated a given dollar amount of our 
incentive budget away from up-front tax incentives to large corpora-
tions, and toward provided customized job training or manufactur-
ing extension services to smaller businesses, we would induce the 
creation of at least 10 times as many jobs. However, at some point 
we might face limitations on how much can usefully be spent on cus-
tomized services to smaller businesses. It might not be as great as 
the total $50 billion incentive budget, although it is plausibly much 
greater than the current $3 billion devoted to such services. Advice is 
useful, but spending 17 times as much on advice is not necessarily 17 
times more useful. 
Multipliers 
Many impact studies done for state economic development agen-
cies estimate multiplier effects of 2.5–4.0. For every job created in 
incented firms, 1.5–3.0 other jobs are created in other state firms; the 
multiplier, or ratio of total jobs created to jobs created in incented 
firms, would then be 2.5–4.0. 
Recent research shows that these multipliers are overstated.36 
These studies’ multipliers typically focus only on the positive impacts 
from increased demand for local suppliers and retailers. These studies 
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overlook negative feedback effects from higher costs: higher costs in 
the state will reduce the state’s competitiveness in attracting business 
growth.37 Negative feedback effects reduce demand-oriented multi-
pliers by at least one-third. 
Plausible state multipliers for most incented firms are around 
1.7–2.0.38 For every 10 jobs directly created by incentives, 7–10 addi-
tional jobs will be indirectly created in the state, after allowing for 
both demand effects, and negative effects of higher costs. 
Multipliers may be higher for high-tech firms in high-tech-
oriented local economies because of cluster effects. Recent research 
suggests that such extra cluster effects are concentrated in the rela-
tively few local economies where high-tech clusters are significantly 
above average size.39 The existing high-tech cluster need not be as 
large as Silicon Valley’s—a high-tech concentration like Denver or 
the Twin Cities is enough to cause higher multipliers. On the other 
hand, out of the approximately 700 local labor markets in the United 
States, only 60 or so probably have sufficiently large concentrations 
of high tech to expect significantly higher high-tech multipliers. 
These are the local labor markets in which the share of employment 
in high-tech industries is at least one-third greater than in the average 
community. Most of these high-tech cluster communities are above 
average in population.40 
In such high-tech cities, the job multiplier for a new high-tech 
firm may be as large as 3.0.41 In contrast, in cities with an average or 
below high-tech sector, high-tech multipliers are no larger than for 
other firms. States may make incentives more efficient by targeting 
high tech, but only for the relatively few high-tech cities—targeting 
high tech does not work if one is building an area’s high-tech sector 
from scratch, or even if one’s high-tech sector is at the U.S. average. 
Not everywhere can be Silicon Valley or a biotech center. 
Multipliers are higher on average if the incentives go to locally 
owned firms. Locally owned firms, compared to otherwise similar 
non–locally owned firms, are more likely to use local suppliers.42 
A locally owned bookstore is more likely than a Barnes and Noble 
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bookstore to use a local accountant. In addition, the incentives will 
increase the profits of local owners, who will spend some of these 
profits locally, further increasing local jobs. The net effect: for two 
otherwise similar projects, the project with incentives going to local 
owners might have a multiplier higher by 5–10 percent, or would be 
2.0 rather than 1.85. 
Multipliers are also higher if the local economy has high rates of 
unemployment or nonemployment. With more available local labor, 
employers are better able to hire locally, which increases the number 
of new jobs created. An economically depressed area, compared to 
a booming area,43 might have a multiplier higher by around 15 per-
cent—in other words, rather than being 1.75, it might be 2.0. 
Who Gets the Jobs? 
In the short run, in the average state’s economy, for every 10 new 
jobs created, 6 jobs increase the employment-to-population ratio and 
4 jobs go to in-migrants. But after five or six years, the proportion 
increasing the employment-to-population ratio declines to 10–30 
percent—for every 10 new jobs, 1–3 jobs increase the employment 
rate for state residents, and the other 7–9 jobs go to in-migrants. This 
change over time is due to increased in-migration effects over time. 
But these effects after 5–6 years seem quite persistent, through at least 
15–20 years.44 
On the one hand, it is surprising to many economists that these 
labor market effects of more jobs are so persistent. A once-and-for-all 
increase in a state’s jobs has long-term effects in increasing state resi-
dents’ employability, which will boost long-run earnings. Good eco-
nomic fortune in the short run alters economic fates in the long run. 
If you add up the increased earnings from a higher employment-to-
population ratio over many years, you end up with a sizable increase 
in lifetime earnings. 
On the other hand, only a minority of new jobs benefit a state’s 
residents. Most new jobs go to in-migrants. These in-migrants are fine 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 Bartik 
people, but they were not the people who paid to finance the state’s 
incentive program. In addition, it is likely that the gain to in-migrants 
is minor—if these new jobs had not been created in this state or local 
economy, the in-migrants could have found jobs somewhere else.45 
It might seem surprising that so few jobs go to the original resi-
dents and so many to in-migrants. What if a new incented firm hires 
all local residents? What needs to be understood is that ultimately, 
new jobs in a state economy must go to either state residents who 
would otherwise not be employed, or to new residents—there is no 
other choice. Mathematically, if one increases state employment, 
either the employment-to-population ratio goes up, or the population 
goes up—or, more likely, some combination of the two. 
In the real world, the way this plays out is that if a firm hires 
state residents who are already employed, this creates a job vacancy 
chain. The new hires create job vacancies at the firms where the 
residents were previously employed. In turn, these firms make job 
hires from some combination of three groups: 1) state residents who 
are already employed, 2) state residents who are not employed, 3) 
in-migrants. Any subsequent hire of state residents who are already 
employed creates another vacancy, which is filled in the same three 
ways. The resulting vacancy chain is terminated only by the hiring 
of either a nonemployed state resident or an in-migrant. Because of 
these vacancy chains, the ultimate impact on state residents’ employ-
ment rates, versus in-migration, depends on many factors in addition 
to whom the incented firm hires.46 We need to consider the hiring 
practices of all the firms that are part of the job vacancy chain. 
How can policy increase the proportion of new jobs going to 
state residents?47 One way is by targeting incentives at places with an 
excess supply of labor: economically depressed areas.48 When a local 
economy’s unemployment rate is high, or its labor force participation 
rates are low, a higher proportion of new jobs go to local residents 
and a lower proportion to in-migrants. In local economies that are 
persistently depressed, compared to local economies that are doing 
well, the proportion of new jobs going to local residents goes up about 
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two-thirds. If the proportion of new jobs going to local residents was 
15 percent in the economically booming local economy, it would be 
25 percent, two-thirds higher, in the economically depressed local 
economy. Why are the local employment rate effects higher? Because 
with more available local residents who are nonemployed, many of 
whom will have competitive job skills, firms all along the job vacancy 
chain become more likely to hire a local, nonemployed resident rather 
than a local resident who is employed or someone from out of state. 
Because of both higher local hiring and higher multipliers in dis-
tressed areas, targeting distressed areas not only has more progressive 
benefits, by helping the nonemployed more, but also has greater eco-
nomic benefits for a state’s economy. (Chapter 4 will have some bot-
tom line numbers.) A state targeting needy areas is like the joke about 
the early Quakers in Philadelphia: they came to do good but ended up 
doing very well indeed. 
Effects on state residents’ employment rates can also be increased 
by policies that encourage incented firms and other firms to hire more 
state residents who lack jobs. State and local governments can use 
carrots or sticks to do this. One possible carrot is providing high-
quality customized job training services. The local community col-
lege can provide training programs customized to firms’ skill needs. 
Those programs can include local residents who lack jobs. Business 
participation in such programs is likely to increase the proportion of 
new hires who are local residents who lack jobs. The ultimate impact 
will be to reduce the hiring of in-migrants, and to make local resi-
dents more competitive in the labor market because of their greater 
job experience. 
Another carrot is offering some incentives that are specifically 
tied to hiring the nonemployed. A problem is that some employ-
ers may be reluctant to hire the unemployed. These employers may 
stigmatize the unemployed as being less-productive workers. For 
example, one experiment showed that if welfare recipients informed 
prospective employers that the employer would receive a subsidy for 
hiring them—which thereby informed the employer that they were on 
  
 
 
 
 
 
32 Bartik 
welfare—then this hiring subsidy actually reduced the chances of the 
welfare recipient being hired.49 
Therefore, incentives to hire the nonemployed are likely to be 
more effective if integrated into job training programs that help screen 
and train the nonemployed, which will help reduce stigma effects. 
Only the unemployed who go through this screening and training 
would be eligible for a hiring subsidy, thereby reducing employer 
fears about the unemployed being unproductive. These job training 
programs also can screen employers. Employers who do not stigma-
tize the unemployed can be recruited and therefore are more likely to 
respond positively to a subsidy for such hiring. Only such recruited 
employers would be offered a hiring subsidy. In the 1980s, Minnesota 
ran such a program on a large scale, with some evidence of success.50 
A stick is accompanying all incentives with a local hiring require-
ment. Because of fears of driving away businesses, state and local 
policymakers tend to use a light tap with these sticks. Some local 
areas, such as Berkeley, have “first source” requirements for firms 
receiving incentives: such firms are required, for entry-level job 
openings, to consider as a first source referrals from local job training 
agencies. Local hiring is not required for all job openings; it is only 
encouraged for some job openings. 
What Is a Local Economy? 
As discussed above, when a local economy is depressed, multi-
plier effects are larger, and a higher proportion of the new jobs go to 
local residents. But what is the size of a meaningful local economy? 
A metropolitan area? A neighborhood? 
The best answer is somewhere between a neighborhood and a 
metropolitan area. A typical U.S. county might be around the right 
size, in terms of land area, to make a meaningful local labor mar-
ket. Research suggests that a significant proportion of the increased 
earnings per capita from increases in job growth within a county will 
occur within that county.51 Some labor market benefits will spill over 
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into surrounding counties in the metropolitan area, but enough bene-
fits will remain in the county for the county’s labor market conditions 
to be meaningfully affected. In contrast, for a city neighborhood, most 
of the benefits of new jobs spill over into surrounding neighborhoods. 
Targeting jobs at a high-unemployment neighborhood does not tar-
get jobs at the neighborhood’s residents. Such targeting might mainly 
increase neighborhood rents, encouraging the neighborhood to gen-
trify and turn over to higher-income residents. 
What if policymakers want to target within a county? They might 
want to target more new jobs for disadvantaged individuals in dis-
advantaged neighborhoods. Such targeting is better accomplished 
through local job training programs or hiring incentives. Just plop-
ping down jobs in a neighborhood is ineffective.52 
Fiscal Benefits 
Incentives may provide state and local governments with some 
fiscal benefits: gains in tax revenue, due to an expanded tax base, 
that exceed the increase in public service needs, due to an expanded 
population. However, these fiscal benefits are usually small enough 
that incentives are unlikely to pay for themselves: the fiscal benefits 
will be less than the incentive costs. 
Fiscal benefits from incentives will vary greatly, based on local 
circumstances. If local roads and schools are already congested, then 
growth will require expensive new infrastructure. If existing infra-
structure has plenty of capacity, these infrastructure costs will be less. 
But on average, increased public spending needs are likely to use 
up at least 90 percent of increased state and local tax revenue. As 
we have discussed, a state’s population growth in the long run will 
likely be 70–90 percent as great as a state’s job growth. State and 
local spending needs in the long run, other things equal, will tend to 
track population growth. (Whether there is excess capacity in cur-
rent infrastructure may push spending needs up or down relative to 
population growth.) Total income in the state will grow along with 
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job growth. State and local tax revenue grows somewhat slower than 
overall state income: state income tax rates don’t go up much with 
income; consumption of goods covered by the sales tax lags income 
growth; property tax revenue increases are often restricted by state 
property tax limitations. Therefore, state and local tax revenue is 
likely to grow somewhat slower than job growth. The net effect is that 
public spending needs will tend to be at least 90 percent of revenue 
growth and may exceed revenue growth if expensive new infrastruc-
ture is needed. 
The upshot of all this is that incentives are not a free lunch—they 
must be paid for. Incentives must be financed in some way, by raising 
state and local taxes, or by cutting state and local public spending. 
Opportunity Costs 
As already mentioned, the higher taxes or lower public spending 
used to pay for the net costs of incentives will affect a state’s econ-
omy in two ways: demand-side effects and supply-side effects. The 
demand-side effects are the effects of higher taxes or higher spending 
on demand by consumers for local goods and services. The supply-
side effects are the effects of higher business taxes or productive pub-
lic services on the supply of capital or labor to the state economy. Of 
all these opportunity costs of paying for incentives, the most impor-
tant, because they are the largest and most persistent, are the opportu-
nity costs of reducing spending on productive public services. 
Demand-side financing effects of incentives are moderate. For 
example, in the baseline model that will be presented in the next 
chapter, paying for the net cost of incentives, after allowing for fiscal 
benefits, via household tax increases offsets about 7 percent of the net 
job creation induced by incentives.53 The intuition is that demand-side 
effects are only temporary. While the incentive is being paid for, the 
added taxes reduce demand for goods and services. But this effect 
is temporary; it goes away after the higher taxes used to pay for the 
incentive are over, whether that takes 5 years or 10 years. And it takes 
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at least tens of thousands in added taxes to reduce demand sufficiently 
to destroy one job.54 In contrast, the induced jobs from incentives, and 
their multiplier effects, are more permanent. A similar argument can 
be made for the demand-side effects of reduced consumer spending 
due to lower public spending: the demand-side effects on the state’s 
economy are temporary; these temporary effects do not count for as 
much as the more persistent effects from incentives. 
Supply-side effects from higher business taxes are more persis-
tent but are modest in size relative to the potential effects of busi-
ness incentives. Most firms paying higher business taxes are produc-
ing nontradable goods and services. Firms in nontradable industries 
base their business activity not on local business taxes but on local 
demand. The number of jobs in fast-food restaurants depends on 
the local population size and its income, not on how much in taxes 
McDonalds pays. 
In addition, many firms are not currently considering any invest-
ment decisions. The average business is satisfied with its status quo 
scale of operations. For those firms, moderately higher business taxes 
will not have the potential for tipping many investment decisions. In 
contrast, incentives target tradable-industry firms that are currently 
making location or expansion decisions. As a result, a given dollar 
amount of incentives has higher job creation effects than a given dol-
lar amount of reductions in general business taxes. 
Furthermore, incentives target firms in tradable industries, which 
have much higher multiplier effects than firms in nontradable indus-
tries. An auto company locating or expanding a plant will create many 
jobs in suppliers and local retailers. Incentivizing a local McDonalds 
to expand or start up a new facility will destroy as many jobs as it cre-
ates by reducing sales at the nearby Burger King. 
But as we will see, the opportunity costs of incentives are large 
if the incentives are financed by cutting productive public spending. 
Axing needed roads or education has large and extremely persistent 
effects in damaging the state economy. This will be explored in more 
detail in Chapter 4. 
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DIFFERENCES FROM USUAL INCENTIVE MODELS 
This model of incentives’ benefits and costs differs greatly from 
commonly used state models. Most states only look at the revenue 
benefits of incentives for state governments. This is incomplete 
even for an analysis restricted to fiscal benefits. It overlooks revenue 
effects on local governments. More importantly, commonly used state 
models overlook effects on spending needs for state and local public 
services. 
For example, the Legislative Fiscal Bureau for the state of Wis-
consin, in evaluating the Foxconn deal, made headlines with its con-
clusion that the deal wouldn’t fiscally break even for the state until 
2042.55 This news was a big political negative for the Foxconn deal. 
But even this negative fiscal analysis was overly optimistic. The 
Fiscal Bureau ignored that the additional jobs and people from the 
Foxconn deal will require additional public services and hence public 
spending. Yet even if we ignore local schools, counties, and other 
local governments, this makes no sense. The state of Wisconsin has 
revenue-sharing programs for local governments. The state pays a 
substantial share of the K–12 school bill. It shares in infrastructure 
costs. A sensible fiscal benefits analysis cannot act as if growth is all 
revenue gain and no expenditure costs. 
Even more importantly, common state models of incentives over-
look economic benefits. States are not businesses seeking to make 
a profit. States do not exist to make money; they exist to serve the 
interests of state residents. These residents are interested in more and 
better job opportunities. It is bizarre to analyze any program aimed 
at increasing job growth, which is pursued to improve residents’
job opportunities, and then to ignore such effects in the benefit-cost 
analysis. 
Commonly used models also explicitly or implicitly assume 
that the “but for” for any incented firm is 100 percent—none of the 
incented jobs, or any substitutes for those jobs, would have occurred 
in the state without the incentives. If one assumes incentives are 100 
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percent successful, is it any wonder that many evaluations of incen-
tives are positive?56 
Economic developers sometimes argue that tax incentives have 
zero costs for the government and state residents. As one economic 
developer said, “It is important to understand that incentives . . . are 
not ‘giving away’ tax dollars, they are just taking away fewer of the 
company’s dollars by reducing some of their taxes for a period of 
time.”57 So, rather than losing tax dollars, we are actually gaining tax 
dollars from the taxes we still collect on this new firm: “For every 
dollar we ‘did not take’ from this company in taxes to incentivize 
them to come to our community we will collect $22 in new taxes— 
new tax dollars that would not exist if they choose to go somewhere 
else.” But that’s the key issue: Is it true that none of these jobs would 
have existed in the state but for the incentives? If three-fourths of the 
incented firms would have located in the state anyway, then those 
incentives are giving away tax dollars that state and local govern-
ments would have otherwise received. 
THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS 
As discussion in this chapter shows, the benefits and costs of 
incentives for a state’s residents are affected by many factors. In the 
next chapter, I report how these factors add up in determining bene-
fits—and what difference is made by specific policies. 

  
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Improving Incentives 
What Can Policymakers Do? 
As shown in Chapter 3, many factors affect incentive benefits. How 
do these all add up? What can policymakers do to increase the incen-
tive benefit-cost ratio? 
To begin, I present a baseline model of incentive benefits and 
costs. The baseline is not The Truth. As we will see, tweaking assump-
tions in the model can significantly change the benefit-cost ratio. 
In this chapter, I use this baseline model for comparison purposes: 
can we significantly improve benefits by reforming incentives? I also 
use the baseline model to show how incentive benefits are typically 
distributed: How are the benefits of typical incentives distributed 
among different types of income, and across different income groups? 
THE BASELINE MODEL 
The baseline model, which I have described in detail elsewhere, 
reflects all the multipliers and spillovers, and leakages and negative 
cost feedbacks, described in Chapter 3.58 The baseline model is a 
model of how a state economy works—how its labor market responds 
to various changes, how its housing market responds, how state and 
local government revenue and spending respond—and how all of this 
affects state job growth and the income per capita of state residents. 
The model uses estimates from research on the magnitude of all these 
factors in a state economy that might alter incentive benefits. 
The baseline model makes the following assumptions:59 
• The incentives analyzed are tax incentives or other cash in-
centives, not services. As mentioned in Chapter 2, cash in-
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centives are over 90 percent of total incentives. The incentive 
program is an average state’s incentive program, with incen-
tives somewhat front-loaded in the first year, but continuing 
at a fairly high level through year 10, as shown in Figure 2.2. 
This incentive package is assumed to have a “but for” per-
centage of about 12 percent—the incentive package induces 
the location or expansion decision in 12 percent of the firms 
receiving incentives. For a typical incentive package, this is a 
plausible incentive effect.60 
• The state’s unemployment rate is assumed to be 3.9 percent, 
which was the U.S. average unemployment rate for 2018.61 
• The effective job multiplier rate for the incented jobs, after in-
cluding negative cost feedbacks, is assumed to be 1.75. In other
words, for every 100 jobs directly created by incentives, a net 
of another 75 jobs are created in the state, resulting in 175 
total jobs. As discussed in Chapter 3, such a state multiplier 
value would be typical for most jobs in a low-unemployment 
local economy. Higher multipliers will occur for high-tech in-
dustries in high-tech areas, or in high-unemployment areas; 
the effects of higher multipliers will be discussed later.62 
• The incentive program, after allowing for fiscal benefits, is 
assumed to be paid for by increases in household taxes. This 
provides a good basis for comparison with other methods of 
financing incentives. 
All these assumptions will be altered when I turn to considering 
different incentive policies. 
This baseline model finds a benefit-cost ratio of 1.52.63 Gross 
benefits are $1.52 per dollar of incentives costs, and net benefits are 
0.52. Considering all effects on state residents’ per capita incomes, 
for every dollar we put into incentives, per capita incomes ignoring 
incentives go up by $1.52. Including incentive costs, net per capita 
incomes go up by $0.52 per incentive dollar. These figures for bene-
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fits and costs are all calculated in what economists call present values: 
future benefits and costs are discounted to their equivalent in dollars 
today.64 
So, incentives pass a benefit-cost test. They’re the greatest thing 
since sliced bread. Let’s charge right ahead and double current incen-
tives from $50 billion to $100 billion. 
Not necessarily. This 1.52 benefit-cost ratio is sensitive to various 
assumptions. 
As just one example, suppose the “but for” percentage is lower. 
Suppose business location and expansion decisions are only half as 
sensitive to business costs as assumed in the baseline model. This 
would yield a “but for” percentage of around 6 percent. Such a 
lower “but for” percentage would be compatible with many research 
studies.65 
With the halved “but for” percentage, the incentive benefit-cost 
ratio drops to 0.92. Benefits are now slightly less than incentive costs, 
so state residents lose, albeit slightly, from this typical incentive 
package. 
My point: a 1.52 benefit-cost ratio is small enough that it doesn’t 
leave much margin for less favorable assumptions, but assumptions 
that are still plausible.66 Nor does it leave much room for variations in 
the benefit-cost ratio due to different state circumstances or different 
incentive program details.67 We might not want to do a hard sell on 
expanding incentives unless we can find an incentive program design 
with a lot higher benefit-cost ratio than 1.52. 
But back to the baseline model. The baseline model reveals some 
typical patterns in how incentive benefits are distributed. 
Distribution across Income Types 
First, consider how incentive benefits are distributed across dif-
ferent income types (Table 4.1). Fiscal benefits offset only about one-
fifth of incentive costs. Under realistic assumptions, incentives rarely 
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Table 4.1  Types of Income Benefits for State Residents, as a Ratio to 
Incentive Costs 
Earnings benefits 1.06 
Property value benefits 0.34 
Fiscal benefits 0.20 
Losses to local business owners from higher costs −0.08 
Total gross benefits (sum of above 4 types) 1.52 
Minus incentive costs −1.00 
Net income per capita increase for state residents 0.52 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
pay for themselves. Property value benefits are slightly higher, at 
about one-third of incentive costs. Property owners should be willing 
to pay a sizable chunk of the costs of incentive programs.68 
But the main benefit of incentives is the resulting increase in per 
capita earnings. Incentives may have modest “but for” percentages 
and multiplier effects on boosting jobs. But more jobs are very valu-
able for a state’s workers. Wage rates go up, as do employment rates. 
Incentives should primarily be considered a labor market policy. 
Incentives boost labor demand. Incentives should be considered along 
with other labor demand and labor supply policies—public jobs pro-
grams, job training, etc.—in debates over how state and local govern-
ments can help workers. Which mix of policies will be the cheapest 
way to boost earnings prospects for different groups? 
Why are the earnings benefits from incentives so much greater 
than other benefits, such as property value benefits or fiscal bene-
fits? The relatively large size of earnings benefits is due in part to 
their persistence. In the short run, more local jobs help the local non-
employed get jobs. Crucially, these short-run effects persist. Short-
run job experience boosts these workers’ skills, and thereby their 
long-run earnings. 
In contrast, the property value gain from a boost to local jobs 
is a one-time capital gain. Fiscal benefits are only a small fraction 
of the earnings gains from growth, as state and local governments 
tax only a portion of any increased income, and these tax revenue 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
 
  
 
  
   
Improving Incentives 43 
gains are offset mostly by increased public service needs from a larger 
population.69 
Distribution across Income Groups 
Second, consider how incentive benefits are distributed across 
different income groups. Incentives boost earnings mainly by boost-
ing employment rates. Of the total earnings benefits in Table 4.1, over 
two-thirds is due to higher employment rates.70 We would expect such 
employment rate increases to be the most valuable for lower-income 
groups, which have the lowest baseline employment rates. 
In this baseline model, the progressive distribution of incentive 
benefits holds true (Figure 4.1). To look at income distribution effects, 
we first rank all households by household income, adjusted for the 
household’s needs based on the number of persons in the household.71 
Figure 4.1  Baseline Income Shares vs. Share of Net Benefits 
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NOTE: Sources and uses of income distribution data are given in more detail in Bartik 
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We then set income cutoffs to distribute households into five 
groups, each with the same number of persons. We look at the pre-
vailing distribution of income across these five income quintiles to 
see what percentage each group usually receives of the total economic 
pie. We then look at what percentage each income quintile receives of 
the net income gains associated with incentives, to see if the percent-
age they receive differs from their usual share.72 
For the households in the bottom one-fifth of the income distribu-
tion, in the prevailing income distribution, such low-income house-
holds have only 5 percent of total household income. But they receive 
16 percent of the net benefits of incentives for household income. 
So, this moderately successful incentive program, with a benefit-cost 
ratio of 1.52, would tend to boost the lowest-income quintile’s share 
of total household income. To put it another way, the percentage boost 
to income for this lowest-income quintile is triple the average for all 
households. 
This progressivity also provides above-average benefits, in per-
centage terms, for the bottom three-fifths of the income distribution. 
In the baseline economy, the lowest three income quintiles get a lit-
tle more than one quarter (28 percent) of the economic pie, yet they 
receive over two-thirds of the increase in net household income from 
incentives. Their percentage boost in income is more than twice the 
average for all households. Research suggests that these bottom- and 
middle-income groups gain the most from increases in local employ-
ment rates.73 
Although incentives are progressive, this progressivity is moder-
ate. For example, welfare and social programs might distribute close 
to 100 percent of their benefits to the lowest-income quintile. Expand-
ing incentives would not be a substitute for expanding social pro-
grams. Financing incentives by cutting welfare programs would be 
unlikely to pay off for the lowest-income quintile.74 Job creation does 
have progressive benefits, but its benefits are more broadly distributed 
than welfare benefits. 
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What is true is that incentive policy, and other labor demand 
policies—if they are successful, in that they have a benefit-cost ratio 
significantly greater than 1.0—tend to do two things: 1) dispropor-
tionately help the lowest income quintile, and 2) disproportionately 
help households up through the middle-income quintile. Incentives 
and other labor demand policies can be progressive, and yet help vot-
ers across a broad range of the income distribution. Politically, this is 
a big plus. 
Many policy debates include discussion about “inclusive 
growth,” by which is meant whether regional or national growth 
includes gains for all groups. Inclusive growth is a buzzword talked 
about by the World Bank,75 the Brookings Institution,76 and numerous 
foundations;77 inclusive growth even has its own Wikipedia page.78 
What Figure 4.1 reveals is that policies that promote local job growth 
tend to be modestly inclusive. This inclusivity is because of local job 
growth to some extent increasing local employment rates in both the 
short run and long run. If local employment rates were unchanged by 
local job growth, then the main beneficiaries would be property own-
ers; this would be “noninclusive growth.” 
The modest inclusivity of local job growth policies is not written 
in stone, impervious to policy design. Local job growth policies that 
target more jobs on the local nonemployed are more inclusive, and 
policies that target fewer jobs on the nonemployed are less inclusive. 
Furthermore, this modest inclusivity can be offset if the incentives 
policy is paid for too regressively; that is, it has much higher percent-
age costs for lower-income groups. Incentive financing is discussed 
later in this chapter. 
WHY AVERAGE INCENTIVES HAVE BENEFITS CLOSE
TO COSTS 
This 1.52 estimated benefit-cost ratio for average incentives 
comes from a model. This model has been explained, but to most 
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readers probably will still be a black box. The model has many mov-
ing parts; it can be hard to understand what generates the results. Can 
any intuition be provided for why average incentives have benefits 
close to costs? 
Here’s a back-of-the-envelope calculation that may be help-
ful to some readers. Average incentives are equivalent to providing 
incented firms with an incentive equal to 3 percent of their wage bill 
for 20 years. The “but for” is around 12 percent, so for the 12 percent 
of jobs that are created, the cost of creating jobs is about 25 percent 
of these jobs’ wage bill (3 percent of the incented jobs divided by the 
12 percent of incented jobs that are induced). If the average multiplier 
is 1.75, then the cost of creating total jobs will end up being reduced, 
by dividing by 1.75, to about 14 percent (= 25 percent / 1.75) of the 
wage bill of the total jobs created.79 So, to summarize the cost side of 
the equation, average incentives, in the assumed low unemployment 
rate environment, will have a cost of around 14 percent of the wage 
bill of the total jobs, with multiplier, that are created. Incentives don’t 
have to pay 100 percent of the wage bill to generate jobs, but they do 
have to pay a significant share. 
On the benefits side, the main advantage is earnings benefits, 
which in turn is mostly due to higher employment rates. In a low-
unemployment environment, the increase in the employment rate 
over time will average around 12 percent of the newly created jobs. 
So, the earnings benefits from higher employment rates in the state 
will average around 12 percent of the wage bill of the total jobs cre-
ated. When one adds in more minor benefits (some wage increases, 
fiscal benefits, property value benefits), total benefits end up being 
modestly greater than total costs. Incentives’ benefits are not close to 
being 100 percent of the new jobs’ wage bill. 
Of course, these different assumptions can be questioned. Per-
haps the “but for” is higher, or the multiplier, or the percent of jobs 
going to local residents. But the baseline model uses estimates that are 
plausible, with backing research evidence. It is risky for policymak-
ers to cherry-pick more favorable assumptions. Far better is reform-
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ing incentives to significantly increase the benefit-cost ratio. Modest 
improvements in the benefit-cost ratio are not enough if incentives 
are to play a significant role in improving state residents’ well-being. 
There are alternatives to incentives that can do much better than a 
1.52 benefit-cost ratio, as we will now discuss. 
AVERAGE INCENTIVES ARE DOMINATED BY
BETTER POLICIES 
A big problem with the modest 1.52 benefit-cost ratio for average 
incentive policies: other policies can do more per dollar to boost state 
residents’ incomes. What other policies? Expanded infrastructure and 
skills development programs, to name a couple. 
Before discussing infrastructure and skills development pro-
grams, I want to provide a perspective on how to consider summary 
ratings of policies, such as cost per job or benefit-cost ratios. Such 
summary ratings deserve consideration in setting policy priorities. 
But they are not the only consideration. 
You don’t necessarily want to always exclusively choose the 
policy with the highest benefit-cost ratio, any more than you always 
want to choose the movie with the best Rotten Tomatoes Rating, and 
never see any movie with just “OK” reviews. Other considerations 
may affect your choice. 
In the case of policy, other considerations include that different 
policies have different effects over time, and benefit somewhat differ-
ent people. For example, some skills development programs, such as 
preschool education, have most benefits decades later. The job cre-
ation from incentives provides benefits immediately.80 In addition, the 
job creation benefits from incentive programs may help a 55-year-old 
worker, who is unlikely to benefit from most job training programs. 
However, benefit-cost ratios and cost per job should certainly be 
strongly considered in setting policy priorities. If BetterPolicy has a 
benefit-cost ratio that is twice as great as GoodPolicy, or a cost per 
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job created that is half as much, a governor or mayor probably should 
avoid cutting funding on BetterPolicy as a way to fund GoodPolicy. 
Also, expanding funding for BetterPolicy will increase income per 
capita. With expanded income per capita, we can increase tax rates, 
and also choose to fund GoodPolicy and still have some income left 
over. So, if infrastructure and skills development programs can have 
higher benefit-cost ratios than average incentive policies, that is cer-
tainly an argument for prioritizing infrastructure and skills develop-
ment policies in creating our state and local economic development 
policies. Let’s start with expanding BetterPolicy, with its higher
benefit-cost ratio, before going on to expand GoodPolicy. 
Infrastructure 
Infrastructure investment—roads, rail, water and sewer lines, 
energy hook-ups, communication networks, environmental clean-up, 
land development—has long been used to promote local economic 
development. From the Erie Canal to the transcontinental railroad to 
California water projects to the interstate highway system to brown-
field cleanup to industrial parks, improving local infrastructure has 
helped attract and grow local jobs. 
Public infrastructure leads to persistent boosts in jobs by lower-
ing private costs. For example, highways lower transport costs for 
both businesses and households, making the area a more attractive 
location. As a result, private investment increases and new jobs are 
created. These new and better jobs develop the skills of local work-
ers. These better skills and higher private investment lead to the area 
having persistent gains in more jobs and better jobs. 
Federally funded economic development programs such as 
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, most active from the 1930s 
through the 1950s) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC, 
most active in the 1960s and 1970s) have spurred regional economic 
development with federal funding of better regional infrastructure. 
TVA invested in electrification, attracting many manufacturing jobs. 
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ARC invested in a regional highway system, which boosted job and 
income growth. 
Based on research, infrastructure investment can be a cost-
effective way to create jobs. Such investment can be more cost-
effective than average incentives. Per job created, some infrastruc-
ture investment has been found to have less than one-fifth the costs 
of average incentives.81 
Skills Development 
Skills development programs—job training or education pro-
grams—can often be a cost-effective way to boost state residents’
earnings per capita. They can have large and persistent effects on a 
person’s earnings. Among those experiencing earnings gains, a suf-
ficient proportion remain in the state for the skills investment to pay 
off for the state economy. 
Skills development programs can have persistent effects on earn-
ings because “skills beget skills,” as Nobel Prize–winning economist 
James Heckman has said. Developing skills now leads to persons 
doing better in later education and training, and in later being more 
successful in getting better jobs, which further develop skills. Skills 
now, higher earnings for a lifetime. 
From past studies of migration patterns, we know Americans are 
less hypermobile than people think. For example, over 60 percent of 
Americans spend most of their working career in the state in which 
they spent their early childhood.82 Even among college graduates, at 
least 50 percent spend most of their career in their childhood state. 
Consider high-quality preschool. Based on research, high-quality 
preschool will increase educational attainment and earnings over the 
entire career for former preschool participants. Most of these increased 
earnings don’t begin to occur for at least 15 years—we’re not send-
ing former preschoolers into the workforce at age 5—but even so, the 
present value of the increase in career earnings is far greater than the 
cost of providing preschool. Suppose we count as benefits only the 
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earnings gains of former preschool participants who stay in the same 
state. In the cost calculation for preschool, we include program costs 
for all preschool participants, including the one-third or more who 
will move out of state. But we throw away in our benefit calculations 
the earnings gains for those persons who participate in preschool in 
Michigan and end up for some reasons moving as an adult to Ohio. 
Despite throwing away these benefits for out-migrants, a high-quality 
preschool program can boost the present value of the increase in per 
capita earnings, for persons who stay in the same state, by over 5 
times the program costs for all preschool participants. 
Other well-designed skills development programs also can have 
high ratios of earnings benefits to costs (Figure 4.2).83 These benefit-
to-cost calculations are from a state perspective: we look only at the 
increase in future earnings of persons who stay in the same state. 
Community college workforce programs can have a ratio of earnings 
benefits in the state, to costs, of over 8-to-1. Increases in public school 
Figure 4.2  Benefit-Cost Ratios for Alternative State Policies 
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spending can have earnings benefits-to-cost ratios from a state per-
spective of almost 5-to-1. High-quality child care can have earnings 
benefit-to-cost ratios from a state perspective of about 3-to-1. Place-
based scholarship programs award college scholarships broadly to 
persons in a particular community and/or graduating from a particular 
high school, usually restricted to colleges in that state. These pro-
grams can have earnings benefits-to-cost ratios from a state resident 
perspective of a little under 3-to-1. 
Multiple skills programs can increase state per capita earnings by 
three to eight times their costs. Average incentives increase state per 
capita earnings by less than twice their costs. If states have additional 
revenues, governors and legislators should put a higher priority on 
fully funding these high-quality skills programs, not additional incen-
tives, at least if those incentives are typically designed incentives. 
Opportunity Costs of Financing Incentives with School 
Spending Cuts 
A big concern is whether incentives in practice are financed by 
reducing spending on programs that are more effective in boosting 
state residents’ earnings per capita. This concern is most acute for 
K–12 spending. As discussed in Chapter 2, over one-quarter of incen-
tives are property tax abatements, which reduce normal property 
tax collections. Given the reliance of public schools on property tax 
revenue, property tax abatements may often lead to some downward 
pressures on school budgets. States also spend a great deal on K–12, 
on average about one-sixth of state general expenditures. State incen-
tives might sometimes impinge on state aid to local public schools. 
If an average incentive package is paid for by reducing K–12 
spending—that is, without the property tax abatements and state 
tax credits, K–12 spending would have been higher by that incen-
tive amount—then the benefits versus costs of incentives dramati-
cally change. The benefit-cost ratio of this average incentive policy 
becomes minus 3.77. For each dollar devoted to incentives, state resi-
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dents’ incomes are reduced by $3.77—and once we account for the 
dollar cost of incentives, income per capita is reduced by $4.77 per 
dollar of incentives. 
Under this scenario, the incentives still create jobs in the short 
run. These short-run jobs have some short-run benefits for boost-
ing state residents’ incomes. But these incentives must be paid for. 
If paid for by reducing public school spending, these spending cuts 
undermine the quality of public schools. The lower quality translates 
into lower future earnings per capita. High school dropout rates may 
go up, and college attendance and graduation may go down, which 
will lower earnings. Among students whose educational attainment 
is unchanged, the lower public school quality may lower their skills, 
which will also lower earnings. In the model, these lower earnings are 
counted only for public school students who stay in the state. Count-
ing out-migrants to other states, the full earnings loss is higher. 
The lower earnings due to lower school spending occurs mostly 
in the long run. We pay for incentives in the short run. These spend-
ing cuts lower the quality of public schools now. But the effects of 
a school’s lower quality on earnings won’t become large for at least 
20 or 30 years, when former public school students reach their peak 
earnings years. 
In the model, poorly financed incentives—paid for by lower 
public school spending—still have net benefits for state residents for 
21 years. But after that, net benefits become net costs. The negative 
effects of cutting school funding end up causing considerable fiscal 
costs for state and local governments, which must be paid for, and put 
additional downward pressure on public school funding. The policy 
causes the state economy to enter a dangerous downward spiral, as 
public school funding cuts lead to lower earnings, which lowers state 
revenue, which leads to further school funding cuts. 
Financing incentives via public school spending cuts is not only 
bad for the overall state economy but also has disproportionate costs 
for lower-income groups. Better public school quality tends to have 
broad benefits. All income groups have children who benefit from 
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higher public school quality, due in part to higher future earnings. 
Because lower-income groups tend to have children with lower pre-
dicted future earnings, any cuts in public school quality have larger 
percentage costs for lower-income groups.84 In the model, financing 
incentives by cuts in public school spending has negative percent-
age effects on all income groups, but these percentage losses are far 
greater for the lowest-income households, the households in the low-
est-income quintile. For the lowest-income quintile, the percentage 
loss is over four times as great as the average household’s loss. 
Assuming 100 percent of incentive costs are financed by K–12 
spending cuts is an extreme assumption. But incentives have net costs 
under less extreme assumptions. Based on some experimentation 
with the model, net incentive benefits turn negative as the share of 
incentives financed by K–12 spending cuts increases from 11 percent 
to 12 percent. 
High-Quality Public Infrastructure and Skills Development 
Programs versus Average Incentives 
Will every infrastructure project create jobs at one-fifth the cost 
of incentives? No. Will every skills development program have earn-
ings benefits of three to eight times its costs? No. 
Infrastructure projects can be boondoggles. An infrastructure 
project can be a bridge to nowhere. Infrastructure costs can be pushed 
up by cost-plus contracts, project delays and redesigns due to undue 
regulatory reviews, and excessive staffing requirements. 
Not every skills development program will develop the needed 
skills. A preschool may fail to achieve good results if it has high 
teacher turnover and poorly trained teachers. A community college 
worker training program may miss the mark if the college staff are not 
attuned to the latest job requirements. 
Quality matters. My comparisons so far in this chapter may have 
been unfair to incentives by comparing average incentives with well-
designed infrastructure and skills development programs, and further 
assuming that these good designs are well implemented. 
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However, these comparisons do show that average-quality incen-
tives have good alternatives: investing in high-quality infrastructure 
and skills development programs. Governors and mayors, in mak-
ing budget choices to advance state and local economic development, 
should prioritize high-quality public infrastructure and skills develop-
ment programs over average incentives. 
BETTER INCENTIVE POLICIES 
But our incentives don’t have to be average. Better policies can 
improve incentives’ multipliers and spillovers and reduce leakages 
and negative feedbacks. I now consider various policy changes to 
reform incentives. Unless otherwise specified, each policy change is 
undertaken separately, with all other factors staying the same. Table 
4.2 summarizes how each policy change affects the incentive policy’s 
benefit-cost ratio. 
Increasing Effects on Incented Firms 
Incentives can be improved by policies that increase their impact 
on incented firms, per dollar of incentives. Tax incentives can be 
made more cost-effective by making more of the incentive payments 
up front. The corporate executives deciding on whether to open a new 
plant or expand an existing plant are focused on the short term. Elimi-
nating incentives that are 10 years out and making those payments up 
front would have greater effects on location and expansion decisions, 
per dollar of cost to the government.85 The model estimates that this 
increases job creation effects per dollar by about 38 percent. Making 
all incentives up front increases the benefit-cost ratio from 1.52 to 
2.13.86 
Up-front incentives face the challenge of what to do if the firm 
leaves sooner than expected. Compared to the usual incentive pack-
age, an up-front package will have already paid out more dollars if the 
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Table 4.2  Benefit-Cost Ratios of Alternative Incentive Policies 
Benefit-
Type of policy reform Description cost ratio 
Baseline Average incentive policy in low- 1.52 
unemployment area, not targeted on high-
tech cluster, financed by household taxes 
Increase effects per $ Up-front incentives 2.13 
on incented firms Business services 16.15 
Increase multiplier High-tech cluster 2.71 
Locally owned incented firms 2.51 
Increase local worker High-unemployment area 3.15 
hiring Job training services 2.03 
Alternative financing Cut K–12 −3.77 
mechanisms for Higher business taxes 1.90 
incentive costs 
NOTE: See text and endnotes for assumptions made. Each policy reform changes one 
feature of incentive design. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
firm unexpectedly leaves. This challenge can be addressed by includ-
ing clawback provisions in the incentive contract. The clawback pro-
visions would specify repayments if the firm leaves early. 
More dramatic increases in the benefit-cost ratio are possible 
with high-quality customized business services. As already men-
tioned, research suggests that, compared to handing firms tax incen-
tives and other cash services, customized services’ effects per dollar 
on job creation are 10 times greater. A manufacturing extension ser-
vice that gives a smaller manufacturer some good advice on targeting 
new markets may have large effects on the manufacturer’s competi-
tiveness, yet the advice is relatively cheap to provide. A community 
college that does a great job of providing skilled workers to local 
firms may persistently improve their competitiveness by far more 
than a one-time cash grant of the same cost. In addition, such custom-
ized services are up-front assistance, which is more salient to business 
decision makers. 
Such high-quality customized business services have a benefit-
cost ratio for state residents of over 16-to-1. Intuitively, the benefit-
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cost ratio of these up-front services increases by about 10 times what 
occurs with baseline tax incentives.87 The local job creation helps 
state residents a lot, compared to these services’ modest costs. 
The limitation policymakers face is that these customized ser-
vices are useful only to a limited clientele of mostly smaller firms 
that are expanding and can use such services. Furthermore, achieving 
such high benefit-cost ratios requires that the government maintain 
these services’ high quality. Scaling up customized services is more 
challenging than scaling up tax incentives. The government can easily 
scale up tax and other cash incentives. Cash is valued by all firms and 
is easy to hand out. 
Increasing Multipliers 
Incentives’ benefits can improve if we increase multiplier effects 
on the state’s total jobs. Multipliers can be increased by targeting 
high-tech firms in cities with high-tech clusters. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, these higher multipliers for high tech will occur 
only in the 60 or so cities with the greatest concentration of high tech. 
In these 60 high-tech areas, each new job in a high-tech firm might 
increase total jobs in the state by three (the high-tech job plus two 
other jobs), up from the 1.7–2.0 multiplier range for more typical 
industries in more typical areas. With such higher multipliers, incen-
tives’ benefit-cost ratio increases from 1.52 to 2.71. 
Multipliers can also be increased by targeting firms with local 
owners, who are more likely to use local suppliers, and who also per-
sonally spend more locally. In addition to modestly increasing the 
multiplier, local ownership also means that the incentives increase the 
income of local residents, not out-of-state owners. Local ownership 
increases incentives’ benefit-cost ratio to 2.51.88 
Increasing State Residents’ Share of the New Jobs 
Incentives’ benefits will improve if more jobs go to state residents 
who otherwise would not be employed. This job share will increase 
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significantly if incentives are targeted at local labor markets (metro-
politan areas or similar areas within which people commute to work) 
that have high rates of nonemployment. In addition to increasing the 
share of jobs that go to the local nonemployed, the greater availability 
of local labor supply will increase the job multiplier. Targeting a local 
economy with unemployment of 10 percent, rather than the baseline 
model’s assumed unemployment of 3.9 percent, increases the benefit-
cost ratio for incentives from 1.52 to 3.15.89 
More jobs will also go to the local nonemployed if state policy 
seeks to encourage firms to do such hiring. For example, if the local 
job training agency does a good job of identifying and training the 
local nonemployed for available job openings, the share of new jobs 
that go to local residents will go up. If at least a portion of incentives 
come in the form of customized job training services, such hiring of 
the local nonemployed may be encouraged by the incentive package. 
The baseline initial percentage of new jobs that go to the local non-
employed is around 55 percent. Suppose we assume that providing 
high-quality job training services for filling new jobs could increase 
this percentage by a factor of 1.50, to a little over 82 percent of all 
new jobs being filled by the local nonemployed. Then the benefit-cost 
ratio for incentives increases to 2.03. 
Why can’t more effective job training do as much to improve 
incentives’ benefits as targeting high-unemployment areas? Based 
on empirical studies of how new jobs are filled, in a local area with 
unemployment of 10 percent, over 97 percent of new jobs in the short 
run will be filled by local residents who otherwise would be nonem-
ployed. In a local economy with 3.9 percent unemployment, it seems 
implausible that local job training policy could reach 97 percent.90 In 
addition, local economies with high nonemployment will have higher 
local job multipliers because of the greater effective labor supply.91 
Financing Incentives with Fewer State Resident Burdens 
As already mentioned, the baseline model assumes that incen-
tives are financed by higher taxes on households. As shown, if we 
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further burden local residents by financing incentives by cuts in pub-
lic school spending, the benefit-cost ratio for incentives changes from 
the baseline 1.52 to −3.77. 
The financial burden of incentives on state residents can be 
reduced by financing incentives with higher overall business tax rates. 
In the model, higher business tax rates have two contradictory effects. 
On the one hand, higher business taxes reduce some private invest-
ment and job growth in the state. On the other hand, higher business 
taxes export some of the financial burden of paying for incentives to 
business owners who live out of state. Which dominates? 
The model suggests that, on net, the advantage to exporting 
business taxes to out-of-state business owners outweighs depressing 
effects on business investment. The benefit-cost ratio for incentives 
increases to 1.90. 
Why do incentives dominate lower business taxes in increasing 
a state’s private sector job growth? As discussed in Chapter 3, incen-
tives are better targeted than lower business taxes, in two ways. The 
first way is that incentives are targeted at tradable goods and services, 
and jobs in these industries have greater effects on boosting local eco-
nomic growth. The second way is that incentives are targeting firms 
that are making investment and job creation decisions. Business tax 
cuts go to many firms that aren’t even thinking about expanding in 
the state. 
Synergistic Effects 
Of course, policymakers can pursue several policy reforms to 
incentives at the same time. Such simultaneous reforms tend to have 
synergistic, multiplicative effects. Increasing multipliers or the jobs 
going to state residents has a multiplied effect if combined with more 
cost-effective business services. The greater initial jobs per dollar 
then yield multiplied greater benefits by being multiplied by a greater 
job multiplier or a greater job share going to local residents. 
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For example, cost-effective business services by themselves have 
a benefit-cost ratio of 16.15. When combined with targeting high-tech 
firms in a high-tech cluster area, the ratio increases to 28.07. When 
cost-effective business services are targeted at a high-unemployment 
local labor market, the benefit-cost ratio increases to 33.02. 
Making a Difference with Incentives 
For incentives to truly make a difference for state residents, 
incentives need to have a sizable benefit-cost ratio. Otherwise, incen-
tives will always have too small benefits to really be more than a 
rounding error in a large state economy. If incentives’ benefit-cost 
ratio is modest, there are better ways of helping boost state residents’
income per capita. 
Average incentives have too many leakages, and too small multi-
pliers, to have large benefits relative to costs. Reforming incentives to 
improve benefit-cost ratios requires finding the key leverage points, 
where a modest change in incentive policy can yield significant effects 
for a much larger state economy. 
A key leverage point is putting limits on tax incentives that are 
too general, which go to all areas and all tradable firms. Incentives 
should be more targeted, either on high unemployment areas, or on 
high-tech firms in high-tech areas. Some of the savings from limiting 
untargeted tax incentives could be used to address another leverage 
point: expanding high-quality services to smaller businesses. Other 
savings could be used to expand nonincentive policies to improve 
earnings, such as high-quality skills development programs. In addi-
tion, limiting the overall incentive budget would reduce the odds that 
incentives end up impinging on public services that promote eco-
nomic development, such as public schools or roads. 
These reforms are much more likely if we have better techniques 
of evaluating incentives, so that policymakers are encouraged to mod-
ify the targeting and design of incentives to be more effective. In the 
next chapter, I turn to the incentive evaluation challenge. 

  
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Are My State’s Incentives Working?
Practical Evaluation Strategies 
for Incentive Programs 
As shown in prior chapters, research around the nation suggests 
what incentive designs work best. But are my state’s incentives work-
ing? This question is asked by state policymakers and voters. 
In recent years, state evaluation of incentive programs has 
increased.92 Thirty-one states now mandate that their incentive pro-
grams be evaluated on some timetable.93 What advice on doing such 
evaluations can be given to state analysts? 
My opening advice: avoid reinventing the wheel. We already 
know a lot about incentives, as described in prior chapters. Some-
times, state evaluators can provide governors and legislators with 
useful information by adapting these national research results to a 
particular state incentive program. 
In addition, the evaluation doesn’t have to use the latest econo-
metrics. Useful information can come from surveys. 
USE A MODEL 
Evaluations should do more than estimate the causal effects of 
incentives on job creation by incented firms. Incentives are only justi-
fied if they benefit state residents. These benefits include effects on 
state residents’ per capita incomes. To see how per capita incomes in 
a state are affected by job creation in incented firms requires a model. 
Such a model, which was outlined in the prior chapters in this book, 
should describe how the state’s economy, labor market, tax revenue, 
and spending needs respond to incented firms’ job increases. 
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To summarize, here are the key elements that must be present in 
a reasonable incentive impact model: 
• An estimate of the job impact of incentives on firms receiving 
them 
• The state job multiplier of the incented jobs 
• What proportion of the total new jobs, after the multiplier, will 
go to state residents vs. in-migrants, and how this varies with 
local economic conditions 
• How job growth and population growth affect state and local 
tax revenue and public spending needs 
• If the incentive is financed by cutting public spending that 
affects the state economy’s productivity, an estimate of the 
economic impact of this spending cut 
Where do states get such a model? Ideally a state would already 
have some econometric model of the state economy and labor market. 
This model should be able to estimate the multiplier and what propor-
tion of jobs go to state residents vs. in-migrants. A state econometric 
model could also be adapted to plug in plausible productivity effects 
from spending cuts. States should also have a fiscal impact model; 
this fiscal impact model should make realistic assumptions about how 
growth affects spending needs for infrastructure and public services. 
Not every model will be suitable, at least without some adjust-
ments. For example, as discussed in Chapter 4, commonly used mod-
els overstate the multiplier by at least one-third. Evaluators might 
want to adjust some models’ multipliers downward by one-third.94 
Alternatively, a state could use some of the parameters outlined 
in prior chapters to get back-of-the-envelope calculations of plausible 
effects of job growth on multipliers, earnings per capita, and the state 
fiscal situation. Or the state could adapt the model underlying Chapter 
4, which is based on a generic state, to its own circumstances. 
But all of this starts with how the incentive affected incented jobs. 
How can a state’s evaluators determine reasonable estimates of these 
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effects? What is the “but for” of state tax incentives? How much does 
it cost in customized business services to create one job? 
EVALUATING JOB CREATION EFFECTS ON INCENTED
FIRMS: THE SELECTION BIAS CHALLENGE 
A state’s evaluators might have some data on job creation in 
incented firms, or on how many incented jobs are created in each of 
the state’s counties. How can an evaluator determine what percentage 
of these incented jobs are a result of the incentives, the “but for” per-
centage? To do so, the evaluator must have some basis for compari-
son—some estimate of what would have happened in a hypothetical 
world without the incentives, to be able to see what the incentives 
have done. This is hard to do. As statisticians and econometricians 
will annoyingly point out, many evaluations are likely to yield esti-
mates of incentive effects that are biased. 
The challenge is that the incented firms and areas are not ran-
domly chosen, but rather for some reason are selected to receive 
incentives. That reason for selection may have its own effects on job 
growth, and bias estimates of the incentives, leading to selection bias. 
There is self-selection bias: firms decided to apply for incentives, or 
more firms in certain areas applied for incentives, or the area decided 
to push incentives more. There is program selection bias: economic 
development agencies for some reason selected these firms or areas. 
Incentives often by design are disproportionately awarded to new 
or expanding firms. If our basis for comparison is all firms, we would 
expect firms receiving incentives to be more likely to expand, given 
that expansion is a criterion for selection. This is positive selection 
bias: even if incentives had no effect, incented firms would be more 
likely to expand. 
On the other hand, suppose we switch the comparison group to 
all firms that expand. In that case, out of all firms that expand, per-
haps firms that have more challenges are more likely to apply for 
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incentives or more likely to be awarded incentives. This is negative 
selection bias: even if incentives had no true effect, incented firms 
might, because of their greater challenges, tend to grow by a smaller 
percentage. 
Incentives for job retention might also have either negative or 
positive selection bias. Compared to all firms, firms receiving job 
retention incentives might be less likely to do well, as they were 
selected because they were at risk of job loss, resulting in negative 
selection bias. On the other hand, compared to other firms that have 
a recent history of job loss, firms receiving job retention incentives 
would be those that selected not to make job cutbacks. This leads to 
positive selection bias: the factors that led the firm to not make job 
cutbacks might cause the incentives rather than the incentive causing 
the job retention. 
Similar selection biases might occur in comparing counties with 
many incented jobs to counties with fewer incented jobs. Positive 
selection bias might occur because counties that grow faster will have 
more new or expanding firms, which will be more likely to receive 
incentives. On the other hand, negative selection bias might occur if 
the state’s incentives target more troubled industries or counties. The 
challenge is that it is difficult to distinguish the true effects of incen-
tives from the effects on county job growth of what types of firms, 
industries, or areas are selected for incentives. 
OVERCOMING SELECTION BIAS 
The perfect incentive evaluation: first, get hold of a time machine. 
Go back in time and eliminate the incentives. Return to the present 
and see how the world differs. Such a parallel worlds evaluation 
would tell us how each firm, county, or person is affected by incen-
tives vs. no incentives. 
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Randomized Control Trials 
A time machine isn’t always around when you need one, so in 
its absence, incentives would ideally be evaluated via a random-
ized control trial. Firms or counties would be randomly assigned to 
either receive incentives or not receive incentives. Random assign-
ment assures that we would expect the treatment group—the incented 
firms or counties—and the control group—the nonincented firms or 
counties—to have the same values of both observed and unobserved 
characteristics on average. As the sample size of firms or counties 
gets larger, this expectation of similar values of both observable and 
unobservable variables is increasingly likely to be realized in the 
observed sample, on average. Therefore, as sample size goes up, it is 
increasingly likely that any differences between the treatment group 
and the control group are due to the incentives, not other variables. 
The randomized control trial is increasingly likely to reveal the incen-
tives’ average effects. 
In my view, randomized control trials by any individual state 
to evaluate incentives are likely to be rare.95 States believe they can 
pick the firms or counties in which incentives will be more effective. 
Randomization eliminates the state’s ability to pick the right firms or 
counties. Incentives also are meant to be perceived by firms as attrac-
tive. Being randomly assigned to a control group is off-putting.96 
Quasi-Experiments 
One alternative to a randomized experiment is a quasi-experiment, 
which indicates a situation where a firm or county receiving more 
incentives is due to factors that, on their own, would not be expected 
to affect job growth. If this is so, the observed association between 
incentives and job growth will reflect incentives’ true causal effects. 
These quasi-experiments are of two types: natural experiments and 
designed quasi-experiments. 
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Natural Experiments 
Sometimes, we are in luck: a quasi-experiment may arise natu-
rally. A natural experiment is where access to the program just hap-
pens to be limited in a way that is not directly correlated with job 
growth. For example, access to an incentive program may vary with 
where the firm is located vs. the office delivering the program, or 
when in the program year the firm happens to apply. If these location 
or timing factors do not have strong job growth effects in their own 
right, the variation in incentive use that is correlated with location or 
time may reveal incentives’ effects. Or there might be some quirk in 
program eligibility rules that leads to otherwise similar firms differing 
in their eligibility for a particular incentive. For example, some firms 
might be ineligible for a tax incentive program because they have 
no remaining business tax liability against which the tax incentive 
can be credited, or because the state has some cap on how much in 
incentives a firm can receive. Or a geographically targeted program 
might be awarded only to a subset of similar eligible areas, and the 
research evidence suggests that prior levels and trends of job growth 
are similar between the successful and unsuccessful applicant areas. 
These examples are not hypothetical. Such evaluations some-
times have been possible: 
• Manufacturing extension services have been evaluated by 
comparing firms receiving such services with otherwise simi-
lar firms that were less likely to receive services because they 
happened to be located farther away from the extension pro-
gram office. This evaluation implies job creation effects per 
dollar of 10 times that of the average tax incentive.97 
• Customized job training programs have been evaluated by 
comparing firms receiving training assistance with similar 
firms that applied late in the fiscal year, after training funds 
were exhausted. This evaluation suggests that such training 
services have job creation effects per dollar of 10 times that of 
the average tax incentive.98 
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• R&D tax credits have been evaluated by comparing firms 
receiving such credits with otherwise similar firms that 
were ineligible for additional R&D credits because they had 
exhausted their state tax liability or reached a cap on the maxi-
mum R&D credits received per firm.99 
• The largest-ever federal regional economic development pro-
gram, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) program started 
in the 1930s, has been evaluated by comparing the assisted 
counties with counties in similar regions that were unsuc-
cessfully proposed for similar regional development program 
assistance, which was mostly in the form of infrastructure 
funding. This evaluation found that TVA was cost-effective in 
creating manufacturing jobs. These manufacturing jobs in the 
TVA region have mostly persisted to the present, many years 
after the TVA’s infrastructure investments were made.100 
These evaluations have achieved reasonably precise and credible 
estimates of incentive effects. (See Box 5.1 for more on the R&D 
credit example.) 
Two limitations should be noted. First, for some programs, sam-
ple sizes may be insufficient to detect the likely program effects. This 
problem depends in part on the sample sizes: how many firms receive 
incentives or how many geographic areas are targeted for economic 
development programs, and how many similar unassisted firms or 
geographic areas are available for comparison. This problem also 
depends in part on the likely program effects. For any given sample 
size, larger program effects on assisted firms or geographic areas are 
easier to detect. 
Second, note that the existence of these credible comparison 
groups—firms or geographic areas that are similar to those receiving 
incentives but do not receive incentives—depends on the program 
being run at less than full scale. Only serving some eligible firms, 
or some eligible counties, would probably be common during a pro-
gram’s early years. So natural experiments may be feasible early on 
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Box 5.1 Evaluation of the Washington State High Technology 
Tax Credit 
Begun in 1994, the state of Washington’s high-technology tax 
credit provided a modest subsidy for R&D spending. The credit 
was limited to R&D spending above typical shares of a firm’s gross 
receipts, and the credit was no more than 1.8 percent of such above-
average R&D spending, with the credit varying by industry, firm cir-
cumstances, and over time. The state annually spent $20–$30 million 
on the credit. Average credits were $48,000 per firm. Around 500–600 
firms annually received the credit, with the average firm having 250 
employees. Half of assisted firms were in the professional, scientific, 
and technical services sector; 20 percent were in manufacturing. 
Using data on firms receiving the credit from 2004 to 2009, a 2012 
evaluation exploited an aspect of the credit that was a natural experi-
ment. First, the credit rate changed for some industries. Second, cred-
its varied over time due to a firm’s tax situation. The credit was non-
refundable, so a firm could not receive a credit if it had no state busi-
ness taxes. In addition, the credit was capped at $2 million per firm. 
The evaluation found a statistically significant effect of credits 
on a firm’s job growth. It took $55,000 in annual credit costs to create 
one job for one year. 
It is unlikely that one job created for one year yields benefits to 
Washington State residents that exceed $55,000. Only a portion of 
new jobs raise the employment-to-population ratio, so new jobs have 
benefits less than the wages paid. 
Based on the findings that the credit was relatively high cost, 
compared to its likely benefits, the state of Washington allowed this 
tax credit to expire in 2015. 
SOURCE: Bartik and Hollenbeck (2012). 
in a program’s history, when they would arguably be most useful. But 
as the program matures and is expanded to full scale, natural experi-
ments may be less feasible. By then, we might hope a natural experi-
ment evaluation has already been done. 
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For example, more recent studies of manufacturing extension 
services have been unable to find a significant effect of the firm’s 
location versus the nearest extension office on the probability of the 
firm receiving services.101 Apparently, manufacturing extension pro-
grams in the United States have succeeded in setting up a sufficient 
number of offices, and have advertised their services sufficiently that 
geographic access is no longer a big barrier to receiving services. This 
is good for program access and program impact, but bad for program 
evaluation. Luckily, in the case of manufacturing extension, an earlier 
evaluation study had already been done, back when the program’s 
geographic access had determined which firms were served. 
Evaluators cannot count on being lucky. Evaluators should look 
out for possible natural experiments (see Box 5.2), but they cannot be 
counted on to be there when needed to evaluate a specific incentive 
program. When natural experiments do occur, they are more likely in 
early program years. 
Box 5.2 Questions to See If a Natural Experiment Evaluation 
Is Feasible 
• Are there unassisted firms or geographic areas that are similar to 
those receiving economic development assistance? 
• Can we explain why some firms or geographic areas received 
assistance from this program and others did not? 
• Is it plausible that the factors explaining who is assisted do not 
directly affect the economic performance of a firm or geographic 
area? 
• Does the program plausibly have large enough effects on economic 
performance for its impact to be statistically detected, given the 
sample size of those assisted vs. unassisted? 
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Designed Quasi-Experiments 
But a quasi-experiment may arise deliberately, from program 
design. An incentives program can be deliberately designed to help 
create a good comparison group for assisted firms or counties. 
For example, in choosing which firms receive tax incentives or 
customized services, a state can base this choice on a quantitative 
scoring system. This scoring system can accommodate whatever fac-
tors the state wants to consider in targeting incentives: likely state 
benefits from the incentive, whether the firm needs the incentive, and 
so on. Firms just above the cutoff may receive incentives, while those 
just below do not. Or firms just above the cutoff may receive much 
higher levels of incentives than those below the cutoff. The key is that 
firms just above or below the cutoff have large differences in incen-
tives received, but firms just above or just below the cutoff are likely 
to be similar on observed and unobserved variables affecting job 
growth, other than the incentives’ receipt. As a result, any observed 
differences between firms just above or below the cutoff are plausible 
estimates of incentives’ true causal effects. 
A similar planned quasi-experiment can be used to create a 
good comparison group for counties (or other geographic areas) that 
receive more incentives. A state could create different tiers of incen-
tive eligibility for different geographic areas. For example, North 
Carolina annually ranks its 100 counties by measures of economic 
distress and divides them into three tiers; each tier has different eligi-
bility for state incentives. Counties just above or below the cutoff for 
receiving a higher level of incentives should on average be similar in 
all observed and unobserved variables affecting county job growth, 
but for the incentive levels. The observed differences in county job 
growth between counties just above or below the cutoff are defensible 
estimates of how incentives affect a county’s growth. 
Among economists, such designed quasi-experiments go under 
the label “regression-discontinuity design,” or RDD for short. Why 
this name? A regression is used to predict how the dependent variable, 
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in this case job growth, varies continuously with some score used to 
determine eligibility for a program. We then incorporate the break 
or discontinuity at some score cutoff in eligibility for the program’s 
treatment, in this case incentives, to identify the causal effects of the 
treatment. 
RDD has been widely used in program evaluations, although not
for incentive programs. For example, it has been used to estimate 
the effects of preschool programs on kindergarten entry test scores.102 
RDD has been shown to give estimates whose quantitative magni-
tudes are similar to randomized control trials.103 
So, RDD can be a great econometric technique. Maybe incentive 
evaluators should catch up with the rest of the program evaluation 
field and use RDD extensively in incentive evaluation? Not so fast. 
For incentives, RDD at the state level has problems with desirability, 
precision, and availability. The desirability issues are most severe 
for RDD with individual firm data, the precision issue is most severe 
for RDD with geographic areas, and the availability problem often 
makes RDD impossible. 
First, on the desirability issue: consider tax incentives to firms. 
Should we have a quantitative scoring system that causes a large, dis-
crete change in tax incentive receipt or magnitude for firms above or 
below some cutoff score? My answer is no. If a firm is 
• in a tradable industry; and 
• is creating jobs in a geographic area with high social benefits 
from more jobs, such as a distressed area; 
then tax incentive policy should encourage job creation in all such 
firms. Social benefits will occur from all such job creation. Perhaps 
social benefits may vary continuously across these firms. So, perhaps 
one should continuously vary the tax incentive with the firm’s wages, 
job multiplier, or investment per job. But the rationale for a large, dis-
crete jump in tax incentive magnitude is lacking. Such a jump helps 
evaluation but does not make sense for how tax incentives to firms 
should be awarded. This big jump in incentives, with a weak ratio-
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nale, is particularly problematic because the incentives may give a 
significant competitive advantage to some firms over others. Unequal 
treatment by the government demands a compelling rationale. 
Consider customized services to firms. For these services, consid-
erable selectivity in who receives services is desirable. Advice is not 
equally useful to all firms. For example, some manufacturing firms 
have problems with the technology they use, or how they market their 
products, that can be readily addressed with good advice, whereas 
other manufacturing firms may not have such problems. 
However, which firms are likely to benefit from customized ser-
vices is hard to capture with a quantitative score. Say you’re a staff 
person for a manufacturing extension service. How are you supposed 
to assign a quantitative score for “how much this firm needs advice” 
to each local manufacturer? The idea is absurd. 
Consider targeting distressed counties. Should we have a quanti-
tative scoring system that causes a large, discrete change in economic 
development programs for counties above or below some cutoff 
score? My answer is yes: not only will this help facilitate more rigor-
ous evaluations, but it makes sense as a way for states to manage local 
economic development assistance. 
The level of economic need may vary continuously across coun-
ties. Deciding which counties to target is to some extent arbitrary. 
But targeting a tier of distressed counties has great symbolic value: 
such an aim clearly communicates expectations to the voters and the 
private sector. In the absence of some arbitrary cutoff for helping dis-
tressed counties, it will be difficult for the public to hold policymak-
ers accountable for targeting, and it will be difficult for the private 
sector to understand the state’s targets. By targeting a most needy set 
of counties, the state can clearly show that it is committed to helping 
reduce the job shortage in these areas, and voters and the private sec-
tor can respond. 
With better information on what areas are being targeted, the pri-
vate sector is more likely to make investment decisions that favor dis-
tressed counties. The voters are better able to judge whether the state 
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government’s plans to help these distressed counties have worked. 
Continuous variation in economic development assistance across 
counties is more confusing than a clear target group. 
Second, an RDD for geographic areas in a single state is likely to 
have some problems of imprecision. An RDD is less precise in esti-
mating impacts than a randomized control trial. To achieve the same 
level of statistical significance as a randomized control trial, an RDD 
would need a sample size at least 2.5 times as large.104 
The intuition for this discrepancy is as follows: a randomized 
control trial would determine who received the “treatment”—which 
in this case is the incentive—by random chance, flipping a coin. An 
RDD must infer from the data, using a regression, how a firm’s or 
county’s job growth is affected as one approaches the eligibility cut-
off for the incentive, from either side. This extra inference require-
ment adds some extra statistical noise or uncertainty to the analysis. A
larger sample size is needed to overcome this extra uncertainty. 
This is a problem because there is a lot of statistical noise in job 
growth for individual firms or counties anyway. By statistical noise, 
I simply mean that there are many unobserved or even unobservable 
variables that help determine whether a given firm or county prospers 
or fails. A firm may happen to get a new contract, a county may hap-
pen to attract a growing firm. There’s a lot of variety in economic 
development fortunes that we don’t fully understand. Variety may be 
the spice of life, but this spice makes it more difficult to get good sta-
tistical precision in estimating the effects of incentives, or indeed any 
other variable, on firm or county job growth. 
So, we may need to have large numbers of assisted and unassisted 
firms, or assisted and unassisted geographic areas, to get good preci-
sion in the estimated effects of tax incentives or customized services. 
Such large sample sizes might frequently be feasible with data for 
individual firms. 
In the case of counties, the situation is worse. Most states don’t 
have hundreds of counties. A single state analysis with cutoffs for 
incentive tiers will often give imprecise estimates of how incentives 
affect county job growth. 
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Geographic areas with cutoffs are more likely to have adequate 
sample sizes with a national sample of counties or other geographic 
areas. But this is only relevant for evaluations done at the national 
level of incentives, which is a separate topic, to be considered in a 
later chapter. Here we are focused on advice to give state evaluators. 
These imprecision problems will not always prevent state RDD 
evaluations of economic development programs. If the program’s 
expected effects are large enough, then even if the RDD estimates are 
somewhat imprecise, it still may be possible to estimate whether pro-
gram effects are statistically significantly greater than whatever stan-
dard is set for the program being successful. For example, if a geo-
graphically targeted economic development program really makes a 
large difference to some geographic area’s job growth, the statistical 
noise in area growth may not prevent an RDD evaluation of this geo-
graphic assistance (see Box 5.3 and Figure 5.1 for an example). 
Third, from the viewpoint of a state analyst, the relevant issue 
is often how to evaluate incentives with the data at hand. Unless the 
analyst has the good fortune that some incentive program has been 
run with active use of a scoring cutoff, with adequate sample size, this 
entire discussion is irrelevant. 
An economist can recommend use of RDD all he wants. But 
if the state’s programs haven’t been designed that way, or the sam-
ple size is low, the economist’s recommendation is no more useful 
than the joke about the economist’s advice about how to open a can 
without a can opener: “First, assume you have a can opener.” If the
can contains rigorous evaluation results, assuming that the RDD can 
opener is available does not magically provide a way to open the
can and get the results. 
Box 5.4 summarizes the questions that must be asked before 
planning an RDD of an economic development program. If all the 
answers are “Yes,” then move forward with an RDD—if you can get 
a can opener, you don’t need to assume one. 
My guess: hell will be converted into a free hockey rink for the 
Detroit Red Wings before the average state will use a quantitative 
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Box 5.3 A Regression-Discontinuity Design County Example 
with Hypothetical Program Effects 
To illustrate the potential—and limits—of RDD, consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical program. We rank the 83 counties of Michigan 
by a distress indicator: the county’s employment-to-population ratio 
in 2007. We imagine that in 2007, an economic development program 
began to assist 60 of these 83 counties. These 60 have the lowest 2007 
employment rate, with 60 being the minimum number that comprise 
half of Michigan’s population. The other 23 counties are unassisted. 
These 60 distressed counties have employment rates of 50.6 per-
cent or lower. As the county breakdown suggests, the distressed coun-
ties have lower average population than the other counties. The state’s 
overall 2007 employment rate was 54.6 percent. 
Suppose this hypothetical program increases average annual job 
growth, from 2007 to 2017, by 2 percentage points. Can RDD detect 
this effect? 
To do this exercise, we take actual 2007–2017 annual job growth 
for each county, and add a fake extra 2 percentage points for the dis-
tressed counties. The evaluation challenge is that counties with a 
higher employment rate might have higher job growth, so distressed 
counties would have lower job growth without the program. 
For RDD, we take some “bandwidth” around the cutoff and esti-
mate how job growth varies with the prior employment rate, both 
below and above the cutoff. Figure 5.1 shows a bandwidth of plus or 
minus 16.4 percent around the cutoff of 50.6 percent. The vertical line 
at 0 represents the cutoff, and the values on the horizontal axis are the 
employment rates of groups of counties relative to the cutoff. 
The two upward sloped lines show that within this bandwidth, 
job growth from 2007 to 2017 tends to be higher in counties with 
higher employment rates. The “jump” in job growth is 2.1 percentage 
points at the cutoff. The standard error of this estimate is 0.8 percent-
age points, so this estimate is statistically significant. Similar estimates 
are obtained for other bandwidths. 
To illustrate the fit, the figure’s points each represent four coun-
ties, where counties are grouped by their 2007 employment rate. Each 
point shows the average 2007 employment rate, and average 2007– 
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Box 5.3  (continued)
 
2017 annual job growth rate, for a group of four counties. Showing all 
83 counties would make the figure noisier. 
RDD can detect this hypothetical effect of 2 percent, but the esti-
mate is noisy. The standard error of 0.8 percent suggests that the pro-
gram effect would have to be 1.6 percent to detect a significant effect 
with Michigan-only data. In the original data, the range between the 
10th and 90th percentile of annual county job growth is from minus 
0.9 percent to plus 1.0 percent. A 1.6 or 2.0 percent effect is large rela-
tive to this variation. 
With data from counties in all 50 states, precision would improve 
by about the square root of the increased sample size, or about seven 
times. With national data, standard errors might be one-seventh of the 
Michigan errors, or 0.1–0.2 percent. We might be able to detect job 
growth effects of 0.4 percent or less. In practice, what would be detect-
able would vary with success measures and the time period. 
Figure 5.1 “Effects” of Hypothetical Job Growth Program in Michigan 
Counties, Estimated Using Regression-Discontinuity Design 
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score cutoff to award tax incentives to individual firms. For incentives 
to firms, RDD is highly unlikely to be a real option. 
For geographic areas, RDD is a more plausible option. Quan-
titative cutoffs have been used in the past to identify geographic 
areas’ needs, by both the federal government and state governments. 
Consider for example federal programs such as the Empowerment 
Zone program of the Clinton administration, or the Opportunity Zone 
program of the Trump administration, or numerous state enterprise 
zone programs. All these programs have based development program 
assistance on the distress statistics of some geographic area.105 These 
past precedents suggest that an RDD evaluation plan might be more 
politically feasible for geographic area programs. 
Box 5.4 Questions to See If a Regression-Discontinuity Design 
Evaluation Is Feasible 
• Is there excess demand for the program’s budget? 
• Is the program able and willing to consistently allocate funds 
among applicant firms or geographic areas using a quantitative 
scoring system? 
• Are the likely program effects “large” relative to the imprecision 
that is expected based on the sample size of program applicants 
and awardees? 
SURVEYS
So, if the econometrically sophisticated methods aren’t available, 
or won’t yield precise enough estimates, what is the state analyst to 
do? What about just asking firms about job creation effects? 
My tribe of economists tends to scoff at just asking people 
about impacts of a public program. Their cynical assumption is that 
frequently everyone has a good reason to lie. But let’s look at that 
assumption more closely for the case of incentives. 
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In the case of tax incentives, or other cash incentives, there are 
good reasons to suspect that surveys of incented firms may yield very 
large exaggerations of job creation effects. All firms will welcome 
getting additional profits by being given tax credits or cash grants. 
Firms will want such programs to continue, even if the program really 
has no effect on job creation decisions. Hence, firms have some good 
reason, from the political interests of the business community, to 
claim greater job creation effects than are true. 
In some cases, a tax incentive or other cash incentive may even 
have a statutory requirement that the incentive not be provided unless 
the location or expansion decision would not have occurred but for 
the incentive. For these programs, a firm that admits that the incentive 
was not needed is at some legal risk. 
Even if the legal risk is slight, the firm may always be at some 
political risk if its response that the incentive was unneeded is 
revealed. Politicians and voters may react adversely to a firm that 
admits to receiving an incentive payment that was unneeded. This 
increase in political hostility might hurt the firm’s prospect of getting 
permits for future expansions, or certainly getting future incentives. 
Having said that, if you can get firms off the record, they will 
frequently admit that the incentives they receive are unneeded. I was 
told by several firms, in not-for-attribution interviews, that the state 
and local incentives they received were irrelevant to their location 
decision. For example, one firm told me that their main location factor 
was the availability of a suitable empty factory near a highway. This 
empty factory near a highway allowed the firm to more quickly open 
the new plant, and this dominated all other location factors. This firm 
received an incentive; it had no bearing on the location decision. 
The problem is, can a state analyst really get such not-for-
attribution admissions for a sufficient number of incented firms? This 
seems doubtful. 
For customized services, surveys of program effects are more 
likely to give useful information. If the service is worthless, the firm 
has no strong reason to lie and claim it was useful. Therefore, the ser-
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vice responses about how the program affected sales, or job creation, 
or other variables, are likely to provide at least a rough indication as 
to whether the program is providing useful services. This is important 
information for a state analyst. Is this particular manufacturing exten-
sion service, or small business development center, or customized job 
training regarded by its clients as a quality program? 
Surveys have been used to give estimates of the job creation 
effects of customized business services. One survey in Illinois esti-
mates that manufacturing extension services have a cost per job cre-
ated of around $20,000.106 The other survey estimates that customized 
job training services in Massachusetts have a cost per job created of 
around $17,000 (see Box 5.5).107 
Are such survey-based estimates accurate? As already men-
tioned, natural experiments suggest that such customized services 
have at least 10 times the effect on firm costs of simply giving the firm 
the same dollars in cash rather than services. If we plug this estimate 
into our model of firm decision making, we end up estimating that it 
takes $46,000 in customized services to create one job.108 This cost 
per job estimate is between two and three times the survey estimates 
for customized services of $20,000 or $17,000 per job created. The 
natural experiment results can be regarded as more rigorous, whereas 
the survey results might be biased because some respondents wish to 
give a positive response to surveys, perhaps because they are grateful 
for the assistance and wish to return the favor. Therefore, the com-
parison suggests that survey results might overstate the job creation 
effects of customized business services by 2- or 3-to-1. 
These results are consistent with another study. The federal man-
ufacturing extension program regularly does surveys to estimate job 
creation effects. Estimates suggest that a little less than one-half of 
this survey-estimated job creation is reflected in additional job cre-
ation in different local labor markets.109 
These findings suggest how surveys of the effects of customized 
business services can be used conservatively. Ask businesses in a 
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Box 5.5 Evaluation of the Massachusetts Workforce Training
Fund Program 
Begun in 1998, the Workforce Training Fund Program provides 
businesses with grants to train their workers, with a requirement that 
businesses match the state grants. The actual training is usually pro-
vided by outside providers, such as community colleges. Annual state 
spending on the program is around $20 million. Grants average around 
$80,000 per employer and typically train about 100 workers, with a 
training period averaging 18 months. The average size of assisted 
employers is around 300 workers. Over three-fifths of grants go to 
manufacturers. 
The evaluation relied on a survey of assisted firms, asking about 
effects of the program on wages of workers trained, and on new hires 
or averting layoffs. The grant cost per job created is around $17,000. 
Half of the job creation is due to new hires, half to averted layoffs. 
The evaluation calculates a rate of return for workers trained, due 
to higher wages alone, of 5 percent, comparing worker wage gains to 
the cost of the grant. The rate of return to firms’ profits is over 16 per-
cent. The study considers effects of the program on both state revenues, 
and state public service needs, allowing for expected in-migration to 
fill created jobs. The annual net gain in state revenue minus public 
spending needs roughly covers the program’s costs. 
NOTE: See Hollenbeck (2008) for the evaluation described in the text box. 
Also see the most recent report for this program: Commonwealth Corpora-
tion (2018). 
well-designed survey about job creation effects. Then divide these 
estimates by three. 
For surveys of the effects of customized services to be most accu-
rate and useful (see Box 5.6), ideally the surveys should be adminis-
tered shortly after the services were delivered and the expansion or 
location decisions were made, as well as directed to someone in the 
firm with knowledge of both decisions. In addition, the survey should 
be distributed and collected by a party independent of whoever runs 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are My State’s Incentives Working?  81 
Box 5.6 Factors Enhancing the Credibility of Surveys of 
Incentive Effects 
• Use surveys for customized services, not tax incentives or cash 
grants. 
• Surveys should be anonymous and administered by an organiza-
tion other than the one running the program. 
• Administer the survey when the services provided are more likely 
to be fresh in the minds of the firm’s managers. 
• Attempt to have the survey answered by those in the firm who are 
most familiar with the services provided. 
• Divide survey-estimated job creation effects by three to be 
conservative. 
the program, and there should be some guarantees that responses 
will remain confidential. We want to reduce the degree to which the 
respondent will for whatever reason want to be known by the program 
for giving favorable responses. This could be because the firm might 
at some future point want to receive additional services.110 
APPLYING NATIONAL STUDIES TO
STATE-SPECIFIC INCENTIVES 
An alternative to an analyst coming up with new state-specific 
estimates for a program is to rely on the consensus of the national 
literature. Why rely on hard-to-come-by estimates using state-specific 
data when there is a national literature with some good estimates of 
how firms respond to costs? 
There is a large research literature on how business location deci-
sions respond to taxes. This research literature suggests that for a 20 
percent reduction in overall state and local business taxes, on aver-
age we would expect a 10 percent increase in business activity.111 
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This translates into such a tax reduction increasing the probability 
of a business location decision from 90 percent to the observed 100 
percent. 
State and local business taxes have typically averaged about 5 
percent of the value of a business’s productive activity, what econo-
mists call the business’s “value-added.” Therefore, if we assume that 
what matters to location decision is costs, any 1 percent reduction in 
costs as a percentage of business “value-added”—which would be 
equivalent to reducing a business’s state and local taxes by 20 per-
cent—would be expected to increase the probability of a favorable 
business location decision by 10 percentage points, from 90 percent 
to 100 percent. 
Applying National Estimates to Tax Incentives 
How might we use these estimated effects of business tax reduc-
tions to estimate the effects of tax incentives? We first assume that 
incentives are simply treated as a cost reduction, as if they are equiv-
alent to a reduction in taxes. We then must somehow compare the 
value of incentives versus taxes, which differ in their timing. The 
research literature estimates the effects of business tax changes that 
are ongoing. As described in Chapter 2, incentives are front-loaded, 
particularly in the first year and the first 10 years. 
Some research exists on how business executives discount the 
future in making investment decisions. Such investment decisions 
would include business location and expansion decisions. This 
research literature suggests that business executives heavily discount 
the future in making investment decisions—that is, their decisions 
focus mostly on the short term. In making investment decisions, 
business executives report using an annual “real” discount rate of 12 
percent.112 Whatever dollar cost reduction is delivered one year from 
now is worth 12 percent less in today’s dollars, even if there were no 
inflation between now and one year from now. (If there were inflation 
of, say, 2 percent, then the discount rate would be 14 percent.) This 
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12 percent compounds over time. As a result, even without inflation, 
a dollar 10 years from now is worth only 32 cents today. 
Why such large discounting? The person at the firm who is mak-
ing the location decision probably won’t be working at the firm 10 
years from now. Stock prices are heavily determined by short-term 
profits. An executive concerned with the value of his stock options 
might be inclined to focus on the short term. 
Based on this information, here is one way for state analysts to 
analyze tax incentives. Take the tax incentive package the state pro-
vides to a firm—some schedule of tax incentives or grants by year 
of the project. Use that schedule to calculate the discounted present 
value of that incentive package, using a 12 percent discount rate. Also 
calculate the discounted present value of the firm’s value of produc-
tion, its value-added, at a 12 percent discount rate.113 Divide one by 
the other to get what average reduction in costs is brought about by 
the incentives. To get the “but for” for the incentive for that project, 
multiply that percentage reduction in costs by 10, based on the busi-
ness tax literature.114 Box 5.7 provides two more specific examples of 
how this methodology can be implemented.115 
Some uncertainty exists in these calculations. Perhaps state and 
local business taxes have lesser or greater effects than the average 
effects from the research literature. Perhaps businesses respond less 
or more to cost reductions from incentives compared to cost reduc-
tions from business taxes.116 Perhaps this particular firm does not dis-
count the future using a 12 percent discount rate. If the analyst wants 
to admit uncertainty, the estimated effects on job creation could be cut 
in half if one is pessimistic, or inflated by one-half if one is optimistic. 
This methodology has been applied to evaluate a Michigan job 
creation grant program. This evaluation found that the program had 
a high benefit-cost ratio under most plausible assumptions (see Box 
5.8). 
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Box 5.7 Two Hypothetical Examples of Using the Tax Research 
to Estimate Incentive Effects 
First, using job figures for the firm receiving incentives, we make 
assumptions about whether these jobs persist. These examples assume 
that the original jobs do not shrink or grow over time. 
Second, we use data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis on value-added per worker in the industry, and make assumptions 
about value-added growth over time. For these examples, I use the 
average value-added per full-time-equivalent (FTE) worker for “trad-
able” industries: $194,000/FTE. For simplicity, I assume no growth. 
Third, we calculate the present value of value-added over time. 
We assume the firm uses an annual discount rate of 12 percent. At that 
discount rate, the present value of value-added is $1.8 million per FTE 
worker. 
Fourth, we calculate the present value of the incentives. I consider 
two incentives: 
1) An up-front job creation tax credit of $20,000 per FTE. 
2) A 50 percent property tax abatement for 10 years. At average 
property taxes, this abatement is worth about $2,300 per FTE 
per year. 
The present value of the job creation tax credit is $20,000. Using a 
12 percent discount rate, the present value of the abatements is $14,500. 
Fifth, we calculate the present value of incentives as a percent of 
the present value of value-added. The job creation tax credit is about 
1.1 percent of the firm’s value-added. The property tax abatement is 
about 0.8 percent of the firm’s value-added. 
Sixth, we assume how sensitive business location decisions are 
to lower costs. The research consensus is that 1 percent lower costs 
increases the probability of tipping that location decision by 10 times 
as much. Based on these assumptions, the job creation tax credit will 
tip 11 percent of location decisions. The 10-year property tax abate-
ment will tip 8 percent of location decisions. 
NOTE: These calculations use the 31 tradable industries in Bartik (2017a). BEA
data is used to calculate value-added/FTE. The database in Bartik (2017a) is 
used to calculate average business property taxes. 
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Box 5.8 Evaluation of the Michigan Business Development 
Program 
Begun in 2012, the Michigan Business Development Program 
(MBDP) has provided $180 million in grants to 239 projects. The 
grants are an up-front subsidy for job creation averaging $7,500 per 
job. About 39 percent of incentive dollars have gone to auto firms, and 
34 percent to other manufacturing firms. 
This evaluation applied a version of the incentive simulation 
model of Chapter 4 to MBDP. This included estimating a plausible 
“but for” and multiplier, and estimating economic effects under differ-
ent methods for financing MBDP. 
The evaluation found a benefit-cost ratio for MBDP exceeding 
4-to-1 if MBDP is financed by higher taxes. If MBDP is financed by 
reducing public school spending, MBDP’s net benefits are negative. 
MBDP’s benefit-cost ratio is higher than typical incentives. This 
higher benefit-cost ratio occurs for three reasons: 
1) MBDP’s incentives are modest, which increases their effec-
tiveness per dollar. 
2) MBDP’s incentives are up front, also increasing effectiveness. 
3) MBDP is targeted at high-multiplier industries. 
The evaluation also considered whether MBDP would pass a 
benefit-cost test if the “but for” effect were significantly less than the 
research consensus. Because of high multipliers and the incentive 
design, MBDP would have net benefits even with a smaller “but for.” 
NOTE: See Bartik et al. (2019) for more details on the example in the text box. 
Customized Services 
We can also apply national estimates to customized business ser-
vices. As mentioned above, we can plug customized services into our 
simulation model, assuming that their job creation effects are 10 times 
that of tax incentives. This yields a cost per job created of $46,000. 
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If this estimate is valid, estimating program effects is simple. 
Determine how much in customized services the program is provid-
ing each year, and divide by $46,000 to get a plausible estimate of job 
creation in incented firms. 
This estimate relies on assuming that the state program being 
analyzed is of comparable quality to the programs being studied in the 
national estimates. The national studies were looking at exemplary 
programs. Perhaps this particular state’s program is of lower quality. 
To be conservative, the analyst might want to do some downward 
adjustment in jobs created. How much? That’s hard to say without 
more knowledge about the quality of the state program. There’s only 
so much one can do without having some specific data or other infor-
mation on the quality of a state program. 
WHAT SHOULD AN EVALUATOR DO? 
As outlined in this chapter, incentives can be evaluated by mul-
tiple methods (see Box 5.9 for summary). How should an evaluator 
decide which method to use? 
If the program hasn’t been set up, see whether it is feasible to 
adopt a randomized control trial or RDD of sufficient precision to 
detect expected incentive effects. Under the RDD, access to the 
incentive program by firms or geographic areas would be based on 
some quantitative scoring system. The program would be evaluated 
by using RDD estimation techniques to see how firm or geographic 
area performance compared just below or just above this quantitative 
score cutoff. 
If the program has already been conducted, see if a natural 
experiment occurred. That is, were there some firms or geographic 
areas that received program assistance, and other similar firms or geo-
graphic areas that did not receive assistance? If the reason that some 
firms or geographic areas were unassisted would not be expected to 
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Box 5.9 Summary of Evaluation Options for State Incentive 
Programs 
• Randomized control trial: firms or geographic areas are randomly 
assigned to receive assistance. 
• Regression-discontinuity design: a quantitative score cutoff is used 
to assign assistance to firms or geographic areas. 
• Natural experiment: use unassisted firms or geographic areas for 
comparison, with reason to believe that who was assisted was due 
to factors with no direct effect on the success of firms or geographic 
areas. 
• For tax incentives, use national estimates of how business taxes 
affect location or expansion decisions to infer plausible effects. 
• For customized business services, use surveys to estimate job cre-
ation effects and divide by three to get conservative estimates. 
• For customized business services, use national estimates of a cost 
per job created of $46,000, but consider adjusting downward based 
on relative quality of this particular state’s program. 
predict subsequent economic success of the firm or geographic area, 
then the similar firms or geographic areas can be used as a compari-
son group to evaluate the incentive program. 
If such rigorous evaluation techniques are infeasible, other eval-
uation methods must be used. A feasible alternative for tax incen-
tives is using national estimates, combined with state-and-program-
specific calculations of how much this particular state incentive pro-
gram reduces business costs, to estimate the “but for.” 
A feasible alternative for customized business services is to sur-
vey these services’ users. A conservative usage of surveys would 
scale down these survey estimates of job creation due to customized 
services to account for overoptimism. The research evidence suggests 
that dividing the survey-projected job creation by three might be a 
reasonably conservative approach. 
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If no survey evidence is available on a state’s customized busi-
ness services, we might be able to rely on prior research on high-
quality business services. If the analyst has some independent infor-
mation suggesting that the customized business services are of high 
quality, the program’s expenditures could be divided by $46,000 (in 
2018 dollars) to determine job creation in assisted firms. These job 
creation effects should be adjusted downward if the analyst believes 
that this particular state program might be of lower quality than the 
national programs studied. 
Either for tax incentives or customized services, the estimated 
effects on incented firms should be inserted into a model of the state 
economy to estimate incentive benefits vs. costs. This is feasible to 
do. The above-mentioned studies, of the Michigan Business Devel-
opment Program and the Massachusetts Workforce Training Fund, 
provide two examples. Each of these studies used their initial job cre-
ation estimates, and economic and fiscal models, to estimate these 
programs’ benefits. 
WE ALREADY KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT
IDEAL POLICIES 
But even without any new evaluation evidence, we already know 
a lot about incentive benefits and costs, as detailed in prior chapters. 
Based on this evidence, what is an ideal state incentive policy? The 
next chapter outlines such an ideal. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
An Ideal State Incentive 
Program, Taking Account of 
Economic and Political Realities 
Given what we know about incentives, what state incentive pro-
gram makes sense for governors and legislators? 
A state incentive program’s design should maximize net eco-
nomic benefits for state residents’ per capita income. But the incen-
tive program’s design should also minimize the temptations for state 
politicians to direct the program to achieve their own political goals, 
rather than the interests of state residents. Designing an ideal state 
program requires considering both economics and politics. 
PRINCIPLES 
For both economic and political reasons, a state’s incentive pro-
gram should be guided by the following principles: 
• Target firms in tradable industries in distressed areas, and 
firms in high-tech tradable industries in a few high-tech 
cluster areas. Incentives should not go to locally oriented 
firms that compete with other firms in the same state, but rather
to firms in tradable industries, which compete in national or 
international markets. As described in Chapter 4, state resi-
dents benefit far more from incentive programs that target dis-
tressed areas or high-tech industries in areas that already have 
a significant high-tech cluster. New jobs in distressed areas, 
with an ample supply of workers lacking jobs, will be more 
likely to go to state residents. The expansion of high-tech 
firms in an area with a significantly above-average high-tech 
89 
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cluster will have higher job multiplier effects that will create 
more jobs in local suppliers and retailers. As noted previously, 
such high-tech cluster communities comprise about 60 or so 
of the roughly 700 local labor markets in the U.S. Do not con-
fuse high-tech aspirations with current realities! 
• Emphasize customized business services more, business 
tax incentives less. Customized business services have more 
job creation effects per dollar than business tax incentives (see 
Chapters 3 and 4). The political demand for customized busi-
ness services is more limited, compared to business tax incen-
tives. All businesses will always demand more business tax 
incentives or other cash, even if the incentives do not alter 
business’s decisions about job creation. Customized business 
services only benefit a more limited number of mostly smaller 
businesses that need such services, and are only demanded if 
the services have some usefulness. 
• Structure incentives to limit the temptation to provide 
excessive long-term incentives to large corporations. Up-
front incentives have a higher benefit-cost ratio (see Chapter 
4). If the state’s rule is that the term of incentives must be 
limited, governors will be less tempted to strike deals that are 
excessive, as they will have to immediately deal with incen-
tives’ budget costs. Mega-deals with large corporations are 
politically tempting for governors because of the publicity. 
But incentives for smaller businesses can be at least as effec-
tive at actually creating jobs. 
• Finance incentives by higher business taxes, not by cutting 
public spending that promotes economic development. 
Incentive design and budgeting procedure should minimize 
the risk that incentives reduce spending on programs that pro-
mote economic development, such as public schools. Ideally, 
a state’s choice to devote more resources to incentives should 
  
 
 
An Ideal State Incentive Program 91 
be paid for by increasing the state’s business tax rate, which 
exports some of the costs to nonresidents. 
AN IDEAL PROGRAM 
Based on these principles, what would be an ideal state incentive 
program?117 Here are some ideas for a possible state strategy. 
• Target counties. The proposed state strategy would target 
state-funded economic development efforts on appropriate 
counties. These counties would be of two types. First, the state 
strategy would target economically distressed counties—that 
is, counties that by some objective measure lack adequate 
jobs. Second, the state strategy might target a few counties 
with high-tech clusters—those whose share of jobs in high-
tech industries was at least one-third greater than the national 
average. For the state targeting to be meaningful, less than 
half of the state’s population should be in targeted counties. 
• Start with the basic services supporting economic devel-
opment. Before funding incentive programs to help specific 
businesses, make sure that target counties have the funding 
they need for adequate services to support economic develop-
ment. Such supportive services include adequate infrastruc-
ture and high-quality programs for skills development. 
• Next, prioritize funding for customized business services. 
Targeted counties could be provided with a block grant sup-
porting a wide array of customized business services. The 
state funding would have to go to firms in tradable industries. 
In counties eligible only because they have a high-tech clus-
ter, the assisted firms would also have to be high tech. Eligible 
services would include manufacturing extension services, 
small business development centers, business incubators, cus-
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tomized job training, and discretionary hiring subsidies for 
firms that hire into newly created jobs local nonemployed res-
idents referred and placed via local workforce agencies.118 The 
block grant should aim at a funding level of customized busi-
ness services so that all targeted firms that need such services 
could receive quality services. Such a funding level would 
be significantly greater than what is currently provided—at 
a guess, at least three times the current national $3 billion in 
such funding, or around $10 billion per year. 
• Make tax incentives totally state funded, limited in costs, 
up front, open to tradable firms of all sizes.119 Tax incen-
tives should be nonrefundable—that is, limited to a business’s 
state and local tax burden. For example, incentives could be 
limited to be no more annually than the sum of the business’s 
income tax liability plus its local business property tax liabil-
ity. The term of the incentive should be limited, for example, 
to no more than three years of the business’s income taxes 
and property taxes. But the incentive should either be legally 
an entitlement for eligible firms in eligible counties, or else 
administered so that smaller firms as well as larger firms are 
in practice equally eligible. One hundred percent state-funded 
incentives, rather than local incentives, would help the target 
counties more, and limit impact on local public services sup-
porting development. 
For example, one can imagine a state-funded tax-incentive pro-
gram that would include an investment tax credit, and a job creation 
tax credit for full-time permanent jobs that exceeded both last year’s 
jobs and some base year’s jobs.120 If this tax incentive program was 
designed so that its magnitude did not exceed three years of the 
typical income and property tax liability of a tradable-industry firm, 
such an incentive package would be about $18,000 per full-time-
equivalent (FTE) job. The state/local budget cost of such an incentive 
package would be less than two-thirds of the current typical state and 
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local tax incentive package. Because less than half of the state would 
be eligible for the incentive package, total national costs of such 
incentives would probably be less than one-third of current national 
costs for tax incentives of $47 billion: total tax incentive costs would 
not exceed $15 billion. 
However, the incentive package could only be taken against the 
firm’s actual state and local income and property tax payments over 
three years, with no carry forwards of unclaimed credits to future tax 
years, so if the state’s existing business tax system had low taxes, 
the incentive package would be limited by the lack of any incentive 
refundability or lengthy carry-forwards.121 The incentive package 
would also include some clawbacks if the created jobs and invest-
ment were not maintained.122 
Summary 
Table 6.1 summarizes this incentive “ideal” vs. current typical 
incentive practices. Compared to current incentive policies, the ideal 
incentive package is more geographically targeted, cheaper, and more 
oriented toward customized business services. Compared to current 
tax incentives, the ideal tax incentives would be much shorter term 
and limited by the firm’s tax liabilities but would be more broadly 
available to smaller businesses. 
POSSIBLE QUESTIONS, WITH RESPONSES 
Here are some critiques of the design of this ideal package, with 
my response. 
Why do incentives at all? Why not just do skills development 
programs or infrastructure programs, which often have high 
returns? (See Figure 4.2.) First, incentives that are customized busi-
ness services often have benefit-cost ratios that are even higher than 
skills development or infrastructure programs (see Table 4.2). Sec-
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Table 6.1  Comparison of Current Incentives vs. “Ideal” Incentives 
Current Ideal 
Untargeted 
$50 billion annual costs over all 
states 
94% tax incentives, 6% customized 
services 
One-quarter local property tax 
abatements 
Tax incentive features: often 
discretionary, up to 20 years, 
refundable 
Average tax incentive: 1.3% of 
value-added 
Often no budget limit for tax 
incentives 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
Targeted at distressed counties and 
high-tech counties 
$25 billion annual costs 
60% tax incentives, 40% customized 
services 
100% state funding 
Tax incentive features: entitlement, 
limited to 3-year term, nonrefundable 
(credited against income & property 
taxes) 
Average tax incentive: 1.0% of 
value-added 
All incentives part of state business 
tax budget 
ond, the job creation from incentives may benefit persons unlikely 
to benefit from skills development programs. For example, older 
workers may benefit because of the jobs created by incentives but are 
less likely to benefit from job training or education programs. Third, 
incentives create jobs and higher earnings per capita immediately, 
whereas the economic benefits from skills development programs or 
new infrastructure are more delayed. High-quality preschool takes 
decades to have its biggest benefits. A new highway provides some 
construction jobs now, but the biggest economic benefits for state jobs 
and earnings are indeed “down the road.” 
Why not abolish tax incentives, as customized services have 
much higher benefit-cost ratios? Customized business services 
have limits in scale, as such services are only useful to certain types 
of businesses at particular stages in their development. Tax incentives 
can be more easily scaled up and are more broadly useful to a wider 
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variety of firms. In distressed counties or high-tech counties, business 
tax incentives can have sufficiently high benefit-cost ratios for state 
residents, as shown in Chapter 4. 
Why not have a fixed budget for tax incentives, rather than 
a projected budget for tax incentives that are entitlements to eli-
gible firms? Wouldn’t a fixed budget give states more control over
these tax incentives?123 A fixed tax incentive budget, if enforced, 
would imply that a state might refuse tax incentives for large projects 
in targeted counties toward the end of the fiscal year, if the tax incen-
tive budget was insufficient. Such refusal does not make much eco-
nomic sense: why forego opportunities for new investment and job 
creation? Such a refusal is unlikely to be politically sustainable: What 
governor or mayor would want to be perceived as refusing incentives 
for a significant new economic development project? 
The ideal package does significantly limit tax incentives by limit-
ing their amount to no more than three years of the firm’s additional 
income tax and property tax liability. In addition, the state would 
seek to each year project the overall net business tax budget, with 
tax incentives included in the budget. Net business tax receipts, after 
these incentives, should be no harder to project for state budgeting 
purposes than is currently the case for business tax receipts. Further-
more, given that incentives will tend to go up with more firm invest-
ment and job creation, net business tax receipts should be less volatile 
with the business cycle than gross business tax receipts. 
Why not offer customized business services statewide, as 
such services appear to have a high benefit-cost ratio even when 
unemployment is low? Local economic development authorities in 
nontargeted counties should certainly be permitted to offer custom-
ized business services. However, state funding should be restricted to 
targeted counties, as the benefit-cost ratio for such services is much 
higher in such counties. In addition, for distressed counties, local eco-
nomic development authorities will have a harder time financing such 
services. In nondistressed counties, the local revenue base to pay for 
such services is more adequate. 
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Why not make tax incentives discretionary, so that economic 
developers can better target incentives on firms whose location 
decisions are more footloose, or whose multipliers or other ben-
efits for the states are higher? In my view, economic developers 
do not have enough knowledge to know when an incentive is truly 
needed to tip a location decision. The firm knows its location options; 
the economic developer is not privy to such knowledge. Economic 
developers are not mind readers. 
Our knowledge about firms’ multipliers and effects on local 
employment-to-population ratios is also limited. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, commonly used input-output models and econometric 
models of multipliers and local labor market effects do not reflect 
many complexities of local economies that may alter economic effects 
of job growth. Our knowledge about incentive benefits vs. costs is not 
reliable enough to fine-tune the incentives to each and every firm. 
What we do know is that incentives have higher returns if tar-
geted at distressed counties, or at high-tech firms in a few high-tech 
counties. We should limit ourselves to the most reliable knowledge in 
incentive design. 
Discretion in incentives is likely to lead policymakers astray. 
Discretion allows incentive magnitude to be unduly influenced by a 
firm’s size, media clout, or political clout. 
Rules are a help to economic development policy, not a hin-
drance. Rules allow incentive targeting and incentive magnitude to be 
based on some reliable guiding principles, and to not vary because of 
political pressures. Rules strengthen the negotiating position of states 
versus firms in the location game. States can tell firms: here are the 
incentives we have, and our formulas for awarding incentives. We 
cannot award you more than what is dictated by those rules, but nei-
ther will we be treating other firms differently than we treat you. 
Why make tax incentive payments up front, in the first three 
years, with a clawback? Why not just “pay for results” with 
incentive payments made over time if the initial jobs are main-
tained, which is what many states claim to do with their current 
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incentive programs? “Paying for results” means paying incentives 
for a long time. Long-term incentives don’t make economic sense, as 
explained in Chapter 3. Firms’ investment decisions about location 
and expansion are myopic, focused on profits and costs in the first 
few years. Therefore, long-term incentives have too low effects on 
location or expansion decisions per dollar of costs. 
Long-term incentives also have bad political effects. Governors 
and mayors are likely to be more excessive with incentives whose 
costs will incur when they are no longer in office. Better to remove 
the temptation by eliminating long-term incentives. 
If the concern is about firms receiving significant incentives and 
then downsizing, this can be dealt with by including clawbacks. With 
clawbacks, some of the up-front incentives can be recovered if the 
firm downsizes. 
Will the ideal incentive package have enough political 
rewards to be politically attractive to governors? Will there be 
enough ribbon cuttings and media coverage of economic devel-
opment triumphs? Can the geographic targeting be politically 
sustained? These entitlement tax incentives still will involve some 
substantial economic development awards for large location deci-
sions. Ribbon cuttings can be scheduled, with impressive numbers 
for press releases. 
If the tax incentive averages about $18,000 per new FTE job, a 
Foxconn that promises 13,000 jobs can be promised over $200 mil-
lion in incentives.124 That’s a lot less than the $3 billion that Wiscon-
sin offered, but over $200 million in incentives is certainly enough for 
a governor to claim credit in a press release. 
If the tax incentive averages $18,000 per job created, an Amazon 
location decision that promises 40,000 jobs can be awarded incen-
tives of $720 million. This is far less than the $3 billion offered by 
New York, let alone the over $7 billion offered by other states. How-
ever, this incentive award is similar to the $773 million that Virginia 
offered to Amazon.125 Such an incentive award is certainly enough for 
a governor to claim credit in the media. 
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Virginia’s offer to Amazon also shows that it is possible to pack-
age infrastructure assistance and jobs skills programs in a way that 
allows a governor to claim credit. Virginia’s offer to Amazon com-
bined an almost $800 million cash incentive with $1.1 billion in 
investments in Virginia job skills and $200 million in infrastructure 
investments. These related investments included locating a new cam-
pus of Virginia Tech in northern Virginia and making improvements to 
highways and mass transit in northern Virginia. Such improvements 
may make it more likely that Amazon will hire locally, given that 
the local skills development pipeline will be better. But such invest-
ments might also more generally boost the attractiveness of northern 
Virginia to other high-tech firms. This Virginia package probably has 
a much higher benefit-cost ratio than a pure cash incentive. But the 
more important point is that the state was able to frame this package 
so that political credit for attracting Amazon was given for providing 
these investments.126 
A more challenging issue is geographic targeting: Is it politically 
viable? It is hard for a state to completely exclude some counties in a 
state from a state economic development program. One can imagine 
that it might be more politically acceptable for a state to offer some 
support for economic development throughout the state, with higher 
support for economic development in targeted counties. For example, 
North Carolina follows a system under which the state’s counties are 
divided based on economic distress into three tiers.127 The amount of 
economic development awards is higher in the more distressed tiers, 
and the local government contribution is less. Geographic targeting is 
challenging, but not politically impossible. 
THE STATE PERSPECTIVE VS. THE NATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 
In this chapter, the ideal incentive program has been designed 
from a state perspective, what maximizes state residents’ net benefits. 
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What about the national perspective? Is this incentive competition a 
zero-sum game, with no net national economic benefits but sizable 
government costs? What, if anything, should the federal government 
do about incentives? The next chapter turns to considering these 
questions. 

  
 
 
Chapter 7 
The National Interest 
What Should the Federal Government 
Do about State and Local Incentives? 
In this book so far, the perspective has been that of an individual 
state: What incentive policy for a specific state provides the most net 
benefits for that state’s residents? 
But we should also consider the national perspective. Does the 
state and local competition for jobs benefit the United States as a 
whole? Does it advance economic efficiency, making the national 
economic pie bigger? Does it make the national economic distribu-
tion more progressive, with greater percentage boosts to the incomes 
of lower-income groups, or does it make the national income distribu-
tion more regressive, with greater percentage boosts to the incomes 
of the rich? Should the federal government seek to regulate state and 
local incentives? If so, how should this federal regulation be done? 
In this chapter, I argue that from an economic theory perspective, 
the case for federal regulation, the case that state and local competi-
tion for jobs necessarily always substantially damages the national 
interest, is weak. If governors and state legislators were the rational 
actors of economic theory and always sought to advance their state 
residents’ best interests, they would already have adopted the previ-
ous chapter’s incentive reforms: more modest incentives that were 
more geographically targeted, with more emphasis on customized 
business services. Such incentive reforms would advance not just 
state interests but national interests. 
But from a practical perspective, the case for federal regulation 
is strong. Our current incentives don’t serve state or national inter-
ests. State and local competition for jobs via incentives, as it is actu-
ally conducted in the real world, does damage national interests. But 
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given that we have a federal system, that rightly values state and local 
government, the question for federal policymakers is how to mean-
ingfully regulate state and local incentives while respecting state and 
local sovereignty. 
IS STATE AND LOCAL COMPETITION FOR JOBS A
ZERO-SUM GAME? 
A common argument is that the state and local competition for 
jobs is a zero-sum game, with no national benefits, only incentive 
costs.128 A new facility such as Foxconn or Amazon will locate some-
where in the United States. The big incentive offers from different 
states do not create more national job creation by Foxconn or Ama-
zon, they only potentially influence the new facility’s chosen state. 
The incentive costs are pure waste, with no national benefit. 
This common argument can be extended from new plants or 
new facilities to incentives to any tradable-industry firm. Suppose an 
incentive is provided to encourage a new facility to start up or an 
existing facility to expand. Suppose the alternative possible choice to 
starting up or expanding would not be to locate in some other state 
but rather not to start up or expand. Even in this case, the new facility 
or the expanded facility will hurt job creation in other states. Because 
this facility is in a tradable industry, it competes in the national mar-
ket. This facility’s start-up or expansion will take sales away from 
firms in other states. As a result, jobs in other states will decline. Net 
national jobs might be unaffected. Again, it could be argued that the 
incentives are pure waste, with no net national job creation. 
This common argument overlooks some incentive benefits. Sup-
pose as an extreme that incentives have zero effects: without the 
incentives, the same location, start-up, expansion, and job retention 
decisions would have occurred. Then the incentive competition has 
no real effects on national economic efficiency. What the incentives 
directly do is transfer income from whomever is paying for the incen-
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tives to whomever owns the firms receiving incentives. The immedi-
ate effect is to transfer income in a regressive way. Stock ownership 
is concentrated among wealthier households than are most state and 
local taxes. A significant portion of incentive costs are likely to be 
paid for by households in the form of higher household taxes or lower 
public services. The average household paying such costs will have 
lower incomes than the average stockholder. So, the immediate effect 
of the incentive competition on economic efficiency is zero, other 
than some transfer of wealth from the average household to the rich. 
Who eventually benefits from incentives—what public finance 
economists call the “economic incidence” of incentives—may differ 
from these initial distributional effects. The state and local incentives 
increase the profits of firms in tradable industries. Presumably, this 
leads to more investment in such industries. The increase in invest-
ment in such industries may lead to some upward pressure on wages 
and some downward pressure on prices. Some of the initial boost in 
profits may be shifted to benefit workers and consumers. How big is 
this shifting? Public finance economists don’t always agree on who 
bears the burden of taxes on capital or subsidies to capital, and incen-
tives are one form of subsidies to capital. Most applied public finance 
economists believe that the shifting would be incomplete. That is, a 
considerable portion of the true incidence of incentives would be to 
transfer resources to stock owners and other business owners, who 
tend to be the wealthy. 
Suppose instead that incentives do have some effects on eco-
nomic activity in different locations. Suppose initially that there are 
similar benefits of more jobs at all locations. Then the incentives will 
also cause the national economy some efficiency costs. The incentives 
lead some firms to locate or expand at locations other than would 
have been chosen. Presumably, these locations had higher production 
costs or other disadvantages that led to them not being chosen with-
out incentives. As a result, the incentives lead to economic inefficien-
cies in the location of business production. Overall production costs 
in the U.S. economy will increase. This will harm the overall U.S. 
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standard of living. In this case, the incentive competition is to some 
extent a negative-sum game. And the competition will tend to shift 
wealth toward the already wealthy. Economic efficiency suffers, and 
the national income distribution becomes more regressive.129 
But this zero-sum or negative-sum game argument overlooks the 
potential for incentives to correct for market failures: various failures 
of the private market to achieve efficiency. Incentives can correct for 
market failures by providing needed business services or targeting 
jobs to areas where the jobs will be more socially productive, as we 
will now discuss.130 
CUSTOMIZED BUSINESS SERVICES CAN MAKE THE
NATIONAL ECONOMIC PIE BIGGER 
The zero-sum game argument made so far assumes all incen-
tives are tax incentives or other cash subsidies to firms. But incen-
tives also include customized business services. If such customized 
business services are high-quality efficient services—their value to 
assisted businesses exceeds the government’s costs of providing the 
services—then these services help increase overall national economic 
productivity. 
Consider manufacturing extension services. Such extension 
services provide smaller manufacturers with advice on various top-
ics: adopting new technologies, reorganizing production, improving 
human resources practices, identifying new markets. If this advice is 
useful, then the business may deploy its capital and labor resources in 
more productive ways. If this productivity increase exceeds the costs 
of providing the advice, then the net economic effect of the exten-
sion services is to increase the overall productivity of the national 
economy. This more productive manufacturing firm may drive other 
less productive manufacturers in other states out of business, but that 
is part of the process of “creative destruction” that makes the overall 
economic pie bigger and improves the U.S. standard of living. 
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Similar arguments can be made for other customized business 
services: small business development centers, entrepreneurship train-
ing, business incubators, customized job training. For all these ser-
vices, the assisted firms may improve their productivity. If the value 
of this productivity increase exceeds the cost of providing the service, 
economic efficiency is enhanced. 
What is the incidence of this increase in the size of the overall 
U.S. economy? That is hard to say. Some of it may be in increased 
profits for the assisted businesses. But some of the benefits will be 
transferred to these firms’ workers and customers, and to workers and 
consumers in general. 
TARGETING DISTRESSED AREAS CAN MAKE THE
NATIONAL ECONOMIC PIE BIGGER AND HELP THE
NONEMPLOYED 
The zero-sum game argument also overlooks that the benefits of 
local job growth may be asymmetrical across locations. As argued 
in Chapter 3, local job growth has much greater benefits for the non-
employed in locations that initially have high nonemployment rates. 
As argued throughout this book, state and local areas should 
respond to these greater benefits by having higher tax incentives in 
economically distressed areas. If this occurs, then the incentive com-
petition makes both the national economy more efficient and the 
income distribution modestly more progressive. 
The higher incentives in distressed areas will lead to more of the 
nonemployed being employed nationally. This enhances the produc-
tive capacity of the national economy. Another way to put it is that 
the economy will be able to accommodate a higher national employ-
ment rate without experiencing accelerating inflation due to a lack of 
workers. The Federal Reserve will be able to accept a higher national 
employment rate without being forced to intervene to squelch 
inflation. 
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Because the expansion of the economy occurs due to increasing 
employment of the otherwise nonemployed, the expansion will tend 
to be distributed modestly progressively. As argued in Chapter 4, the 
persons who get jobs because of new local jobs tend to be in the bot-
tom three-fifths of the income distribution—particularly in the bottom 
one-fifth. The benefits from incentive policy will not be distributed as 
progressively as various social welfare policies, such as expanding 
welfare, food stamps, or Medicaid, but will tend to increase the share 
of the economic pie of lower- and middle-income groups.131 
TARGETING HIGH-TECH CLUSTERS CAN MAKE
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY MORE PRODUCTIVE BY
AUGMENTING AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES 
Targeting more high-tech activity to areas with high-tech clusters 
can also potentially make the national economy more productive. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, there is some evidence that high-tech firms 
are more productive if located in a high-tech cluster, and that adding 
more high-tech firms to an existing high-tech cluster further increases 
the productivity of other firms in the cluster. Productivity might go 
up because firms steal ideas and workers from each other, and add-
ing more high-tech firms increases such synergies. These productivity 
effects of adding more high-tech firms to a high-tech cluster may be 
reflected in greater job multipliers, and may also lead to greater wage 
increases in the local high-tech cluster. 
Ideally, state and local areas should respond to these high-tech 
spillovers by targeting some incentives on high-tech firms that are 
locating or expanding in high-tech areas. If this occurs, these incen-
tives will increase the overall productivity of the U.S. high-tech sec-
tor. Because of such incentive targeting, high-tech firms would be 
encouraged to locate or expand in existing high-tech clusters, where 
their location or expansion will do the most to spill over into increased 
productivity of other high-tech firms. 
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REJOINING THE REAL WORLD: ACTUAL INCENTIVE
PRACTICE IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE NET NATIONAL
BENEFITS 
So, incentives can have significant net national benefits, but only 
if they are high-quality customized business services, or targeted at 
job growth in distressed areas, or targeted at high-tech growth in high-
tech clusters. The net national benefits would be reflected in part in 
higher job growth, which will yield modestly progressive benefits. 
If incentives are financed by higher business taxes, as recommended 
in the book, adverse distributional effects of financing incentives are 
minimized. If all states adopted the ideal incentive package outlined 
in the prior chapter, then our current national competition for jobs 
would make the national economy grow and have modestly progres-
sive distributional effects. 
But let’s get real. Actual incentive practice bears little resem-
blance to the ideal (see Chapter 2). Few incentives are customized 
services. Most incentives are tax incentives that go anywhere in the 
state, not to distressed areas or high-tech clusters. More distressed 
states do not more aggressively use incentives, so incentive differen-
tials across states do little to help reallocate jobs to areas where there 
are more nonemployed persons in need of jobs. States excessively 
invest in long-term incentives to major corporations, not because this 
makes more economic sense, but because it makes more political 
sense: governors get the political benefits now, and pass on incentive 
costs to the next governor. 
The typical nonemployed person in a distressed area is as likely 
to lose from incentives as gain. Our state incentive competition dis-
tributes jobs both toward and away from distressed areas, with little 
net effect. The average high-tech firm in a high-tech cluster is as likely 
to lose from incentives as gain. Our state incentive competition some-
times hurts the United States’ most productive high-tech clusters, and 
sometimes helps, with little net effect. 
 
 
  
 
108 Bartik 
As a result, in practice incentives produce little if any efficiency 
benefits for the national economy. They redistribute jobs across states 
and local areas based more on political accidents than on any eco-
nomic logic. 
With incentives yielding little national efficiency benefits, 
incentives’ major economic impact is to redistribute income toward 
the major corporations that receive the bulk of incentives. These 
increased profits for major corporations benefit their top executives, 
as well as their stockholders, who tend to be toward the top of the 
U.S. income distribution. Because states do not necessarily finance 
incentives by higher business taxes, a substantial share of incentive 
costs are paid by households, through both higher taxes and reduced 
public services. The group paying for incentives tends to have much 
lower incomes than the executives and stockholders receiving incen-
tive benefits. Our current incentive system is likely to make the U.S. 
distribution of income more regressive. 
A SIMPLE SOLUTION 
A simple solution is for the federal government to outlaw cur-
rent incentive practices. The federal government could impose the 
ideal incentive system, as outlined in Chapter 6. All discretionary 
business tax incentives would be made illegal under federal law. The 
federal government would select target counties or other target areas 
in which economic development program efforts must be focused. 
These target counties would include distressed counties and high-tech 
counties, as determined by federal criteria. They would be eligible for 
certain time-limited entitlement tax incentives for firms in tradable 
industries. These counties would also be eligible for block grants for 
infrastructure, skills development programs, and customized business 
services. The tax incentives and block grants could be state funded, 
federally funded, or some combination. 
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Whether such a solution is constitutional is debatable. Some legal 
opinions have argued that state and local government assistance to 
business could be regulated by the federal government under the fed-
eral power to regulate interstate commerce.132 Such state and local 
business assistance could be deemed an interference with interstate 
commerce. Subsidizing a state’s own businesses disadvantages busi-
nesses in other states. The federal government could outlaw such 
business assistance, or direct that it be used only in designated geo-
graphic areas and only when designed in specified ways. 
Rather than outlawing current incentives, the federal government 
could subject incentives to extra taxes.133 Any gain in business profits 
from incentives is already implicitly taxed under the federal corporate 
income tax system. But the federal government could impose a differ-
entially higher tax on the value of either state and local tax incentives 
or customized business services, or both, unless these incentives and 
services meet some federal criteria for being acceptable. 
The European Union has an incentive regulatory system that 
restricts the incentives of member countries.134 If applied in the 
United States, the EU regulatory system would make many current 
state and local incentives illegal. Under the EU system, incentives are 
allowed only in targeted distressed regions. For example, in wealthier 
EU countries such as France or Germany, the regions eligible for any
incentives make up only about one-quarter of the overall national 
population.135 In eligible regions, incentives are capped: the value of 
the incentive, as a percent of the dollar amount of the private invest-
ment that is incentivized, must be less than some maximum percent-
age. The cap increases if the region is more distressed. 
BALANCING STATE SOVEREIGNTY WITH
NATIONAL INTERESTS 
The federal government outlawing the current incentive system, 
and imposing its own system, seems politically unlikely.136 Such a 
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takeover also is problematic if one believes that state flexibility and 
experimentation are desirable. A federal takeover would require 
extensive regulation of the state and local business tax system. The 
federal government would also be regulating how the states conduct 
their economic development policy. 
If we already knew the one best business tax policy, and one best 
local development policy, and if we believed that the federal govern-
ment was wise enough to adopt these best policies, then perhaps a fed-
eral takeover would make sense. But we don’t necessarily know the 
one best tax policy or economic development policy. Perhaps the best 
policy varies from state to state, with different local conditions. And 
the federal government has limited wisdom and capacity. It already 
faces many policy challenges, including climate change, health care, 
antiterrorism, and immigration. Does the federal government have the 
wisdom and capacity to also micromanage state and local business 
tax policy and economic development policy? 
Perhaps a wiser federal policy would try to restrict intervention 
to the cases that most clearly affect national interests. And perhaps a 
more politically acceptable federal intervention would not outlaw or 
penalize incentives, but rather reward states for better state policy. In 
other words: carrots not sticks. This would give the states flexibility to 
ignore the carrots. And federal policymakers would have more politi-
cal rewards from handing out carrots than using sticks. 
The national interest is most clearly at stake for incentives to 
large corporations. In recent years, large corporations have acquired 
increased market power. Many markets are less competitive. A few 
large corporations dominate many markets, with great power to 
set prices and wages. Recent economic research suggests that this 
increased market power may have reduced long-term investment in 
R&D and worker training, increased consumer prices, and reduced 
worker wages.137 
Because state and local incentives are disproportionately awarded 
to large corporations, the market power of such corporations is further 
strengthened. Amazon or Google or Microsoft or General Motors or 
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Boeing are far more likely to get large incentives than are smaller 
firms. Is this in the national interest? Probably not. 
Long-term incentives to large corporations pose the greatest 
temptation for state excess. A governor can attract great media atten-
tion and political support with such incentives, yet postpone costs to 
their successor. 
Focusing federal intervention on incentives to the largest corpo-
rations is also more manageable for federal regulators. Fewer than 
1,500 firms in the United States have more than 10,000 employees 
nationally.138 Yet such firms probably get over one-half of all state and 
local incentives.139 It is easier to regulate incentives for these rela-
tively few firms than to deal with every case of state and local assis-
tance to individual businesses. 
Restrictions on long-term incentives to large corporations could 
be made a condition of receiving federal grants. This could be a con-
dition incorporated into existing programs, such as the federal com-
munity development block grant program, or grants from the U.S. 
Economic Development Administration, as has been proposed.140 Or 
it could be a condition incorporated into a new federal initiative to 
support economic development in targeted areas, which I will now 
outline. 
As I have argued in this book, there is a national interest in target-
ing more job growth to distressed areas, and in targeting more high-
tech growth to high-tech clusters. A new federal program to target 
such growth in such areas could make sense. But the devil’s in the 
details, to which we now turn. 
A NATIONAL PROPOSAL 
Since the 2016 presidential election, national interest has grown 
in regard to how to help distressed regions. Some cities have been 
hard hit by manufacturing decline, some regions have been hit by the 
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decline of coal mining, and many rural areas and smaller communi-
ties have lost jobs to bigger cities. 
A wide variety of proposals have been made for federal initiatives 
to revitalize distressed areas. These proposals range from funding for 
infrastructure, public jobs, privately subsidized jobs, manufacturing 
extension, small business development, high-tech cluster develop-
ment, and customized job training.141 
National interest is also great in helping strengthen our existing 
high-tech clusters. Concerns have been expressed that current hous-
ing supply shortages in such clusters (e.g., Silicon Valley) are restrict-
ing the growth of these clusters, thereby damaging U.S. productivity 
and GDP growth.142 
Distressed areas and high-tech clusters are diverse. Different 
areas probably have quite different needs. Some areas may most need 
more infrastructure. Other areas may most need greater housing sup-
ply. Still other areas may most need higher-quality customized busi-
ness services. Some areas may most need enhanced skills develop-
ment programs. 
For the federal government to flexibly address these diverse prob-
lems, one possibility is for a federal block grant program to states to 
help designated counties. States would be required to identify coun-
ties that would qualify as being distressed or high-tech clusters. Block 
grants would go from the federal government to the states to the des-
ignated counties. Block grants could be used flexibly for a variety 
of programs that address local development needs. These programs 
could include all those mentioned above: infrastructure, housing, cus-
tomized business services, and job training. 
Federal funding and state match requirements could vary with 
the overall economic distress of the state. States would be required 
to restrict designated counties so that no more than half of the state’s 
population was eligible for assistance. 
As a condition for receiving these federal block grants, states 
would have to agree to forego providing discretionary tax incen-
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tives to large corporations (10,000 national employees or more) that 
exceeded some set size. The size could be set as so many dollars per 
job. States would continue to be free to have investment tax credits 
or job creation tax credits that are entitlements that go to firms of all 
sizes, but they would be restricted on any incentive that is discretion-
ary, and which tends by law or practice to differentially go to large 
firms. Governors and legislators could continue to assist the distressed 
areas in their state—the Flints or East St. Louis’s or troubled rural 
counties—but not in a way that differentially favors large corpora-
tions over smaller businesses. The federal government could enforce 
this by monitoring incentive awards and deciding whether they in fact 
are differentially awarded to larger firms. Given the limited number of 
large corporations involved, such monitoring is feasible. 
A meaningful federal program to help these targeted areas prob-
ably would have an annual cost of at least $10–$20 billion. This 
amount is consistent with likely job needs of distressed areas.143 This 
amount is also consistent with scaled-up versions of previous federal 
regional economic development efforts, such as TVA.144 
For evaluation purposes, states would be required to select dis-
tressed counties, or high-tech counties, using a quantitative cutoff. 
This would allow national evaluators to estimate the program’s aver-
age effect. As previously discussed, with a quantitative cutoff for pro-
gram eligibility, an RDD can estimate the program’s effect at the cut-
off. Intuitively, the quantitative score and the cutoff would be used to 
predict how county performance on job and wage growth, and other 
indicators, differ between counties just below or just above the cutoff 
for eligibility. 
By adopting this program (see summary in Box 7.1), the federal 
government would be encouraging the states to target job growth in 
counties where it will have greater benefits, either in helping the cur-
rently nonemployed get jobs, or in increasing the productivity of U.S. 
high-tech clusters. And this program would provide a valuable carrot 
for encouraging states to forego the excessive long-term tax incen-
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tives to large corporations. Over time, evaluation evidence would 
show how these economic development efforts are shaping economic 
growth. 
Box 7.1 Summary of Proposed National Economic Development 
Program 
• Federal block grant of between $10 billion and $20 billion annu-
ally, to help states assist designated distressed counties, or target a 
few high-tech counties, with two strings attached. 
• String 1: For states to receive a block grant, they must agree to 
forego giving discretionary incentives exceeding some maximum 
size to large corporations. 
• String 2: For states to receive a block grant, they must agree to tar-
get counties using quantitative criteria, to allow for better program 
evaluation. 
MOVING ON FROM THE IDEAL 
This chapter and the previous chapter considered incentive poli-
cies that are “ideal” for the federal government and for an individual 
state government. But how in practice can we get closer to these ide-
als? The next chapter turns to this question. 
 
 
Chapter 8 
A Practical Path Forward 
Many current incentives are wasteful. Excessive long-term incen-
tives to large corporations, which are awarded regardless of industry 
or location, are not an effective way to increase economic growth. 
These incentives mainly redistribute money and power to large cor-
porations and their owners. 
Current incentive policies have good alternatives. Scaled-back 
tax incentives can be useful in needy areas or to boost high-tech 
clusters. High-quality business services to smaller businesses, such 
as manufacturing extension services and small business development 
centers, can cost-effectively boost job growth. 
But how do we get to these good alternatives? Current incentive 
policies are politically popular. Voters like their governors and may-
ors to “do something” to create more jobs. Because current incentive 
policies are popular and easy to implement—it’s not hard to promise 
lots of cash to a few major corporations for the next 20 years—they 
are hard to reform. What can move us toward the needed incentive 
reforms? 
TRANSPARENCY 
Voters might like incentives less if they knew more about them.145 
Right now, voters might not fully understand incentives’ costs, or the 
failure of many incentives to achieve their job creation goals. 
State and local governments should fully disclose all incentive 
deals. This includes disclosing exactly how much in assistance was 
promised to the individual firm, how much job creation was prom-
ised, and how much in assistance and job creation actually occurred. 
115 
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Transparency has increased in recent years. Some state websites 
give detailed reports on individual incentive deals. This disclosure is 
often mandated by legislative requirements. 
In 2015, the Government Accounting Standards Board mandated 
that to meet generally accepted accounting principles, state and local 
governments must annually disclose the aggregate annual dollar 
costs of many incentives.146 This measure should help transparency. 
However, disclosure of both the promises and outcomes of individual
deals is also needed. 
Does transparency help the cause of incentive reform? Consider 
the recent Amazon controversy. Amazon in 2018 tentatively decided 
to locate two major facilities, one in New York and one in Virginia. 
Then in 2019, Amazon backed out of the New York decision. It is 
unclear why, but part of it was that the New York deal seemed to 
attract political controversy. 
Perhaps one reason for the controversy was an accident: due to 
the simultaneous announcement of the Virginia and New York loca-
tion decisions, it became clear to the voters of New York that they 
were paying four times as much in incentives per job as Virginia—$3 
billion in tax incentives in New York vs. $800 million in Virginia, 
for about the same number of jobs. No clear rationale was apparent 
for why New York should pay four times as much per job. If voters 
were more fully aware of the costs they are paying for incentives, and 
how they compare with other states, perhaps there would be some 
increased voter resistance to incentives in other high-incentive states. 
EVALUATION 
But transparency doesn’t much help if voters are misled into 
thinking that incentive costs are irrelevant because incentives gener-
ate enough tax revenue to more than cover their costs, as is sometimes 
claimed in current state evaluations. As outlined in this book, we need 
better evaluation practices, at both the state and local level. 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
A Practical Path Forward  117 
Better evaluations of incentives will point out that many incentives 
• do not induce new job creation; 
• have only modest multiplier effects; 
• generate as much in needed public spending as revenue gains; 
• only have a minority of their jobs lead to new job opportunities; 
• have opportunity costs for the state economy because of other 
programs the funds could have been spent on, which might 
have more effectively boosted the state economy. 
States should continue expanding evaluation requirements for 
state and local incentive programs. Programs should be regularly 
evaluated on a definite schedule. 
The rigor of these evaluations should be increased as much as 
possible, while being realistic about what is practical in evaluat-
ing an ongoing nonexperimental program. States should develop a 
model of their state economy that enables incentives to be entered 
into the model, with all their positive and negative feedback effects 
included. Evaluations should focus on whether incentives increase 
state residents’ per capita incomes. Incentives are mainly a labor mar-
ket program, which, if successful, boost local labor demand. National 
research and state-specific data collection and surveys should be used 
to provide realistic estimates of incentive job creation. 
Will evaluation really help promote incentive reform? Some spe-
cific evaluations have been documented to lead to incentive reforms. 
For example, consider the Washington State R&D tax credit. In 2012, 
the Washington State Legislative Audit and Review Commission 
sponsored an outside evaluation by two economists, including me.147 
This evaluation found relatively high costs of this credit per job cre-
ated. The finding led to a recommendation to allow this credit to sun-
set, which occurred in 2015.148 
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ALTERNATIVES 
It’s hard to beat something with nothing. If the only obvious way 
to immediately increase jobs is to offer large tax incentives to major 
corporations, that’s what governors and mayors will do. And that’s 
what voters will demand. 
State and local governments should expand and promote alterna-
tive economic development policies other than tax incentives. These 
alternatives include 
• infrastructure and land development programs; 
• skills development programs; 
• customized business services to individual businesses, par-
ticularly smaller businesses. 
As alternative economic development policies are developed, 
they need to be regularly evaluated. These evaluations will help mod-
ify the programs to ensure they are high quality. The evaluations also 
will help educate the media and voters and policymakers about what 
such alternative policies can do to boost state residents’ per capita 
incomes. 
In some local communities, it has been possible to develop a con-
stituency for such economic development strategies. Consider Grand 
Rapids, Michigan, which traditionally has been a manufacturing-
intense area, with a manufacturing share of total jobs of about twice 
the national average.149 This community’s economic development 
strategy has included the following elements: 
• The state of Michigan has made a significantly above-average 
state investment in customized job training programs for the 
area’s manufacturers. 
• Grand Rapids invested in getting a branch office of the manu-
facturing extension service to locate in the area. 
• The area’s economic development organization has orga-
nized clusters of area manufacturers to discuss common prob-
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lems, such as skill needs, and to come up with possible local 
solutions. 
• The local area has Talent 2025, an organization that is encour-
aging increased investment in local skill development from 
early childhood through adulthood. 
• Local business leaders and political leaders have made signifi-
cant infrastructure investments in downtown Grand Rapids. 
• Local business leaders put up funds to convince the medi-
cal school of Michigan State University to locate in Grand 
Rapids. 
The results? There are specific Grand Rapids success stories: for 
one, a local cluster organization, the West Michigan Medical Device 
Consortium, helped an auto parts supplier convert to making ortho-
pedic devices.150 There is overall success in a tough economic envi-
ronment: despite the problems with U.S. manufacturing overall, the 
Grand Rapids area has more manufacturing jobs today than in 1990. 
A FULL-EMPLOYMENT ECONOMY 
Incentives will be hard to reform unless we can significantly 
reduce the shortage of good jobs. If Americans believe that job oppor-
tunities are lacking, there will be a strong push for governors and 
mayors to do something to create jobs. 
When unemployment is low, policymakers and voters are more 
inclined to “just say no” to costly tax incentives. As of early 2019, 
there was a new effort to develop an interstate compact in which states 
would agree to forego company-specific tax incentives. Bills to estab-
lish such a compact have been introduced in at least three states.151 
Such efforts have failed in the past, but maybe this time is different.152 
It is probably no accident that such legislation is being introduced at a 
time when the national unemployment rate is around 4 percent. 
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THE BABY AND THE BATHWATER 
Incentives can be a useful part of an active labor market policy. 
They can be a cost-effective way to locate more jobs where they are 
most needed. We need more jobs where the unemployed are located. 
We need more jobs in productive high-tech clusters. Some incentive 
designs can promote needed job growth in these places, at a reason-
able cost per job. 
In reforming incentives, we shouldn’t throw out the baby with the 
bathwater. Communities need a healthy labor market. That requires 
working on both sides of the labor market. On the labor supply side, 
we need to make wise investment in better skills development. On the 
labor demand side, we need to promote growth of more and higher-
wage jobs. Our labor demand policies should include smart incen-
tives to individual businesses, both scaled back and geographically 
targeted tax incentives, and high-quality business services 
But there is little danger of incentives being eliminated. A more 
likely danger is that long-term tax incentives to mega-corporations 
will be unwisely expanded, to the point where they threaten needed 
public services, and significantly redistribute income to the wealthy. 
The baby’s in no danger. What’s in danger is the house flooding from 
overflowing bathwater. 
To promote broadly shared prosperity, incentives shouldn’t be 
eliminated. But to switch metaphors, incentives should be tamed. 
This taming requires some cutbacks of what we currently know as 
incentives. It also requires reforms. Remaining incentives should be 
more short term and emphasize business services more. The incentive 
animal needs to go on a more nutritional diet. Only after such tam-
ing can incentives make sense. Only then can incentives help build 
prosperity for all. 
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
Notes 
1. LeRoy, Mattera, Tarczynska (2019). 
2. There are obviously many ways to distinguish economic development 
incentives from overall state and local economic policies. But in my 
view, other definitions are less useful. One could restrict incentives to 
only discretionary assistance to individual businesses—that is, elimi-
nate any tax breaks that are provided by right to all businesses that meet 
the tax break’s criteria. But in practice, many discretionary incentives 
are provided almost universally. For example, property tax abatements 
in Michigan are discretionary, but any significant new manufacturing 
facility will receive an abatement. Therefore, discretionary incentives 
are often not much different from an investment tax credit limited to 
new manufacturing investment. In my view, it is better to include these 
nondiscretionary incentives if they target particular industries or firms 
to promote local job growth. 
Alternatively, one could broaden incentives to include corporate 
income tax cuts that aim to increase a state’s job growth. But then, why 
not include any state or local policy for which some politician argues an 
economic development benefit? Soon, such an approach classifies all 
state and local government activities as “economic development.” But 
the incentives that arouse controversy are the ones that target particular 
firms or industries. This targeting demands a rationale. 
One could include as incentives any policy that favors some indus-
try, not just those that aim at job growth. Maybe a state passes laws that 
favor some industry because of the industry’s political clout. But such 
selectivity is clearly wrong. What is distinctive about incentives is that 
they have an economic rationale—jobs offer social benefits—yet are 
subject to waste and abuse, as targeting “winners” can go awry. 
3. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the latest empirical evidence suggests 
that many U.S. counties might also be big enough to at least be a distinc-
tive geographic labor submarket. 
4. Therefore, I do not consider the recent federal Opportunity Zone pro-
gram to be an “economic development” program. First, the Opportunity 
Zone program provides a capital gains tax break that is not targeted at 
job growth. Second, the Opportunity Zones mostly seem to be no bigger 
than a neighborhood. Even if the program increases job growth in the 
zones, it is likely to mostly do so by taking jobs away from other neigh-
borhoods in the same local labor market. 
5. Jensen and Malesky (2018). 
6. Multipliers will be discussed extensively later in the book. The latest 
multiplier evidence is discussed in Bartik and Sotherland (2019). 
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7. This chapter is based largely on an incentives database that I developed. 
This database is described in Bartik (2017a) and can be downloaded at 
https://www.upjohn.org/research-highlights/new-database-and-report-
reveal-how-much-states-spend-incentives-entice. 
8. For more on Mississippi’s “Balance Agriculture with Industry,” see 
Freedman (2017). 
9. I am not the only policy wonk worrying about this. For example, Rich-
ard Florida (2019) raises this concern. On the other hand, the contro-
versies over both Foxconn and Amazon may increase the odds of sig-
nificant incentive reform, as argued by LeRoy, Mattera, and Tarczynska 
(2019). 
10. The incentives cost data is derived from Bartik (2017a) but updated to 
2018 prices. The customized services data is derived in Bartik (2019). 
Sources include Hollenbeck (2013) and the U.S. federal budget for 
2019. 
11. Figures on state corporate income tax revenues come from the 2016 
Census Annual Survey of State and Local Finances but are adjusted 
using the CPI to 2018 dollars. 
12. This is calculated using the incentives as a percent of value-added fig-
ures in Bartik (2017a), using a 12 percent discount rate to get the firm’s 
present value perspective, and then multiplying by the share of wages in 
value-added for firms in tradable industries in Bartik (2017a, Table 3). 
13. Inspired by the folk music duo of Lou and Peter Berryman, authors of 
the song “Your State’s Name Here.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=EX9p50MIexs (accessed July 30, 2019). 
14. Annual tax revenue figures for state and local governments are from the 
U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Surveys of State and Local Government 
Finances for 2016, updated to 2018 dollars using the CPI. 
15. If every state offered identical 30 percent of wages incentives to every 
firm, the incentives would not affect location decisions. But in the real 
world, each state would offer such large incentives only to a few firms, 
and different firms would be targeted by different states. So, location 
decisions would change a lot if incentives averaged 30 percent of wages. 
16. A more implausible scenario is that business taxes would pay for the 
incentives. To finance $500 billion in incentives by higher state corpo-
rate income taxes would require increasing such taxes over 11-fold. 
17. The average percentage that R&D spending is of value-added is 6 per-
cent across these 31 industries. Computer manufacturing is at 23 per-
cent, chemical manufacturing at 21 percent. The only other of the 31 
industries whose R&D percentage of value-added is over twice the all-
industry average is software and other publishing, at 17 percent. The all-
tradable-industry average incentive rate is 1.4 percent of value-added. 
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Computer manufacturing is at 1.7 percent, chemical manufacturing at 
1.4 percent, and software and other publishing is at 1.2 percent. 
18. Figures on incentives by firm size are from Chatterji (2018), using data 
from LeRoy et al. (2015). The distribution of firms by size class is from 
the 2016 Longitudinal Business Database (U.S. Census Bureau 2018). 
19. See Bartik (2017a, Table 10) for state-by-state average incentive figures. 
20. In 2015, Indiana’s incentives were 2.68 percent of value-added for 
tradable industries/export-base industries, while Illinois’s were 1.35 
percent. The employment-to-population ratio (employment rate) for 
prime-age workers in 2015 was 0.789 in Indiana, 0.785 in Illinois. South 
Carolina’s average incentives were 2.39 percent, versus North Caroli-
na’s 0.93 percent. The prime-age employment rate was 0.767 in South 
Carolina, 0.758 in North Carolina. Incentives data comes from Bartik 
(2017a). Employment rates are calculated for 2015 from the American 
Community Survey. 
21. Enterprise zones target needy areas, but these programs are small rela-
tive to overall incentives (Peters and Fisher 2004). North Carolina has 
geographic tiers with different incentives, but this is unusual. 
22. The incentives model described in this chapter, with results in the next 
chapter, is described more fully in Bartik (2018a). 
23. I am indebted to Mark Robyn for helping to improve this figure. 
24. Even if all incentives went to locally owned businesses, such incentives 
would be difficult to rationalize without local job creation effects. If 
the incentives had no job creation effects, then the incentive transfers 
income from the average household to the average local business owner, 
which would tend to redistribute income upward. 
25. Steve Jobs at Apple personally asked Eric Schmidt at Google to stop 
poaching workers. https://www.theverge.com/2012/1/27/2753701/no
-poach-scandal-unredacted-steve-jobs-eric-schmidt-paul-otellini
(accessed July 30, 2019). 
26. These agglomeration economy effects are a central idea in urban and 
regional economics (Donahue, Parilla, and McDearman 2018; Duranton 
and Puga 2004; Kline and Moretti 2013, 2014 ). 
27. Sports stadium subsidies might make sense if major league teams have 
a significant amenity value to local residents, beyond what they are will-
ing to pay for tickets. If Twin Cities residents just like knowing that the 
Vikings or Twins are around, then perhaps subsidies for these teams can 
be justified. But this justification is for the amenity value, not the job 
creation benefits. See Noll and Zimbalist (1997). 
28. If all local businesses in a nontradable industry experience similar local 
cost increases, most economists would expect the incidence of these 
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cost increases to fall largely on local consumers, as they are the group 
least able to adjust away from these cost increases. 
What about the loss of local workers’ well-being due to higher local 
prices? Local job growth would be expected to increase local wages 
faster than local prices. There might be losses for local residents whose 
incomes are not tied to local prices, for example local residents living on 
Social Security or pension income. 
29. See Bartik (2018d) and Chapter 5 in this book. 
30. This could be because the would-have-been incented firm would still 
make the same decision. Alternatively, a similar number of jobs would 
have been created by some other firm at the site the incented firm would 
have occupied. 
31. This discussion assumes the incentives go to non–locally owned busi-
nesses. If the incentives go to businesses owned by state residents, then 
the incentives transfer income to these residents. This is a direct benefit 
to some state residents, and leads to respending by these business own-
ers on local goods and services. 
32. More up-front incentives means policymakers will have to decide what 
to do if the incented firm leaves or downsizes. As I discuss in Chapter 
4, one answer is to have clawbacks: provisions in incentive contracts 
that require some repayment of incentives if jobs are not maintained for 
some minimum time period. 
33. The argument made here is that business executives have a greater focus 
on the short term than makes sense for policymakers. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the evidence suggests that business executives in making 
investment decisions use an annual discount rate on future real cash 
flows of 12 percent (Poterba and Summers 1995). The optimal annual 
discount rate for society to use in evaluating different public policies 
has often been assumed to be close to 3 percent (see Bartik [2011] for 
a review). As a consequence, the social costs of incentives, relative to 
their “but for” effects, can be lowered by making incentives more up 
front. 
34. Specifically, using the model described in Bartik (2018a), the ratio of 
the “but for” percentage to the incentive costs increases by 38 percent. 
35. This statement is based mostly on quasi-experimental studies for manu-
facturing extension (Jarmin 1999) and customized job training (Holzer 
et al. 1993). This quasi-experimental evidence is consistent with survey 
evidence for manufacturing extension from Ehlen (2001), and for cus-
tomized job training from Hollenbeck (2008). It is also consistent with 
regression evidence on customized job training versus tax incentives 
by Hoyt, Jepsen, and Troske (2008). This evidence is reviewed at more 
length in Bartik (2018b). 
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36. See Bartik and Sotherland (2019). This study reviews research on multi-
pliers and provides new estimates. It is these new estimates that are used 
to describe plausible empirical magnitudes in this section. 
37. This is true of the many state studies using input-output models. The 
regional econometrics model of Regional Economics Model Incorpo-
rated (REMI) provides multipliers that do include negative feedback 
effects from costs. However, REMI then adds in estimates of effects 
of agglomeration economies that roughly offset the negative feed-
back effects from costs. This is questionable for most non-high-tech 
industries. 
38. This is based on results in Bartik and Sotherland (2019). 
39. The statements in this paragraph and the next paragraph about high-tech 
multipliers, and how they vary with the size of the existing high-tech 
cluster, are based on Bartik and Sotherland (2019). 
40. Using the “Tech 4” definition in Bartik and Sotherland (2019), I would 
suggest setting the minimum high-tech share somewhere in the 16–16.5 
percent of all employment range. The average for all communities 
(unweighted) is around 12 percent (Bartik and Sotherland, Table 20). 
The population-weighted average is around 14 percent. As this suggests, 
the more high-tech communities tend to be larger in population. The 60 
or so communities in which high tech is most clustered tend to be larger 
communities such as the Silicon Valley area, the Detroit area, the Dallas 
area, the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, and the Denver area. 
41. Some researchers have estimated much higher high-tech multipliers; for 
example, Moretti (2010). For reasons outlined in Bartik and Sotherland 
(2019), I think these much higher multipliers are overstated. 
42. Civic Economics (2007, 2013). 
43. An economically booming area is defined as an area at the 90th per-
centile across local labor markets in the prime-age employment rate, 
the ratio of employment to population for 25- to 54-year-olds. An eco-
nomically struggling or depressed area is defined as an area at the 10th 
percentile. 
44. The evidence for these long-run effects is reviewed in Bartik (2015, 
2019). 
45. Why are in-migrants different from the original state residents? The 
original residents have ties to the state that cause additional earnings 
opportunities in their home state to be significantly more valuable than 
opportunities elsewhere. In contrast, for in-migrants, opportunities in 
various destination states do not involve different special values for a 
home state. This argument is made at greater length in Bartik (1991). 
46. This job vacancy chain issue is most thoroughly explored in Persky, 
Felsenstein, and Carlson (2004). 
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47. How to achieve more inclusive economic development is an active area 
of research, including the work of the Metropolitan Policy Program at 
the Brookings Institution. See, for example, Liu (2016). 
48. One could also pursue incentives more vigorously when the state is in a 
recession, and less when a state is in a boom. But recessions and booms 
end. A policy designed to fit a state’s economic situation now may be a 
poor fit by the time it is implemented. Therefore, it seems wiser to target 
places with a more persistent lack of jobs. 
49. See Burtless (1985). 
50. This Minnesota program was called MEED, an acronym that originally 
stood for Minnesota Emergency Economic Development program, and 
later for Minnesota Employment and Economic Development Program. 
For more on MEED, see Bartik (2001). 
51. Metropolitan areas are federally designated county groups that are 
designed to incorporate the vast majority of local commuting flows, 
and thus to define areas within which almost all effects of a local 
labor demand shock will occur. However, recent evidence suggests 
that smaller areas may capture a high proportion of the demand shock 
effects. Manning and Petrongolo (2017) find that about half of a labor 
demand shock’s effects on unemployment flows occurs within a radius 
of about 10 miles, and about 90 percent within a radius of about 20 
miles. The former would be a little more than 300 square miles, the 
latter a little under 1,300 square miles. The average county in the U.S. 
is 2,584 square miles. This suggests that most counties encompass sig-
nificant proportions of the effects of labor demand shocks within the 
county, even if many demand shocks are not at the county centroid. 
52. Because of the spreading of economic development benefits beyond a 
neighborhood to the county and then the overall metropolitan area or 
other local labor market area, we really don’t want economic devel-
opment organizations to be competing at the very localized level, say, 
among a city versus its suburbs, or between two suburbs. Randall et al. 
(2018) is a recent attempt to discuss how local governments have tried 
to achieve broader geographic cooperation. 
53. See Bartik (2018a) for more such results. 
54. See Bartik (2017b). 
55. Legislative Fiscal Bureau (2017). 
56. A “but for” of 100 percent is assumed in the models that Wisconsin 
used to evaluate Foxconn (Baker Tilly 2017; EY Quantitative Econom-
ics and Statistics 2017), in the model that New York used to evaluate 
Amazon (Evangelakis 2018), and in the model that Virginia used to 
evaluate Amazon (Fuller and Chapman 2018). Some states are begin-
ning to move away from the 100 percent “but for;” for example, Rhode 
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Island (Goodman and Wakefield 2018; Rhode Island Office of Revenue 
Analysis 2017), Maryland (Maryland Department of Legislative Ser-
vices 2016), and Connecticut (Connecticut Department of Economic 
and Community Development 2014). However, such state analyses are 
exceptions. Most analyses of state economic development incentives 
implicitly or explicitly assume that all the incented activity was induced 
by the incentive. 
57. The two quotations in this paragraph are from Kazmierski (2015). 
58. Bartik (2018a). 
59. All other model assumptions are identical to those in Bartik (2018a). 
60. More precisely, the “but for” percentage is based on the research litera-
ture that the elasticity of state and local business activity with respect to 
state and local business taxes is −0.5, similar to the baseline assumption 
made in Bartik (2018a). This ends up yielding a “but for” percentage 
of 11.7 percent. This is similar to the 12.7 percent median “but for” 
percentage found in a review of 30 incentive studies by Bartik (2018b). 
This overall median is likely positively biased, as many of the 30 studies 
are positively biased. 
61. In addition, the starting unemployment rate is not assumed to converge, 
contrary to Bartik (2018a). Based on the research by Austin, Glaeser, 
and Summers (2018), I now think it is proper to interpret the local 
unemployment rate as being a proxy for whether the state economy is 
chronically depressed or chronically doing well. 
62. Based on the results in Bartik and Sotherland (2019), this appears to be a 
reasonable assumption for most jobs in most areas of a state’s economy. 
Note that this is the effective multiplier after negative cost feedbacks. 
The starting input-output multiplier to get this 1.75 effective multiplier 
is 2.64. This is slightly higher than the 2.50 baseline assumption in Bar-
tik (2018a). 
63. The baseline model in Bartik (2018a) found a benefit-cost ratio of 1.22. 
The differences between the 1.22 and 1.52 figures are due to 1) the lower 
unemployment rate in this book’s baseline; 2) the higher multiplier in 
this book’s baseline; 3) the household tax financing in this book’s base-
line, versus the mixed financing from various taxes and spending cuts in 
Bartik (2018a). 
64. The model uses a real discount rate of 3 percent annually, which is often 
used in benefit-cost analysis. 
65. For example, in Bartik (1991), the mean long-run business elasticity 
with respect to taxes (Table 2.3 on page 40) is −0.25, which would be 
consistent with a “but for” of 6 percent for typical incentives. In Bartik 
(2018b), the relatively few studies (7 studies) with no obvious bias have 
a mean “but for” percentage of 6.7 percent, and a median of 3.4 percent. 
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This lower elasticity is also found in Bartik and Hollenbeck (2012) and 
Devereux, Griffith, and Simpson (2007). 
66. As another example, the baseline model assumes that the project pro-
ceeds as planned, and that after 20 years there is some depreciation off-
set by further incentives. If one instead assumes depreciation of the proj-
ect from year one—for example, there is some probability of the project 
closing down each year after year one—then the project benefit-cost 
ratio dips below 1 if the annual depreciation rate exceeds 2.7 percent. 
This alternative assumption seems possible. 
67. As another example of sensitivity to model details, the baseline model 
assumes that the elasticity of spending needs with respect to population 
is 1.0. If this elasticity is 1.17 or higher—public service needs go up at 
least 17 percent faster than population—then the benefit-cost ratio dips 
below 1.0. 
68. In addition to earnings benefits, property value benefits, and fiscal ben-
efits, Table 4.1 shows costs of about 8 percent of incentive costs due 
to job growth increasing local costs for local businesses that sell to a 
national market and cannot pass on those costs. 
69. In addition, the business owner losses from higher costs are limited 
because, first, the model takes a state perspective and therefore looks 
only at income effects for state residents, so businesses owned out of 
state are not counted. Second, the model assumes that for businesses 
that sell to a local market, any higher costs are passed on in higher prod-
uct prices. As a result, the business owner loss is only for locally owned 
businesses selling to a national market, which is a distinct minority of 
overall business ownership. 
70. Specifically, the model estimates that 72 percent of the increased earn-
ings is due to increased employment rates, and the other 28 percent is 
due to increased real wages. The higher percentage for employment 
rate effects is largely because the evidence suggests that employment 
rate effects are persistent, whereas the evidence for persistent real wage 
effects is weaker. 
71. My data on baseline income shares come from the U.S. Congressional 
Budget Office (2016), and my use of CBO data is discussed in Bartik 
(2018a). 
72. The assumptions made to generate distributional effects of changes in 
different local income types are discussed in Bartik (2018a). 
73. See Bartik (1994), which shows that the income and earnings benefits 
from metropolitan job growth are focused on the bottom three income 
quintiles, but then drop off as one gets to the highest two income 
quintiles. 
74. This is explicitly shown in Bartik (1994). 
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75. See Ianchovichina and Lundstrom (2009). 
76. See Berube et al. (2019). 
77. For example, see the mission statement of the Funders’ Network, a 
group of dozens of leading U.S. foundations that aims at promoting 
“environmentally sustainable, socially equitable and economically 
prosperous regions and communities.” https://www.fundersnetwork
.org/about/mission-strategy/ (accessed July 30, 2019). 
78. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inclusive_growth (accessed July 30, 
2019). 
79. This assumes that wages per job are the same for the total jobs created 
as for the incented jobs. 
80. In theory, the 3 percent annual real discount rate adequately takes 
account of these trade-offs between benefits and costs this year versus 
benefits and costs two decades hence. However, political leaders may 
feel they need to attain more immediate benefits than are implied by the 
perspective of an optimal social planner. 
81. See Bartik (2018b) for a discussion of the rate of return to infrastruc-
ture programs such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Appala-
chian Regional Commission, as well as a review of other infrastructure 
programs. Based on Kline and Moretti (2013), the Tennessee Valley 
Authority created jobs at less than one-twentieth the cost per job of typi-
cal business incentives. Based on Paull (2008), brownfield redevelop-
ment can create jobs at less than one-tenth the cost of typical incen-
tive programs. Jaworski and Kitchens (2016) provide evidence that the 
Appalachian Regional Commission highways boosted annual per capita 
incomes by 15 percent of highway spending. 
82. Bartik (2009). 
83. Figure 4.2 calculates ratios of the present value of state earnings benefits 
to costs for these skills development policies. Only increases in earnings 
per capita for those staying in the same state are included. The sources 
for these calculations are given in Bartik (2018b,c). These numbers are 
further adjusted in two ways. First, I uniformly assume the percent-
age staying in the original state is 50 percent. The 50 percent figure 
is conservative. Based on Bartik (2009), this percentage staying is a 
minimum figure for college graduates staying in the state where they 
spent their early childhood. Second, the ratios are adjusted by assuming 
household tax financing and allowing for demand-side effects of both 
the tax financing and the spending increases. This increases the bene-
fit-cost ratio by 0.07 to account for balanced-budget multiplier effects. 
Balanced budget multiplier effects are calculated using the simulation 
model of Bartik (2018a). This adjustment is done so that the skills 
development benefit-cost ratios are consistent with the household tax 
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financing assumptions of the average incentive benefit-cost ratio. The 
skills development benefit-cost ratios are also conservative in that other 
benefits of these programs, such as fiscal benefits, are ignored. 
84. As discussed in Bartik (2018a, pp. 31–32), the research evidence sug-
gests that changes in educational quality have close to similar dollar
effects on future earnings for different income groups. This naturally 
gives rise to much larger percentage effects for children from lower-
income groups. Educational quality may have similar dollar effects 
because children from lower income backgrounds may be on average 
more dependent on school inputs for increasing skills. In addition, 
schools with a higher percentage of low-income children may on aver-
age have resources that fall shorter of needs. 
85. This analysis assumes that the government should use a lower social 
discount rate than the private discount rate used by incented firms. The 
model in Bartik (2018a) assumes that the appropriate social discount 
rate is 3 percent per year, which is consistent with the research literature. 
In contrast, the private discount rate used by firms in making investment 
decisions is assumed to be 12 percent per year (Poterba and Summers 
1995). 
86. The increase in the benefit-cost ratio, from 1.52 to 2.13, is slightly 
greater than the 38 percent increase in the cost-effectiveness of incen-
tives (2.13 / 1.52 = 1.40). This occurs because the model has some posi-
tive feedbacks. For example, greater employment effects will increase 
fiscal benefits, which will reduce the negative economic effects of pay-
ing for incentives. 
87. The benefit-cost ratio increases by more than 10-to-1 because of posi-
tive feedback effects in the model. 
88. Most of this increase in the benefit-cost ratio is due to the incentive 
augmenting the profits of local owners. This increase in profits of local 
owners would probably be skewed to upper-income groups. 
89. The simulations of the effects of local unemployment rates on benefit-
cost ratios use the model of Bartik (2018a), but with somewhat differ-
ent assumptions. First, here I assume chronic local unemployment or 
nonemployment, which I now think is more suited to the problems of 
depressed areas. Specifically, the simulation assumes the initial local 
unemployment rate is fixed over time, whereas the model in Bartik 
(2018a) assumes a convergence to the national average. Second, in the 
current version of the model, I use the results of Bartik and Sotherland 
(2019) to adjust the multiplier with local unemployment. 
90. Assumptions could be adopted that would increase the effect of local 
job training policies on the share of the local nonemployed who get 
available jobs. For example, the simulation reported in the text assumes 
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that local job training services simply increase the initial share of avail-
able jobs that go to the nonemployed by a factor of 1.5. After that initial 
increase, the depreciation rate per year of the initial employment rate 
effect occurs similarly to the baseline simulation. In particular, the labor 
force participation rate effect is assumed to depreciate based on aver-
age mortality rates and out-migration rates (Bartik 2018a). Suppose we 
instead assumed that better training services could prevent any depreci-
ation of the initial labor force participation effect. Then the benefit-cost 
ratio for incentives would increase to 3.38. But it is not clear that we 
know how to do this. 
91. One could argue that more effective local job training will also increase 
the local job multiplier. However, I know of no evidence for this. 
92. Pew Charitable Trusts (2017) provides examples of state evaluations 
of incentives, with discussion of how these incentives affected policy 
decisions. 
93. These statements on state practices are based on a January 2019 update 
by Pew to its mapping of state incentive procedures in its May 2017 
report (Pew Charitable Trusts 2017). 
94. This downward adjustment of multipliers will clearly be needed for 
input-output models, which do not allow for the negative effects of 
higher local costs on growth. The REMI model does allow for such cost 
feedback effects. However, the REMI model also adds to the multiplier 
by adding cluster effects. The research in Bartik and Sotherland (2019) 
estimates such cluster additions to multipliers only for high-tech indus-
tries in high-tech areas. A conservative approach would be to also adjust 
REMI multipliers downward by one-third for non-high-tech industries, 
or for high-tech industries in non-high-tech areas. 
95. In contrast, in the developing country context, there are many ran-
domized control trials of different development programs; for exam-
ple, evaluations of micro-loan programs (Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty 
Action Lab [J-PAL] 2018). We are clearly more willing to experiment 
with people and businesses in developing countries than in the United 
States. 
96. To my knowledge, there are only two randomized control trials (RCT) 
for U.S. economic development programs. The first is for an entrepre-
neurship training program for disadvantaged persons. The evaluations 
of these programs have reached mixed conclusions about effective-
ness (Benus et al. 1994; Benus et al. 2009; Fairlie, Karlan, and Zinman 
2015). This evaluation relies on our willingness to experiment in the 
United States with disadvantaged individuals, who are usually not the 
direct targets for economic development programs. 
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The second such RCT is for California’s film tax credit program, in 
the 2011 to 2013 period (Taylor 2016). During this period, California 
allocated only $100 million per year for this program. The program 
initially operated on a first-come first-served basis. However, by 2011, 
most applications were submitted on the first day applications were 
accepted. Given this situation, the state of California decided to award 
film tax credits via a lottery. This “accidental” RCT allowed the Cali-
fornia Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) to evaluate the program. 
The LAO concluded that the credit tipped 66 percent of the incented 
film projects. This is for a mostly up-front incentive that averages 11 
percent of the film’s production costs. The model parameters used in 
Bartik (2018a) predicts such an incentive would tip about 72 percent 
of incented projects. 
This second RCT is an accidental RCT, which arose because the 
program happened to be underfunded. The program has since been 
tripled in size. It is unclear whether this lottery evaluation will be pos-
sible in the future. 
97. Jarmin (1999). 
98. Holzer et al. (1993). 
99. This study is by Bartik and Hollenbeck (2012) and is further described 
in the text box. 
100. This TVA evaluation is in Kline and Moretti (2013). 
101. This is found in a recent evaluation of manufacturing extension by
Lipscomb et al. (2018). 
102. See, for example, Wong et al. (2008), Weiland and Yoshikawa (2013), 
and Bartik (2013). See Lipsey et al. (2015) for a discussion of method-
ological issues in applying RDD to preschool. 
103. For a recent paper showing this, see Chaplin et al. (2018). 
104. See Goldberger (1972) or Schochet (2009). 
105. However, none of these programs used a quantitative score cutoff to 
select eligible areas. Rather, they used some minimum distress stan-
dard to create eligible areas, and then federal or state officials used 
subjective judgment criteria to designate program recipients. Further-
more, for most of these programs, the eligible areas were often rela-
tively small—smaller than a county. Therefore, these programs are not 
really economic development programs that increase jobs in a local 
labor market. Rather, they are community development programs that 
improve amenities in a neighborhood. 
106. Ehlen (2001). This study is described more in depth in Bartik (2018b). 
The $20,000 is in 2018 dollars. 
107. Hollenbeck (2008). This study is discussed more in Bartik (2018b). 
The $17,000 is in 2018 dollars. 
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108. This assumes that the incentives are all up front and that they have 10 
times the effects on firm’s location or expansion decisions of a cash 
incentive. The dollar costs of the incentive are then divided by the 
induced jobs. Dollar costs are in 2018 dollars. 
109. See Bartik (2018b, pp. 90–91). The inference is that 43 percent of the 
claimed job growth in manufacturing extension actually occurred, 
based on estimated effects of claimed job growth on actual job growth. 
110. There is an older manual by Hatry et al. (1990) at the Urban Institute 
that outlines some useful guidance on how to survey assisted firms. 
111. See Bartik (1991, 1992). This is for studies that control for both 
public services and fixed area effects. These publications review an 
older research literature. This estimate is also consistent with a meta-
analysis of the research literature by Phillips and Goss (1995). More 
recent studies are consistent with these findings (Giroud and Rauh, 
forthcoming; Suarez Serrato and Zidar 2016). 
112. Poterba and Summers (1995). 
113. The firm’s value-added would ordinarily not be reported in state data 
on incented firms. However, the data will usually report such vari-
ables as the firm’s job creation or payroll creation. The firm’s jobs or 
payroll can be combined with state-specific ratios for that industry of 
value-added to jobs, or value-added to payroll, available from the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The value-added should be calculated 
over an infinite time horizon and discounted at 12 percent annually to 
the present. This will require some assumption about how value-added 
evolves over time. If the incented payments are actual payments, con-
tingent on actual jobs or investment, I would advise assuming that the 
last observed value-added continues. If the incented payments in the 
study are promised payments, conditional on job creation or invest-
ment, I would assume that the last promised level of business activity 
continues at the same rate forever. Given the 12 percent discount rate, 
assumptions about how value-added evolves after 20 years are not 
very important. 
114. Bartik (2018a, Appendix D) develops a more elaborate version of 
the model. The research literature is reporting tax elasticities. These 
reflect the long-run change in the logarithm of business activity with 
respect to the logarithm of costs. The “but for” percentage will then be
1 − (1 − s)10, where s is the cost reduction in proportional terms. As a 
result, there are some diminishing returns to scale. A 0.1 percent reduc-
tion in costs due to incentives will have a “but for” of 1 percent; a 1 
percent reduction in costs due to incentives will have a “but for” of 
9.6 percent; 2 percent cost reduction yields 18.3 percent; 10 percent 
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cost reduction yields 65.1 percent, etc. This formulation bounds the 
maximum effect at 100 percent. 
115. As mentioned before, if we apply this to the average total incentive 
package in the U.S., which averages 1.2 percent of the value of pro-
duction over an infinite time horizon, we get the result that the “but 
for” is about 12 percentage points. This passes a sniff test. It seems 
likely that a 1.2 percent change in a business’s production costs would 
have some effect but would not in most cases be the decisive factor. 
On the other hand, when this approach is applied to cases such as Fox-
conn, it yields much larger effects. The Foxconn incentives were over 
30 percent of the firm’s wage bill over 20 years. My estimates suggest 
that these massive incentives yielded a “but for” of over 70 percent-
age points—that is, without the incentives, the chances of Wisconsin 
securing Foxconn would have been less than 30 percent. 
116. Businesses might respond more to incentives than to taxes if state eco-
nomic development staff can be mind readers and target incentives on 
firms that are more likely to have a good alternative location outside 
the state. Businesses might respond less to incentives than to taxes if 
incentives are seen as a more temporary feature of a state’s business 
climate than is the state’s business tax system. 
117. The ideal state program outlined here is consistent with some other 
proposals, such as Liu (2016). 
118. These discretionary hiring subsidies, with accompanying screening 
and training services, are modeled after the Minnesota Employment 
and Economic Development (MEED) program of the 1980s. MEED is 
further discussed in Chapter 3 and in Bartik (2001). 
119. Caps are a recurrent idea in reforming incentives. As discussed later, 
the European Union caps incentives (LeRoy and Thomas 2019; Sin-
naeve 2007). LeRoy, Mattera, and Tarczynska (2019) suggest possible 
caps of between $5,000 and $35,000 per job. 
120. In the average state, an incentive package with these characteristics 
could combine a 3.6 percent investment tax credit with a job creation 
tax credit of $9,852 per job. At the national average capital intensity 
for firms in tradable industries, the investment tax credit would be 
equivalent to $7,837 per job, so the investment tax credit and job cre-
ation tax credit would together add to $17,689, which is the sum of 
three years of property taxes and state corporate income taxes per job 
for the average tradable industry firm in the average state, based on the 
database in Bartik (2017a). These shares of the investment tax credit 
vs. the job creation tax credit correspond to the typical capital vs. labor 
shares of tradable industries, so this incentive package would provide 
roughly equal subsidies for capital and labor. 
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121. My proposed “ideal” incentive program does not cap incentive costs 
per firm, as proposed in LeRoy, Mattera, and Tarczynska (2019). If a 
firm creates a lot of jobs, it is unclear why we would want to provide 
lesser incentives per job because of a cap. I don’t think that large firms 
should be favored over smaller firms in having higher incentives per 
job, but I also don’t think they should be disfavored. 
122. For example, one could have clawbacks for up to 10 years following 
the credited job creation. If the firm’s average jobs fell x percent below 
the initial increment during the 10-year period, x percent of the initial 
package could be required to be repaid. 
123. I have sometimes argued for a tax incentive budget (Bartik 2005), 
and a budget cap is mentioned as a possible reform in Pew Charitable 
Trusts (2015) and in LeRoy, Mattera, and Tarczynska (2019). 
124. More precisely, if the Foxconn incentive was actually just $18,000 per 
job, the promised tax incentive would be $234 million. 
125. This is for a planned facility that may eventually have 37,850 jobs, 
according to the various agreements between Amazon and Virginia. 
The originally announced New York facility would have up to 40,000 
jobs. At 37,850 jobs, an $18,000 per job incentive would total $681 
million. 
126. As pointed out by Liu (2019), Virginia’s offer to Amazon seems prefer-
able to offers from New York or other states. 
127. See https://www.nccommerce.com/grants-incentives/county-distress
-rankings-tiers (accessed August 26, 2019). The tier system has been 
subject to criticism, as it may not measure distress adequately. See 
https://www.ncleg.net/PED/Reports/documents/EDTiers/ED_Tiers_ 
Report.pdf (accessed August 26, 2019). 
128. The zero-sum game argument is extensively discussed in Bartik (1991, 
2011). 
129. This argument overlooks that higher overall national incentives, by 
raising profits from new job creation, might boost national job creation. 
But we would expect these national job growth effects to be slight. It 
is easier for incentives to affect business location decisions than to 
affect overall national growth. Research suggests that the national job 
growth effects of a given incentive level, as a percentage of business 
costs, might be 14 percent of the local job growth effects (Bartik 2011, 
p. 285). This would make incentives extraordinarily costly as a way to 
create national jobs. 
130. The subsequent sections of this chapter examine market failure argu-
ments for assisting individual businesses. This topic is also explored in 
Bartik (1990, 2019) and Kline and Moretti (2014). 
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131. If incentives are financed by households through higher household 
taxes or lower services, the incentives also transfer some resources 
from the average household to stockholders. However, if the benefits 
of the incentives are some multiple of the costs, then the progressive 
distribution of benefits should more than offset these regressive effects. 
The regressive effect of incentive financing can be eliminated if incen-
tives are financed, as argued for in earlier chapters, by higher business 
taxes. 
132. See Frickey (1996); Hellerstein (1996); Kramer (1996). 
133. Such extra taxes have been proposed by many authors, starting with 
Burstein and Rolnick (1995). Congressman David Minge proposed 
100 percent federal taxes on incentives in a 2000 bill (LeRoy, Mattera, 
and Tarczynska 2019). 
134. Sinnaeve (2007) describes the EU system, and LeRoy and Thomas 
(2019) update this description. EU incentives are also discussed by 
Thomas (2000, 2011). 
135. See European Commission (2013). 
136. When federal court rulings threatened incentives in the 2004 Cuno 
case in Ohio, federal legislation was introduced to overturn the rulings. 
https://www.cbpp.org/archiveSite/2-18-05sfp.pdf (accessed August 
26, 2019). See LeRoy, Mattera, and Tarczynska (2019). Ultimately, 
the Supreme Court in 2006 voided the lower federal court decision 
that limited incentives by denying that state taxpayers had standing to 
challenge incentives in federal court. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/
federal/us/547/332/ (accessed August 26, 2019). 
137. See, for example, Azar, Marinescu, and Steinbaum (2017); Benmelech,
Bergman, and Kim (2018); De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017); Gutiérrez
and Philippon (2017). 
138. From the Longitudinal Business Database, U.S. Census Bureau (2018). 
The actual number of such firms in 2016 was 1,491. 
139. This is an informed guess, given that these largest firms, with more 
than 10,000 employees, comprised 28 percent of business employ-
ment, and given that the evidence strongly suggests that the larger the 
firm, the greater the likelihood of receiving incentives. 
140. For example, in LeRoy, Mattera, and Tarczynska (2019). 
141. To help distressed regions, proposals have been made for infrastructure 
(Center for American Progress 2018; Smith 2018); public or nonprofit 
jobs programs (Center for American Progress 2018; Neumark 2018); 
subsidized job creation and hiring (Glaeser, Summers, and Austin 2018; 
Neumark 2018); manufacturing extension (Baron, Kantor, and Whalley
2018; Bartik 2010); high-tech cluster development (Hendrickson,
Muro, and Galston 2018); customized job training (Austin, Glaeser, 
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and Summers 2018; Bartik 2010); small business assistance (Chatterji 
2018). 
142. Hsieh and Moretti (2019). 
143. For example, Bartik (2019) calculates that to bring the bottom quintile 
of commuting zones to the median CZ employment rate, we would 
have to relocate about 6 million jobs, and that a plausible cost per job 
of such a job location change would be $60,000 per job. The total cost 
is $360 billion. If accomplished over a 20-year period, the annual cost 
is $18 billion per year. 
144. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was the most intense federal 
regional economic development program. Its peak annual costs in 
today’s dollars was about $1.5 billion per year. The TVA region has 
a population of about 9 million. If we assumed that a new regional 
program had a target population of 10 times as great as TVA, the cost 
of a program of similar intensity to TVA but for broader eligible areas 
would be $15 billion per year. 
145. Transparency has long been advocated by Greg LeRoy of Good Jobs 
First (LeRoy 2007). 
146. Good Jobs First has played a leading role in advocating for this GASB 
rule and monitoring its progress. See https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/ 
gasb-statement-no-77 (accessed August 26, 2019). 
147. See Bartik and Hollenbeck (2012). 
148. See Pew Charitable Trusts (2017, p. 21), http://www.citizentaxpref.wa
.gov/documents/meetingmaterials/10-09-12.pdf and http://leg.wa.gov/ 
jlarc/AuditAndStudyReports/Documents/13-1.pdf (accessed August 
26, 2019). 
149. See Bartik (2018b) and the references therein for much more informa-
tion on Grand Rapids. 
150. Atkins et al. (2011, p. 17). 
151. See http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-amazon-multistate
-effort-ban-tax-breaks.html (accessed August 26, 2019). 
152. See LeRoy, Mattera, and Tarczynska (2019) for more on past efforts. 
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Michigan State University; 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University 
Employment, local, and in-migrant 
workers, 5, 25, 29–30, 62, 
125n45 
Employment rates 
commuting zone, and job relocation, 
113, 137n143 
earnings and, 43, 46, 128n70 
as employment-to-population ratio, 
14, 75b–76b, 96, 123n20 
job creation and, 6, 20, 29–32, 
125nn44–46, 126nn47–50 
Empowerment Zone program, for 
distressed geographic areas, 77, 
132n105 
Enterprise zones, in local jobless 
markets, 14, 123n21 
See also Opportunity Zones 
Entrepreneurship training, 10, 131n96 
Environmental concerns, job growth and 
potential for, 17 
European Union 
caps (limits) on cost per job created, 
92, 134n119 
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block grants as, 112–113, 114b 
funding mix with, for economic 
development services, 9f, 10 
infrastructure investments by, 48–49, 
129n81 
(see also specifics, e.g.,
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[TVA]) 
job help costs to, in distressed areas, 
113, 137nn143–144 
local market benefits of, vs.
neighborhoods, 2, 121n4 
potential role of, in state and local 
incentives (see Business 
incentives, national interests in) 
Financing incentives 
better, policies with fewer in-state 
burdens, 57–58 
with business taxes, 55t, 58, 90–91 
demand- vs. supply-side, 34–35 
household taxes for, 40, 103, 127n63, 
129–130n83, 136n131 
opportunity costs of, incentives, 
51–53, 117, 130n84 
with public spending cuts, 51–53, 
55t, 90, 120 
voter awareness of, 115–116 
welfare and social programs cuts for, 
44, 128n74 
Foxconn (firm) 
business incentives offered to, 1, 9, 
12, 13, 27, 97, 122n9, 135n124 
evaluation of, deal with “but for” 
percentage, 36–37, 126–127n56, 
134n115 
evaluation of incentives deal with, 
36, 126n55 
U.S. location potential for, 102, 
135n128 
Free services, attracting businesses 
with, 1 
Funders’ Network, “inclusive growth” as 
buzzword to, 45, 129n77 
GASB. See Government Accounting 
Standards Board 
GDP. See Gross Domestic Product 
Geographic areas 
counties and metropolitan areas 
as, 32–33, 44, 91, 95–96, 126n51,
128n73 
economic development plans selected
for, 67, 73, 77, 108–109, 113, 
132n105 
(see also Distressed areas) 
Google (firm), poaching workers by, 
20, 123n25 
Government Accounting Standards 
Board (GASB), mandate for 
incentive dollar cost disclosure 
by, 116, 137n146 
Government subsidies to firms. See
Subsidies 
Grand Rapids, Michigan, economic 
development strategies for, 118–
119, 137n149 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), damage 
to U.S., 112 
High-tech industries 
communities with, and above average
population, 28, 90, 125nn39–41 
firms in tradable, targeted for 
business incentives, 89–90, 106 
multiplier effect of, 5, 20, 28, 55t, 91, 
123nn25–26, 125nn39–41, 
131n94 
R&D tax credits for, 9, 68b, 117 
strengthening cluster development of,
112, 113, 136–137n141, 137n142 
Hiring subsidies 
as employer incentive, 31–32, 56–57, 
126nn49–50, 130n89 
in ideal incentive program, 92, 
134n118 
Household taxes 
assumption of financing incentives 
with, 40, 103, 136n131 
benefit-cost ratio and, incentive 
financing, 127n63, 129–130n83 
Housing supply, shortage of, 112 
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Illinois, 113 
employment rate and incentives in, 
vs. Indiana, 14, 123n20 
evaluation of manufacturing 
extension services in, 79, 
132n106 
Income 
incentive benefits distributed across, 
groups, 43–45, 43f, 106–107, 
120, 128nn70–74, 129nn75–78, 
136n131 
per capita, affected by state 
incentives, 8–9, 17, 21–22, 25, 
42, 42t, 50, 50f, 94, 117 
solving regressive, distribution with 
national interests, 108–109, 
135n129, 136nn132–135 
Income taxes, corporate business 
liabilities for, 8–9 
Indiana, employment rate and incentives 
in, vs. Illinois, 14, 123n20 
Infrastructure 
adequate, as basic service supporting 
economic development, 91, 
93–94 
development programs for, as 
alternative to present tax 
incentives, 118, 119 
federal investment in, 48–49, 129n81 
funding for, in distressed areas, 112, 
136–137n141 
spending for, 22, 25, 33–34, 35, 36 
Investment, 35, 120 
effect of, by large corporations, 110, 
136n137 
federal, in infrastructure, 48–49, 
129n81 
future discounted in business, 
decisions, 82–83 
social discount rates and, decisions, 
54, 130n85 
tax credits for, as state business 
incentives, 9, 9f 
Job creation, 17, 44 
cost per job created, 79, 85–86, 90, 
92, 120, 132nn106–107, 
133n108, 134nn119–120 
credits for, as largest business 
incentive, 8–9, 9f, 84b 
effect of, on state economies, 61–63, 
117 
employment rates and, 6, 29–32, 
125nn44–46, 126nn47–50 
infrastructure programs for, 48–49, 
129n81 
local, required of state incentives, 
18–21, 19f 
new jobs for state residents vs. in-
migrants and policy, 30–32, 62, 
126nn47–50 
selection bias challenge and, in 
business incentives evaluation, 
63–64 
share of new jobs in-state with better 
incentive policies, 56–57, 89, 
130–131nn90–91, 130n89 
targeted incentives for, and economic
rationale, 4–5 
Job growth, 17 
claimed vs. actual, 79, 107–108, 
133n109 
effects of incentives associated with 
(see Business incentives 
evaluation) 
hypothetical, program and RDD 
effects, 75b–76b, 76f 
inclusivity of, 45, 129nn74–78 
local brownfield redevelopment and, 
48, 129n81 
promotion of, 2–3, 7, 20–21, 36, 113,
120, 121n2, 135n129 
Job opportunities, full-employment 
economy and, 119 
Job skills, added, as incentives benefit, 20 
Job training 
benefit-cost ratios of, 55t, 57, 130–
131n90, 131n91 
cuts in, and future wages, 25–26 
free, as business incentive, 1, 9–10 
nonemployed workers and, 105–106, 
113 
See also Customized job training 
Jobs, 1, 3 
federal costs for, in needy areas, 113, 
137nn143–144 
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numbers of, and incentives, 26, 115, 
117, 124n30 
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areas, 112, 136–137n141 
Labor markets 
excess supply in, and economically 
depressed areas, 30–31, 126n48 
local, and in-migrant workers, 5, 25, 
62 
local vs. neighborhood, 2, 121nn2–4 
policy for, to include business 
incentives, 42, 45, 117, 120 
Land, attracting businesses with, 1, 7, 
118, 122n8 
See also entries beginning, Property 
Loans, attracting businesses with, 1, 
131n95 
Local businesses 
competition among, 5, 12 
customized services for, 90, 119 
federal programs and, vs.
neighborhoods, 2, 121n4 
incentives receipt by, 18, 55t,
123n24, 124n31 
multipliers average higher for, 28–29, 
125n42 
small, assistance in distressed areas, 
112, 115, 136–137n141 
Local economies 
economic development strategies for, 
118–119 
infrastructure for, 33–34, 35, 48, 119 
job numbers in, 42, 45 
size of, 32–33, 126n51 
Local governments, 3 
advisory services of, 4, 27 
brownfield redevelopment by, 48, 
129n81 
competition of, with state incentives, 
101–104, 135nn128–130 
economic policies of, distinguished 
from business incentives, 2, 
121nn2–4 
incentive deals disclosed by, 115–
116, 137nn145–146 
officials in, affected by incentive 
politics, 3, 97, 115, 118, 119 
property tax abatement by, 9, 9f, 11 
sports teams subsidies by, 24, 123n17 
targeting and, 1, 12–13, 14, 91 
tax revenue vs. incentives cost and, 
12, 95, 122n14 
Manufacturing industries 
evaluation of extension services 
for, 66, 69, 79, 132n97, 132n101, 
132nn106–107 
extension of, in distressed areas, 112, 
115, 136–137n141 
MBDP grants for job creation, 83, 85b,
88 
Mississippi as leading state for, 
incentives, 7, 9, 122n8 
prioritized funding for extension 
services to, 91–92, 118–119 
Maryland, move away from incentives 
evaluation with “but for” 
percentage by, 36–37, 126–
127n56 
Massachusetts, evaluation of customized 
job training in, 79, 80b, 88, 
132n107 
MBDP. See Michigan Business 
Development Program 
Media attention 
business incentives and, 13, 90, 97 
Wikipedia as, 45, 129n78 
MEED. See Minnesota Employment and 
Economic Development program 
Metropolitan areas 
job growth in, and income quintiles, 
44, 128n73 
too big to be “local economy,” 
32–33, 126n51 
Metropolitan Policy Program, 
achieving more inclusive 
economic development with, 30, 
126n47 
Michigan, 7 
assistance to distressed counties in, 
and hypothetical program effects 
using RDD, 75b–76b, 76f, 113 
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investments by, in manufacturing 
areas, 118–119 
job creation grant program (MBDP) 
in, 83, 85b, 88 
Michigan State University, medical 
school of, and local business, 119 
Minge, Rep. David, extra business taxes 
on incentives proposal by, 109, 
136n133 
Minneapolis-St. Paul area, high-tech 
industries in, 28, 125n40 
Minnesota 
economic development plans 
(MEED) in, 32, 126n50, 134n118 
high-tech area in, 28, 125n40 
Mississippi, as leading state with 
business incentives, 7, 9, 122n8 
Multiplier effects, 6, 125n37 
assumption of, in basic incentives 
model, 40, 127n62 
benefit-cost ratio and, 56, 127n63, 
130n88 
high-tech clusters and, 89–90 
job creation and, 4–5, 20, 46, 58, 62, 
121n6, 131n94 
overstatement of, 5, 27–28, 117, 
125n36 
spillovers and, (benefits) in 
evaluation, 18–22, 19f, 27–29, 
123nn23–26, 125nn36–43 
Neighborhoods 
community development of, 2, 
121nn2–4 
not large enough per se to be “local 
economy,” 32–33, 126n52 
New Mexico, business incentives in, vs.
national average, 13 
New York (state) 
Amazon business location decision 
with, 97–98, 116, 135n125 
evaluation of Amazon deal with 
“but for” percentage by, 36–37, 
126–127n56 
incentives offered in, 7, 8f 
Nontradable goods or services 
local firms in, 12, 24, 35 
multipliers and, vs. tradable, 4–5, 24, 
123–124n28 
North Carolina 
employment rate and incentives in, 
vs. South Carolina, 14, 123n20 
geographic areas tiered for incentives 
eligibility in, 70, 98, 135n127 
Opportunity costs 
financing, with school spending cuts, 
51–53 
incentives with, 34–35, 117 
Opportunity Zone program 
for distressed geographic areas, 77, 
132n105 
local market benefits of, vs.
neighborhoods, 2, 121n4 
See also Enterprise zones 
Pew Charitable Trusts 
state evaluation examples provided 
by, 61, 131nn92–93 
tax credit demise recommendation 
by, 117, 137n148 
tax incentive budget caps and, 95, 
135n123 
Politics and business incentives, 3, 121n5 
ideal relationship of, 89, 97–98 
interstate competition in, 3, 5, 7 
likelihood of federal impositions on 
states, 109–11, 136nn136–140 
offsetting influences in, 7, 115, 119 
paying for long-term costs, 14–15 
surveys in evaluations and, 77–78 
voter awareness of, 13, 90, 97, 115–
116, 118, 137nn145–146 
Population growth 
areas with, 28, 90, 125n40 
public services needs and, 43, 62, 
128n67 
Private employers, 3 
favored for business incentives, 13, 
123n18 
job growth promotion by, 2–3, 
121n2, 135n129 
Productivity, U.S., 112, 113 
Property taxes, abatement of hypothetical
value-added per worker and, 86b,
134n115 
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clawbacks in, 26–27, 54–55, 93, 
96–97, 124n32, 135n122 
effect of state incentives evaluation 
on, 131n92 
effects of, on business incentives, 
25–35, 55t, 59 
federal, as carrots vs. sticks, 110–111, 
113–114 
ideal, about incentives, 6, 39, 88 
(see also Business incentives, 
ideal state program) 
long-term vs. up-front business 
incentives and, 14–15, 47, 54–55, 
55t, 90, 129n80 
new jobs for state residents vs. in-
migrants, 30–32, 62, 126nn47–50 
Public services 
cost of wasteful incentives to, 5–6, 
117 
education programs as, 49–51, 50f,
130n84 
needs for, and population, 43, 62, 
128n67 
spending for, 5–6, 22, 25–26, 34, 35, 
36, 62, 90 
targeted business incentives and, 1, 
12, 122n16 
tax revenue vs. incentives cost and, 
12, 122n14, 122n16 
Quality of life, incentives affect on, 17, 
25 
Randomized controlled trials (RCT) 
accidental, via lottery, 132n96 
research implementation to minimize 
bias, 65, 86, 87b, 131–132n96, 
131n95 
RCT. See Randomized controlled trials 
R&D. See Research and Development 
within firms 
RDD. See Regression-discontinuity 
design 
Regional Economics Model Incorporated 
(REMI), cluster and cost feedback 
effects in, 125n37, 131n94 
Regression-discontinuity design (RDD) 
application of, to incentive evaluation
and preschools, 71, 132nn102–
103 
estimating a program’s effect at 
cutoff, 71, 76f, 113, 114b 
as type of quasi-experiment, 70–71, 
73–77, 75b–76b, 77b, 86, 87b,
132nn104–105 
REMI. See Regional Economics Model 
Incorporated 
Research and Development (R&D) 
within firms 
investment in, and market power of 
large corporations, 110, 136n137 
spending in chemicals and computer 
manufacturing industries for, 13, 
122–123n17 
tax credits for, as state business 
incentives, 9, 9f, 67, 68b, 132n99 
tax credits for, spending as state 
business incentives, 9, 9f, 117 
Research implementation, 64–77 
designed quasi-experiments, 70–77, 
75b–76b, 77b, 132nn102–105 
natural experiments, 65–69, 68b,
69b, 86, 87b, 132nn95–101 
quasi-experiments, 65–77 
RCT to minimize bias, 65, 131–
132n96, 131n95 
sample size in, 67, 73–74 
selection bias and other problems in, 
63–64, 74, 83 
Rhode Island, move away from 
incentives evaluation with “but 
for” percentage by, 36–37, 126–
127n56 
Silicon Valley, 5 
above average population in, 28, 
125n40 
growth restrictions due to housing 
supply shortage in, 112, 137n142 
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Skills development programs 
as alternative to present tax 
incentives, 118, 119, 120 
as basic service supporting economic
development, 91, 93–94, 112 
better policies than average business 
incentives lie in, 49–51, 50f,
129–130n83, 129n82 
high-quality, vs. average incentives, 
53–54 
See also Education programs; Job 
training 
Social benefits, 3 
business incentives and, to needy 
areas, 13–14, 29, 70–71, 125n43 
costs of, 5–6, 26, 124n33 
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incentives, 4–5, 121n2 
Social programs 
benefits distribution of expanded 
economy to, 106, 136n131 
financing incentives with cuts to, 44, 
128n74 
see also Welfare programs 
South Carolina, employment rate and 
incentives in, vs. North Carolina, 
14, 123n20 
Sports teams, government subsidies for, 
24, 74, 77, 123n17 
State economies, 59 
effect of incented firms’ job growth 
on, 61–63 
effects of paying for incentive costs 
on, 34–35, 117, 126nn53–55 
State governments, 112 
advisory services of, 4, 10, 27, 
55–56, 72 
budgeting by, 90, 94t, 95, 135n123 
customized services of, 27, 79, 88, 
90, 94t, 95 
economic policies of, distinguished 
from business incentives, 2, 
121n2 
federal takeover of, 108–111, 
136nn132–140 
incentive deals disclosed by, 115–
116, 137nn145–146 
incentives designed by, 6, 9, 15, 
63–64, 83, 89, 90, 134n116 
(see also Business incentives, 
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Washington (state); and specific 
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officials in, affected by incentive 
politics, 3, 14, 90, 96–97, 113, 
115, 118, 119 
targeted business incentives by, 1, 
9–10, 12–13, 96 
tax revenue vs. incentives cost and, 3, 
12, 17, 122n14 
State legislative oversight, 36–37, 
126–127n56 
interstate compacts as, 119, 
137nn151–152 
Washington State Legislative Audit 
and Review Commission, 117 
Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, 
36, 126n55 
Subsidies, 103 
discretionary hiring and, 31–32, 
56–57, 92, 126nn49–50, 130n89, 
134n118 
equal, for capital and labor as ideal 
incentive, 92–93, 134n120 
private, for jobs in distressed areas, 
112, 136–137n141 
for sports teams, 24, 74, 77, 123n17 
to state businesses and interstate 
commerce, 109, 136n132 
as wages to firms, 11, 12, 27, 122n12,
122nn15–16 
Supply-side financing, effects on state 
economy of, 34–35 
Surveys 
in business incentives evaluation, 
77–81, 87, 87b 
factors enhancing credibility of, 
80–81, 81b, 132nn106–107, 
133n110 
reported cost per job created, 79, 
132nn106–107, 133n108 
Tax breaks 
attracting businesses with, 1, 39–40 
cutback of, 7, 115, 119, 120, 137n151 
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112–113, 114b, 121n2 
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Tax credits 
as entitlements, 94t, 113 
evaluation of, for California films by 
RCT, 132n96 
hypothetical value-added per worker 
and, 86b, 134n115 
investment and R&D, as state 
business incentives, 9, 9f, 67, 
68b, 92, 117, 132n99 
job creation, for tradable industries, 
92–93, 134n120 
Tax revenue, 62 
fiscal gain of incentives and, 5–6, 
21–22, 33–34, 66 
incentives cost and, 12, 25, 122n14 
increases in, 3, 34 
Taxes. See specifics, e.g., Business taxes; 
Household taxes; Income taxes; 
Property taxes 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 
evaluation of, as economic develop-
ment program, 67, 131n100 
federal costs for, 113, 137n144 
as federal infrastructure investment, 
48, 129n81 
Texas, high-tech area in, 28, 125n40 
Tradable goods or services 
firms with, targeted for business 
incentives, 8f, 12–13, 35, 89–90, 
102–103, 122–123n17 
industries with, and job creation tax 
credits, 92–93, 134n120 
nontradable vs., and multipliers, 4–5, 
24, 123–124n28 
Transportation programs, as federal 
infrastructure investment in local 
development, 48, 94 
Trump administration, help for distressed
regions under, 77, 111–114, 
132n105 
TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority), 48, 
67, 129n81, 131n100 
Twin Cities area. See Minneapolis-St. 
Paul area 
Unemployment, worker history of, 
and hiring potential, 31–32, 
91–92, 126nn49–50, 134n118 
Unemployment rate 
assumption of, in basic incentives 
model, 40, 127n61 
benefit-cost ratio and, 56–57, 
127n63, 130n89 
low, and business incentives, 95, 119 
United States (U.S.) 
business incentives (see under
Business incentives, national 
interests in; Federal programs) 
federal regulations in, 101–102, 109, 
110, 136n132 
government accounting mandates in, 
116, 137n146 
interstate compacts in, 119, 137n151 
productivity of, 112, 113 
U.S. Congress, business tax proposals in, 
109, 136n133 
U.S. Supreme Court, business incentive 
challenges in, 109, 136n136 
Virginia 
Amazon business location decision 
with, 97–98, 116, 135nn125–126 
evaluation of Amazon deal with 
“but for” percentage by, 36–37, 
126–127n56 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University, Amazon location deal 
and, 98, 135n126 
Wages 
boost in, and job growth, 20–21, 120 
incentive for, vs. profit gaps, 11–12 
job training and, 25–26, 80b 
real, as share of increased earnings, 
43, 46, 128n70 
reduced upward, 5, 7, 25, 110 
state subsidies to firms for, 11, 12, 
27, 122n12, 122nn15–16 
Washington (state), 13 
R&D tax credit evaluation for high-
tech industries in, 68b, 117, 
137n147 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
162 Bartik 
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benefits distribution of expanded 
economy to, 106, 136n131 
financing incentives with cuts to, 44, 
128n74 
West Michigan Medical Device 
Consortium, local business 
development behind, 119, 
137n150 
Wisconsin, 7 
business incentives provided by, 1, 
12, 13, 27.97 
evaluation of Foxconn deal with 
“but for” percentage by, 36–37, 
126–127n56, 126n55, 134n115 
Workforce Training Fund Program, 
evaluation in and by 
Massachusetts of, 79, 80b, 88, 
132n107 
World Bank, “inclusive growth” as 
buzzword to, 45, 129n75 
“Your State’s Name Here” (Berryman 
and Berryman), 11–12, 122n13 
Zero-sum game 
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of national interest, 102–104, 
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 About the Institute 
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit 
research organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to employ-
ment-related problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity 
of the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was estab-
lished in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of 
The Upjohn Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment 
income during economic downturns. 
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unem-
ployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of 
publications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements:
1) a research program conducted by a resident staff of professional social sci-
entists; 2) the Early Career Research Award program, which provides funding 
for emerging scholars to complete policy-relevant research on labor-market 
issues; 3) a publications program and online research repository, which pro-
vide a vehicles for disseminating the research of staff and outside scholars; 
4) a regional team that conducts analyses for local economic and workforce 
development; and 5) the Employment Management Services Division, which 
administers publicly funded employment and training services as Michigan 
Works! Southwest in the Institute’s local four-county area. 
The broad objectives of the Institute’s activities are to 1) promote schol-
arship and evidence-based practices on issues of employment and unemploy-
ment policy, and 2) make knowledge and scholarship relevant and useful to 
policymakers in their pursuit of solutions related to employment and unem-
ployment. 
Current areas of concentration for these programs include the causes, 
consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance 
and income maintenance programs; compensation and benefits; workforce 
skills; nonstandard work arrangements; and place-based policy initiatives for 
strengthening regional economic development and local labor markets. 
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“With this book, Tim Bartik has solidifed his rank as the leading, trusted expert 
on economic development incentives and economic development broadly. The 
role of frm-based incentives has triggered passionate debate, and Bartik 
responds with rigor, reason, and realism. I hope readers heed the call for needed 
reforms recommended in this timely book.” 
Amy Liu, Vice President and Director,  
Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program 
“Economic development incentives are one of the biggest boondoggles of our
time, draining away tens of billions of dollars of precious taxpayer dollars, with 
some states and cities ofering as much as $7 billion to lure Amazon’s much-
ballyhooed HQ2. No one understands the intricacies of economic development 
incentives—what works and what does not—and the broader feld of economic 
development policy and strategy better than Tim Bartik. This book is an absolute 
must read for mayors, governors, economic developers, city-builders, CEOs and 
business executives, community activists, and all those concerned about the 
future of our cities and communities.” 
Richard Florida, author of Rise of the Creative Class, 
and University Professor at the University of Toronto 
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